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Abstract 
 
 Scholars and policymakers have long argued that state-level officials operating 
free from the influence of the central government act as the major drivers of innovative, 
or novel, policy in a federal system. However, this belief runs counter to the possibility 
that electoral considerations and resource limitations could cause state-level officials to 
emulate (or copy) policy rather than innovating. In this dissertation, I evaluate the 
decision by state-level officials to innovate or emulate, and I conduct my analysis in three 
parts using data on renewable portfolio standard (RPS) policy. First, I evaluate the 
innovation and emulation activity of state legislatures making policy adoption decisions. 
Then I compare the innovation and emulation decisions of elected versus appointed state 
public utilities commissioners. And third, I analyze the innovation and emulation 
behavior of cosponsoring state legislators. I find evidence suggesting that the states are 
better described as drivers of emulation rather than innovation: both electoral 
vulnerability and legislative professionalism increase the likelihood of emulation rather 
than innovation. At the same time, giving policy authority to appointees will not increase 
innovation, as appointees are less likely to innovate compared to elected peers. Results 
suggest that the federal government may play an important role in advancing state policy 
innovation. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A Federation of Innovators and Emulators: The Case of the American 
States 
 
1.1 Introduction: Devolution as an Enabler of Policy Innovation 
Many observers of federalism believe that the capacity for devolution1 within 
federalism promotes policy innovation, or the creation of diverse, novel, or untested 
policy, by splitting policymaking authority across multiple jurisdictions. The division of 
power across “distinct governments,” to use Madison’s words, disperses rather than 
concentrates policymaking authority and lets representatives of the distinct governments 
craft policies demanded by their respective constituencies (Madison 1788). 
The notion that devolution facilitates policy innovation has widely been upheld as 
a central virtue of federalism. Justice Brandeis, in an oft-mentioned opinion, remarked 
that “a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country” (New State 
Ice Company v Liebmann 1932). Proponents of New Federalism, an attempt in the 1980s 
and 1990s to take policymaking authority from the federal government and give it to the 
states, couched their defense of New Federalism in Brandeis’s language and argued for
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Devolution” represents the transfer of policymaking authority from a single (usually 
national-level) government to multiple (usually state-level) governments.  
2 A great example of someone espousing the agenda of New Federalism comes from 
then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Discussing his party’s vision for welfare reform, 
Gingrich states that “We are committed to getting power back to the states, we are 
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the devolution of education, environmental, and welfare policy on the grounds that the 
states were more qualified to solve local problems than was the distant federal 
government (Peterson 1995).2 
Other proponents of devolution defend the capacity of the states to innovate in the 
language of states’ rights and argue that policy innovation reflects the democratic will of 
the citizens who elect representatives to adopt policies on their behalf. These states’ 
rights proponents of devolution also argue that the centralization or federalization of 
policymaking authority will lead to a homogenization of policy in which the democratic 
choices of citizens in the states are superseded by federal fiat. 3
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 A great example of someone espousing the agenda of New Federalism comes from 
then-House Speaker Newt Gingrich. Discussing his party’s vision for welfare reform, 
Gingrich states that “We are committed to getting power back to the states, we are 
committed to breaking the logjam of Federal bureaucrats controlling how we help the 
poor, and we believe you can trust the 50 states and the 50 state legislatures to work 
together on behalf of the citizens of their states” (quoted in Apple 1995). 
3 Examples of this view come from Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy Moore 
and U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas in response to recent decisions by 
federal judges to permit gay marriage in Alabama, thus challenging a gay marriage ban in 
that state. Moore, who was elected by Alabama voters, claims that “It’s my duty to speak 
up when I see the jurisdiction of our (state) courts being intruded by unlawful federal 
authority.” Thomas, who sees the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision to neither support nor 
oppose the federal judges as an affront to Alabama voters, claims that the federal court 
had “no regard for the people (Alabama voters) who approved these laws in referendums 
or elected the representatives who voted for them” (quoted in Associated Press 2015). A 
states’ rights-based interpretation of policy innovation is interesting insofar as it runs 
counter to the pro-civil rights views of Brandeis.  
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The case for devolution (and by extension, policy innovation) is not just made 
within federal countries. Many Scottish supporters of a unionist solution to the issue of 
Scotland’s independence from the United Kingdom have advocated that the United 
Kingdom adopt a federal form of government. Supporters of a unionist solution, such as 
members of the Home Rule and Community Rule Commission of the Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, argue that federalism will “allow different domestic policies to be pursued in 
different parts of the United Kingdom,” meaning that the Scots can innovate and design 
solutions to their own problems instead of importing solutions from Westminster (Home 
Rule and Community Rule Commission 2012). 
 
 1.2 Do State Governments Innovate under Devolution? 
 Defenders of the view linking devolution to policy innovation often assume that 
state governments naturally innovate in a devolutionary environment. However, we know 
very little about why state governments in devolutionary environments would even 
choose to innovate in the first place. Why should a state government, which may have a 
limited resource capacity, go through the hassle of researching and adopting a novel and 
untested policy (that is, an innovation) when that state government could adopt an 
existing and tried-and-true policy (an action that I refer to as emulation throughout this 
dissertation) at an arguably lower cost in terms of time and resources? And why would an 
elected state government official, who ostensibly desires and strives for reelection 
(Mayhew 1974), accept the risk of innovating when that state government official could 
emulate and place his or her reelection prospects in less jeopardy? 
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 Innovation literally represents the adoption of novel policy while emulation 
represents the adoption of policy that has already been adopted elsewhere. This means 
that an innovating government adopts a policy before any other government has adopted 
the same policy while an emulating government adopts the policy after other 
government(s) have adopted the policy. Innovation is arguably riskier than emulation 
because an innovating government cannot examine how a novel policy has performed in 
other settings before deciding whether to adopt the policy. In contrast, an emulating 
government can use a candidate policy’s track record of performance in other settings to 
inform its own adoption decision. In this project, I investigate the innovation and 
emulation behavior of one particular set of governments, the U.S. states.4 
Political science is only beginning to take the issue of state governmental 
innovation versus emulation seriously, and extant literature does not provide a solid 
endorsement to the view that state governments are natural wellsprings of policy 
innovation. Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) and Cai and Treisman (2009) show in  
formal theoretic models (but not empirically) that reelection-seeking officials in a given 
state may emulate and copy policy choices made in other states instead of taking on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A hypothetical example of innovation and emulation comes from education policy. 
Suppose that Michigan is the first state to adopt a policy that offers loan forgiveness for 
college students that remain in-state following graduation. Since Michigan adopted this 
policy before any other state, it counts as an innovator. Five years later, suppose that 
Ohio decides to also adopt a policy offering loan forgiveness for college students 
remaining in-state following graduation. Since Ohio’s adoption follows Michigan’s and 
Ohio can use Michigan’s track record to inform its own decision-making, Ohio counts as 
an emulator. Importantly, in this project, I define and analyze innovation and emulation 
within the bounded system of the U.S. states. This is not to say that Ohio could not 
emulate the actions of another country’s government (say, Norway). However, this kind 
of emulation (across countries) arguably entails a greater level of risk than emulation that 
occurs within a closed system of similarly structured units (the U.S. states). I provide 
several concrete examples of innovation and emulation in chapter 2.        
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risk of developing their own novel policy solutions. These authors argue that elected 
officials in a given state do not want to jeopardize their electoral prospects by innovating 
and will therefore choose to emulate (this is a safer choice for the officials since they can 
observe how potential candidates for emulation performed in other states). Given that 
reelection is ostensibly a goal for officials across all fifty state legislatures and that a 
given state often faces problems that are similar in nature to the problems faced by other 
states, the claims of Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) and Cai and Treisman (2009) are 
serious and warrant further consideration. After all, the revelation that the states are 
laboratories of emulation rather than laboratories of innovation has implications for how 
we view the role of the states with respect to policymaking in a federal system. 
 
1.3 The Goal and Structure of the Dissertation 
Overview 
 The formal theoretic observations of Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) and Cai 
and Treisman (2009) are compelling but have not been subject to empirical evaluation. 
Additionally, for all the discussion about the positive association between devolution and 
policy innovation, we still do not have a baseline idea about what drives state-level 
innovation and emulation absent direct federal influence (that is, given devolution). 
Establishing a baseline understanding of state-level innovation and emulation is 
important so that we can (in future research) then see how direct federal influence 
interacts with baseline explanators to affect state-level innovation and emulation. 
 In this project, I seek to establish a baseline understanding of state-level 
innovation and emulation under devolution and evaluate the determinants of state policy 
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innovation (or the lack thereof) under devolution across different institutional 
arrangements, such as when legislatures versus regulatory agencies control the 
policymaking process. Analyzing different institutional arrangements is important 
because (1) state policymaking occurs through multiple institutional channels and (2) 
different institutional structures create different incentives for policymakers, leading to a 
potential diversity in policy outcomes.5 Focusing on legislative activity and ignoring the 
role of non-legislative actors gives us an incomplete view of the states as policy 
laboratories, and I compare legislative and regulatory policymaking to provide the reader 
with a richer view of the policymaking environments that exist across the states. 
 Throughout the dissertation, I analyze state innovation and emulation choices 
with respect to a single policy area: the development of renewables portfolio standard 
(RPS) policies across the U.S. states. RPS policies represent a class of policies that aim to 
increase renewable energy use at the state-level by mandating that electricity providers 
generate some amount of electricity from renewable sources. RPS is a fantastic policy 
area for exploring state-level innovation and emulation for three reasons. First, the states 
adopted RPS policies with no discernible direct federal influence, meaning that RPS 
offers a great case for evaluating how state governments behave under devolution.6 
Second, ample innovation and emulation has occurred with respect to RPS policy, as 
state governments pioneer new innovations in RPS policy (by designating an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 A canonical example from political science (and one that I explore here) concerns 
whether elected officials approach their policymaking responsibilities differently from 
appointees, who do not face reelection pressures. 
6 The federal government did not communicate an RPS policy preference to the states 
until the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) release of a Proposed Clean Power 
Plant Rule in 2014 (and 2014 lies outside the bounds of this study). Of course, it is worth 
acknowledging, as McCann (Forthcoming) indicates, that the federal government’s 
decision to leave the states alone may be strategic in nature. 
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unconventional energy source as a form of “renewable” energy, for example) or adopt 
practices utilized in other states. Finally, the states adopted RPS policies using different 
institutional venues, including bodies (legislatures) where all members face electoral 
pressure and bodies (public utilities commissions) where some members are elected and 
other members are appointed. Variation in the institutional venue of adoption lets us 
explore how the incentives faced by members of an institution affect the innovation and 
emulation decisions of that institution, and I conduct this analysis in the chapters ahead.     
Chapter 2 
 In chapter 2, I describe the RPS policy domain in lengthy detail and also discuss 
why I analyze innovation and emulation at the level of the policy feature rather than the 
more commonly used policy regime.7 I then walk the reader through the coding process 
that I utilize throughout this dissertation to distinguish innovation and emulation, and I 
provide examples to the reader of how I identify innovation and emulation in official 
state RPS policymaking documents. I close the chapter with a discussion of how I 
employ my coding method to answer the big theoretical questions evaluated in the 
dissertation, and I suggest future research projects that could be analyzed using my 
coding method.  
Chapter 3 
In chapter 3, I examine when state legislatures innovate and emulate while 
adopting RPS policy and hold the claims of Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) and Cai 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In chapter 2, I define and distinguish policy features and policy regimes from one 
another. 
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and Treisman (2009) to empirical scrutiny.8 The bulk of the extant work on state policy 
innovation deals with the policy adoption behavior of legislatures, which are not only 
tasked with crafting policy but also have members that are subject to reelection. 
Evaluating state legislative RPS policy adoption behavior across fifty states and over 
nearly thirty years (1983-2011), I find evidence for the claim that electoral vulnerability 
increases emulation, as increases in the median vote share of an incumbent legislator in 
the last election relate negatively with the likelihood that a state legislature emulates 
when adopting policy. I also interrogate the prominent claim linking state legislative 
professionalism, or resource capacity, to innovation (Walker 1969; and Boushey 2010) 
and find that professionalism increases the likelihood of emulation more than it increases 
the likelihood of innovation. I argue that increased professionalism raises the likelihood 
of emulation more than innovation because it increases the ability for members of a 
legislature in a given state to learn about and vet a candidate for emulation (in short, to 
research about the fit of a policy that has already been adopted elsewhere) more than it 
increases their ability to learn about and vet a candidate for innovation (to research about 
the fit of a policy that has never been tested in any state). The pro-emulation results with 
respect to electoral vulnerability and legislative professionalism (and the empirical fact 
that legislatures emulate much more than they innovate) suggest that state legislatures 
strongly prefer emulation to innovation and that when they do innovate, the impetus for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) and Cai and Treisman (2009) analyze governments 
where officials are elected and can adopt policy. In the U.S. states, the governmental 
institutions that most closely fit these criteria are legislatures. In chapter 3, I look at the 
policy adoption behavior of state legislatures. In chapter 3, the state legislature (rather 
than the state legislator) is the fundamental actor of interest.  
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innovation does not come from the resource advantages associated with legislative 
professionalism.  
The result linking electoral vulnerability to emulation complicates the view that 
the states are natural laboratories of innovation, because it suggests that reelection-
seeking members of a legislature will push for emulation rather than innovation. And the 
result linking legislative professionalism to emulation complicates the view that the states 
are natural laboratories of innovation, because it suggests that even those states that are 
perhaps best equipped to innovate (states with high legislative professionalism) use the 
resource advantages of professionalism to emulate. 
Chapter 4 
In chapter 4, I shift my focus to the policy adoption behavior of regulatory 
agencies operating and examine when state public utilities commissions innovate and 
emulate while adopting RPS policy. Regulatory agencies play a key role in policy 
adoption, as they possess extensive procedural and technical knowledge about the areas 
that they regulate. Moreover, the commissioners of regulatory agencies are often 
appointed, and the nonelection of these commissioners may have implications on whether 
they choose to innovate or emulate when adopting policy. The result from chapter 3 
linking electoral vulnerability with emulation suggests that appointed officials may favor 
innovation, as these actors are not bound by reelection concerns. At the same time, 
however, appointed officials are accountable to the principals (state legislators and 
governors) that appoint them and may favor emulation in order to avoid confrontation 
with their principals. 
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There is variation across the states in terms of whether public utilities 
commissioners are appointed by governors (and confirmed by state legislatures) or 
elected by statewide voters, and I exploit this variation here to examine whether elected 
public utilities commissioners innovate more or less than appointed public utilities 
commissioners when adopting policy. I find that elected public utilities commissioners 
are more likely to innovate compared to appointed commissioners and argue that this 
result stems from a difference in how the principals of elected and appointed 
commissioners monitor those commissioners. Median voters are the principals of elected 
public utilities commissioners, and these median voters primarily care about consumer 
prices over all other aspects of public utility regulatory policy (Besley and Coate 2003). 
This means that elected public utilities commissioners are largely free to take risks and 
innovate with respect to regulatory policy so long as they can convince median voters 
that innovations will not raise consumer prices. In contrast, appointed public utilities 
commissioners serve principals (state legislators and governors) that may have strong 
preferences about regulatory policy and concerns about how novel changes to regulatory 
policy will affect constituents. Appointed public utilities commissioners may then partly 
reject innovation as a way to reduce the possibility of conflict with or backlash from 
concerned legislative and executive bosses.   
   The result from chapter 4 adds to our baseline understanding of state policy 
innovation and emulation under devolution because it suggests that giving policy 
responsibility to appointees will not necessarily increase innovation. Elected officials are 
bound by reelection constraints and certainly appear (based on the finding from chapter 3 
linking electoral vulnerability to emulation) to emulate in response to fears about 
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reelection. Despite the reelection constraint, however, elected officials still appear to 
drive policy innovation in the states, and elected officials (both in the state legislatures 
and in state public utilities commissions) definitely innovate with far greater frequency 
than appointed officials. The increased innovation output from elected rather than 
appointed officials implies that we continue to look to elected state officials to serve as 
the wellsprings of state policy innovation. While appointees play a role in the 
policymaking process, appointees (at least in the area of RPS policy) do not appear to be 
risk-acceptant policy adopters. 
Chapter 5 
In this chapter, I move away from analyzing the decision-making of collective 
institutions (for example, I analyzed legislative decision-making in chapter 3 and agency 
decision-making in chapter 4) and instead devote my attention to the choices of 
individual legislators operating under devolution. I also move away from analyzing 
policy adoption and instead look at whether legislators choose to innovate or emulate 
when cosponsoring policies. I focus on micro-level (individual) rather than macro-level 
(collective) determinants of innovation and emulation since macro-level institutions 
consist of individuals making their own choices about policy. Ignoring micro-level 
explanators and focusing only on a macro-level picture may cause us to miss important 
individual-specific drivers of innovation and emulation. I focus on cosponsorship because 
cosponsors are important advancers of policy proposals within a legislature.9 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 I only have data identifying cosponsorship and lack information about primary 
authorship (or sponsorship). The absence of sponsorship data is unfortunate since 
sponsors serve the key movers of policy proposals through the legislative process (this 
does not mean, of course, as a rich literature on cosponsorship demonstrates, that 
cosponsors are unimportant in the policymaking process). Moving forward, I plan to use 
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Understanding when cosponsors choose to advance novel policy versus push for existing 
policy would help us uncover individual factors that affect the content of policy proposals 
that receive consideration from a legislature for adoption.10 
Analyzing the RPS cosponsorship activity of 867 legislators from thirty states, I 
find that increased legislative professionalism raises the likelihood that legislators choose 
to emulate rather than innovate during cosponsorship. This result mirrors the macro-level 
legislative professionalism result obtained in chapter 3 and suggests that increased 
legislative professionalism (think more staff and due to increases in legislator salary and 
time on the job, possibly more fact-finding commissions and study groups) also increases 
the ability for legislators to learn about and vet a policy proposal that already exists 
elsewhere more than it increases the ability for legislators to learn about and vet a novel 
policy. Evaluating the other finding from chapter 3—the finding linking electoral 
vulnerability to increased emulation in adoption—I fail to find evidence that individual-
level electoral vulnerability increases the likelihood that legislators emulate when they 
cosponsor policy.  
At the same time, however, I find evidence linking term limit provisions to an 
increased likelihood that legislators cosponsor innovative policy. This result, I argue, 
stems from work by Kousser (2005), Ferraz and Finan (2011), and Alt, Bueno de 
Mesquita, and Rose (2011) linking the shorter time horizons associated with term limits 
to increased risk-taking by legislators. Compared to legislators from states without term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
formal information requests to gather data on primary authorship and will hopefully be 
able to identify commonalities and differences in the innovation and emulation patterns 
of cosponsors and sponsors.  
10 “Content” here refers to whether a policy is novel (an example of innovation) or 
whether it has already been adopted elsewhere (an example of emulation). 
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limit provisions, legislators from states with term limit provisions may be more willing 
(provided, of course, that they like an innovative policy) to cosponsor innovative 
legislation. This is because term limits shorten the time horizons of legislators and reduce 
the possibility that unanticipated and undesired effects of the innovative policy jeopardize 
the electoral prospects of the cosponsoring legislators. In contrast, the absence of term 
limit provisions lengthens the time horizons of legislators and increases the likelihood 
that a legislator may emulate rather than innovate in order to protect his or her electoral 
future.11  
Results from chapter 5 provide insight about the factors that affect policy 
innovation and emulation in cosponsorship. Importantly, we should expect legislators 
from less professional legislatures and legislators from states with term limit provisions 
to cosponsor innovative policy and perhaps serve as key players in the narrative 
describing the states as laboratories of policy innovation. We should emphasize, however, 
that the legislative professionalism and term limit findings could be bad from a 
democratic accountability perspective, if the findings suggest that (1) legislators do not 
utilize the tools of legislative professionalism to research about prospective innovations; 
and that (2) term limits reduce electoral accountability and increase the chance that 
legislators engage in risky policymaking.   
Implications 
Viewed in total, the results from the three empirical chapters complicate the 
narrative linking state policymaking under devolution to policy innovation. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In my analysis of legislative policy adoption in chapter 3, term limits also increase the 
probability of innovation and decrease the probability of emulation. However, these 
findings are not significant statistically. I discuss why this may be the case in chapter 3 
and in the conclusion of the dissertation. 
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legislatures—the primary institutions through which states craft policy—emulate more 
than they innovate, and legislative electoral vulnerability increases emulation at the 
adoption stage, as shown in chapter 3. The fact that electoral vulnerability increases 
emulation is normatively good insofar as it shows that lawmakers take voter 
considerations seriously and try not to subject voters to the consequences of risky 
innovation. And the finding from chapter 4 linking appointment to reduced innovation is 
also normatively good from a democratic accountability perspective, as it shows that 
innovation more likely comes from elected individuals who maintain a direct link to 
voters rather than appointed individuals who are insulated from voter demands. 
Two potential normative problems raised in this project relate to the origins of 
innovation. The first problem deals with the finding (shown in chapter 5) linking term 
limit provisions with increased innovation in cosponsorship. If legislators in states with 
term limits are willing to subject citizens to the risk of innovation in order to advance 
what they consider to be “good” policy that they believe meets the demands of 
constituents, then there is arguably little cause from concern from a democratic 
accountability perspective, as legislators are serving as good representatives (Pitkin 
1972). However, if legislators in states with term limits are willing to subject citizens to 
the risk of innovation in order to satisfy their own personal desires or those of key 
supporters, then good governance may be threatened insofar as innovations occur as the 
result of particularistic personal and interest group goals rather than a goal to improve the 
general public good.12   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is not beyond the realm of possibility. Legislators may want to advance the 
interests of a key supporter in order to procure lobbying jobs after the conclusion of their 
term-limited legislative careers (Kousser 2005).  
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The second problem concerns the legislative professionalism result discussed in 
chapters 3 and 5. The lack of a statistical relationship between legislative professionalism 
and innovation may seem harmless, but it suggests that legislative research capacity does 
not drive innovation and may even indicate that innovators do not research the 
ramifications of potential innovations as much as they probably should.   
Future research will allow us to take the baseline of state policymaking under 
devolution established here and evaluate how policy centralization interacts with the 
factors in this dissertation to affect state innovation and emulation.13 Compared to the 
baseline of devolution, legislators from states with term limit provisions could emulate 
more given federal involvement, as the legislators face incentives to comply with federal 
rules. And also compared to the baseline of devolution, electorally vulnerable lawmakers 
could innovate more given federal involvement, as these lawmakers may want to signal 
to constituents that they are using federal financial assistance to solve vexing policy 
challenges. The probable federalization of the policy area (renewable energy regulation) 
analyzed in this project will help us examine the effects of centralization moving forward.  
 
1.4 A Brief Description of the Empirics of the Dissertation 
 The goal of the dissertation is to examine factors affecting state innovation and 
emulation given devolution, or an absence of direct federal influence on state 
policymakers. In order to evaluate state innovation and emulation choices under the 
baseline condition of negligible direct federal influence on state policymaking, it is 
imperative to investigate a policy area where the federal government left policymaking in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Centralization typically refers to when the federal government uses grants or rules to 
incentivize the states to move policy in a certain direction (Peterson 1995). 
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the hands of the states. It is also important, given the nature of the questions examined in 
chapters 3, 4, and 5, to investigate a policy area where legislative and regulatory agency 
actors participated in adopting (and in the case of legislators, sponsoring, policy.) RPS 
policymaking meets the criteria outlined above, and data on state RPS policy adoption 
and sponsorship are used to evaluate the theoretical propositions outlined in this 
dissertation. RPS, it is worth repeating, describes a family of policies specifying that 
electric utilities derive some amount of electricity from “renewable” sources and 
outlining how utilities should meet these standards. Renewable energy possesses issue 
salience, as individuals of different ideological and partisan stripes in government, 
academia, and the private sector have advocated for the development of America’s 
renewable energy infrastructure in order to reduce dependence on foreign oil and address 
threats from climate change (Rabe 2004). 
The state governments, absent direct federal influence, have taken the lead in 
crafting RPS policies and created diverse RPS regimes, where a regime simply refers to 
the set of adopted policy features that together comprise a state’s RPS program: Hawaii, 
for example, devised an RPS regime designed to maximize the use of traditional sources 
of renewable energy (for example, hydroelectric, solar, and wind count as traditional 
sources of renewable energy) while West Virginia has crafted a regime devoted to 
classifying coal as a renewable resource. To date, from 1983 to 2011, 37 states adopted 
RPS regimes, and I evaluate the RPS policy adoption choices of legislatures and public 
utilities commissions across the fifty states and the RPS sponsorship behavior of 
legislators within and across thirty states (the states for which sponsorship data of any 
kind is available) to identify the conditions under which state governmental actors 
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innovate or emulate during policy adoption or sponsorship.14 Table 1 lists the states (in 
chronological order, based on first adoption) that have adopted RPS regimes.15   
 
TABLE 1: States with RPS Regimes 
State Year of RPS 
Initiation 
Iowa 1983 
Minnesota 1994 
Arizona 1996 
Maine 1997 
Nevada 1997 
Massachusetts 1997 
Wisconsin 1998 
Connecticut 1998 
New Jersey 1999 
Texas 1999 
Hawaii 2001 
Illinois 2001 
California 2002 
New Mexico 2002 
Maryland 2004 
Rhode Island 2004 
New York 2004 
Pennsylvania 2004 
Colorado 2004 
Montana 2005 
Vermont 2005 
Delaware 2005 
North Dakota 2006 
Washington 2006 
Virginia 2007 
New Hampshire 2007 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Public utilities commissions are the agencies typically charged with regulating the 
actions of electric utilities. Two states, Colorado and Washington, adopted their RPS 
programs through ballot initiative. There are no cases of ballot initiative innovation and a 
low sample size (26) of emulations that occur through ballot initiative. I therefore do not 
investigate the nature of the innovation/emulation choice from the vantage point of 
citizens using a ballot initiative process.   
15 Iowa adopted RPS well before the next state (Minnesota), and it is an open question as 
to why eleven years passed before Minnesota’s creation of an RPS regime. My best guess 
centers on the extreme newness of the regime or program in 1983: Iowa was literally the 
first state to take on public utilities and require that they comply with renewable 
mandates. Other states, perhaps due in part to the threat of litigation, may have waited 
until Iowa’s program was solidly established before creating their own RPS regimes. 
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State Year of RPS 
Initiation 
Missouri 2007 
Oregon 2007 
North Carolina 2007 
South Dakota 2008 
Utah 2008 
Ohio 2008 
Michigan 2008 
Kansas 2009 
West Virginia 2009 
Oklahoma 2010 
Indiana 2011 
 
 A challenge in evaluating the innovation and emulation choices of state 
governments involves determining what innovation and emulation look like empirically. 
The extant political science literature (Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 1990; 
Boushey 2010; Pacheco 2012; Makse 2013; and others) does not distinguish innovation 
from emulation and instead refers to innovation as a state’s adoption of policy regardless 
of when that state adopted the policy.  
In this dissertation, I empirically disentangle innovation from emulation by 
tracing the adoption of a given policy feature across the states and then designating a 
particular state as an innovator or emulator depending on when (in relation to other 
states) that state adopted the policy feature. I do this by gathering all state-level enabling 
documentation (these are typically approved bills or public utility commission rules, and 
there are 306 enabling documents in total) and sorting through the documentation to 
assign a date to when a state adopted a particular RPS policy feature. I gather the names 
of specific RPS policy features from the preeminent repository of state RPS data, the 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). DSIRE identified 
key policy features of state RPS programs, and I analyze whether the states innovate or 
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emulate with respect to these policy features. Taking the dates from each state’s adoption 
of a particular policy feature, I generally label a state as an innovator if it adopts a 
particular policy feature before any other state has done so and label a state as an 
emulator if it adopts a particular policy feature after another state has adopted the policy 
component. 
This empirical manifestation of innovation and emulation, which I discuss in 
much greater detail in chapter 2 and briefly in chapters 3, 4, and 5, represents a major 
contribution of the dissertation and allows us to relate changes in key explanatory 
variables to the likelihood of innovation and emulation. 
 
1.5 Outline of the Dissertation 
 In chapter 2, I describe the RPS policy domain, discuss why I analyze innovation 
and emulation using the policy feature as the unit of adoption, give the reader a thorough 
overview of the coding process that I utilize to distinguish innovation from emulation, 
and sketch out future projects in which my coding process can be employed to better 
understand when governmental actors innovate or emulate. 
In chapter 3, I use the coding process discussed in chapter 2 to examine the 
determinants of legislative innovation and emulation during policy adoption and 
specifically investigate how electoral vulnerability and legislative professionalism affect 
the likelihood of innovation and emulation. 
 In chapter 4, I switch from legislative to regulatory agency action and use the 
coding process discussed in chapter 2 to examine whether elected public utility 
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commissioners are more likely to innovate compared to appointed public utility 
commissioners. 
 In chapter 5, I use the coding process discussed in chapter 2 to examine the 
cosponsorship (rather than adoption) activity of legislators and identify conditions that 
affect when cosponsors innovate or emulate. The data processing procedure involves an 
additional step to that utilized in chapters 3 and 4, as I must link the names of individual 
cosponsors with their decisions to cosponsor policies that either represent examples of 
innovation or emulation. 
 Finally, in chapter 6, I offer a recapitulation of the project’s conclusions and 
implications and provide the reader with an outline of future directions of this research. 
 I now move on to distinguishing how I separate the choices of innovation and 
emulation using RPS policymaking in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 
Separating Innovation from Emulation using Policy Features from State 
Renewables Portfolio Standards 
 
2.1 An Introduction and Note on Terminology 
 In this chapter, I provide detail about the RPS policy domain and specify a 
general process (which I apply in this project to the RPS policy domain) that can be used 
to differentiate innovation from emulation. I first discuss the terminology used in this 
chapter and differentiate a policy feature from a policy regime and a policy domain. I then 
describe the nature of the RPS policy domain. I thirdly discuss why it is beneficial to use 
the policy feature as the unit of analysis when investigating adoption. I then walk through 
the exact coding process that I use to identify instances of innovation and emulation from 
state government policymaking pertaining to the RPS policy domain; and I lastly discuss 
how I utilize the output from this coding process to advance the goals of my dissertation. 
 Before describing the nature of state RPS policymaking, it is helpful to define 
terminology that features prominently in this chapter and in the broader dissertation. I 
begin with the concept of a policy feature. A policy feature is the most basic unit of 
policy choice and describes in granular detail how a government plans to achieve a 
programmatic goal in some issue area. Suppose that a state government wants to ensure 
the cleanliness of waterways and plans to monitor activity from businesses and punish 
those businesses that are considered to be polluting the waterways. A policy feature 
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allows the state government to operationalize its programmatic goal (cleaning the 
waterways) and describes how, in specific and granular terms, the state government plans 
to achieve its programmatic goal. Actual policy features in this hypothetical example may 
include how the state government defines cleanliness of the waterways, what businesses 
will be inspected, how often businesses will be inspected, and how businesses will be 
punished for polluting the waterways. Policy features give specificity to the state 
government’s programmatic goal and provide the analyst with concrete ways in which 
the government plans to accomplish its programmatic goal. 
 A policy regime is simply the set of all policy features that a government adopts 
in order to meet its programmatic goal. In the example from above, a policy regime is the 
set of all policy features that a state government has adopted to ensure the cleanliness of 
its waterways: this means that a state’s policy regime for ensuring clean waterways is the 
sum of the four hypothetical policy features that the state adopted in the previous 
paragraph. A state government adopts a policy regime when it initially adopts any set of 
policy features that are designed to meet the state’s programmatic goal. However, the 
state government can change its policy regime over time by adopting new policy features.   
Two states have identical policy regimes if they have each adopted the same exact set of 
policy features as one another; if not, then the states have different policy regimes from 
one another. 
 A policy domain is simply the entire set of policy features that have been adopted 
across all governments (in the case of this dissertation, “all governments” refers to the 
governments of the fifty states) that share the same programmatic goal. In the clean 
waterways example, the policy domain of ensuring clean waterways would consist of the 
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set of all policy features that have adopted by the fifty state governments in order to 
maintain cleanliness and prevent pollution in waterways. In this dissertation, I investigate 
state governmental policymaking in the RPS policy domain and define innovation and 
emulation by comparing the policy adoption behavior of the states at the level of the 
policy feature.      
 
2.2 The Renewables Portfolio Standard Policy Domain 
Renewables portfolio standards, or RPS, refer to a set of policy features that state 
governments use to encourage and in some cases mandate electric utility companies to 
utilize renewable sources of energy (Rabe 2006). Electric utility companies typically 
deliver electricity from producers to end-use consumers16, and RPS regimes promote 
renewable energy use by placing the onus on electric utility companies to supply their 
consumers with electricity derived from renewable raw materials. RPS regimes have 
emerged as the preferred tool that state policymakers use in trying to spur renewable 
energy consumption: an RPS regime is more viable politically than are policy instruments 
that impose direct and observable costs on end-use energy consumers (a fossil fuel tax is 
an example of a policy instrument that imposes a direct and observable cost on end-use 
energy consumers) because the RPS regime not only shields end-use energy consumers 
from direct costs but imposes direct costs on actors—electric utility companies—with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Some electric utility companies produce and deliver electricity to end-use consumers. 
However, all electric utility companies deliver electricity to end-use consumers. An end-
use consumer is defined as any electricity consumer who sits at the very end of an 
electricity supply chain and uses electricity but does not distribute electricity to other 
users. The vast majority of electricity consumers are end-use consumers (Besley and 
Coate 2003).    
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whom the majority of end-use consumers have an adversarial relationship (Besley and 
Coate 2003; Holland, Hughes, and Knittel 2009). 
 RPS regimes are also viable politically because they are not purely associated (in 
the eyes of the public and some policymakers) with climate change (Rabe 2004, 2006). 
Other policy instruments that promote renewable energy use, like fossil fuel taxes or cap 
and trade systems, have directly been labeled as anti-climate change policies and face 
opposition from climate change skeptics; RPS regimes, on the other hand, have been 
lauded as an effective way to reduce dependence on foreign petroleum while creating 
jobs and have even won support from policymakers in several politically conservative 
states where the domestic fossil fuel industry represents an important constituency (Rabe 
2004, 2006).17  
 The states have adopted RPS regimes with negligible federal influence, as the 
federal government has not provided financial or rule-based incentives or advice to the 
states on whether the states should adopt RPS regimes or how the states should craft their 
RPS regimes. The states have also crafted their RPS regimes in diverse ways and 
policymakers in many states have innovated by adopting RPS policy features that have 
not previously been adopted in any state while other policymakers have emulated by 
adopting RPS policy features that have already been adopted in other states. The 
combination of negligible federal influence plus the diversity across the states with 
respect to the design of RPS regimes makes the RPS policy domain superb for evaluating 
when state policymakers choose to innovate or emulate given the absence of direct 
federal influence on state governments. And although I cannot determine how changes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Oklahoma, Texas, and West Virginia all have strong fossil fuel industries and RPS 
regimes. 
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centralization affect the innovation and emulation choices of state policymakers, as I do 
not observe variation in centralization in the RPS policy domain, I can use the RPS policy 
domain to identify when state policymakers choose to innovate or emulate under the 
baseline condition of devolution. Moreover, in future work, I can potentially evaluate 
how direct federal influence on state governments changes the innovation and emulation 
behavior of state policymakers.18 
 An RPS regime consists of a set of policy features that dictate how an electric 
utility company should provide renewable energy-derived electricity to consumers. Each 
state RPS regime typically includes six groups of policy features that specify how an 
electric utility company should provide renewable energy-derived electricity to 
consumers: (1) policy features belonging to the first group specify the exact energy 
sources that are considered to be “renewable” (such as hydroelectric or wind) for the 
purposes of meeting the requirements of an RPS; (2) policy features belonging to the 
second group deal with the type of standard that a state may impose on electric utility 
companies to meet the state’s RPS: most states require that electric utility companies 
procure some percentage of electricity sold to retail consumers from renewable sources—
this is called a percentage of retail standard—while other states require that electric 
utility companies procure some percentage of electricity consumed (regardless of whether 
that electricity is sold or not) from renewable sources—this is called a percentage of 
consumption standard. 
 (3) Policy features belonging to the third group deal with the exact amount of 
electricity that a state may require electric utility companies to procure from renewable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Given the high probability of future federal involvement in the RPS policy domain. 
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energy sources: California, for example, requires that 33% of the electricity sold to 
consumers be procured from renewable sources while Michigan requires that 10% of the 
electricity sold to consumers be procured from renewable sources.19 (4) Policy features 
belonging to the fourth group deal with whether a state requires that electric utility 
companies must utilize a specific renewable resource to meet part of their RPS 
obligations: New Hampshire, for example, requires that electric utility companies 
operating in that state must meet part of their RPS obligations by procuring electricity 
from biomass sources.20 (5) Policy features belonging to the fifth group deal with whether 
a state allows for electric utility companies to trade credits with one another in order to 
meet RPS obligations: some states permit electric utility companies to purchase credits in 
lieu of procuring electricity from renewable sources while other states do not allow for 
credit trading by electric utility companies. (6) Policy features belonging to the sixth 
group deal with whether a state requires electric utility companies to participate in an 
RPS regime: while some states require electric utility companies to meet RPS 
obligations, other states allow electric utility companies to voluntarily choose whether to 
participate in RPS regimes. I display the full list of policy features utilized in this project 
in the appendix of the dissertation.21 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Here, the policy features identified by DSIRE would be 33% and 10% respectively. I 
do not include policy features associated with actual amounts in this project and discuss 
my justification for doing so later in this chapter.  
20 Policy features that require electric utility companies to meet part of their RPS 
requirements from specific renewable sources are called “technology minimums” in the 
renewable policy community. 
21 DSIRE places policy features into six groups in order to make categorization of policy 
features easier. However, it is the policy feature (and not one of the six groups of policy 
features) that is both the basic policy unit identified by DSIRE and the basic policy unit 
analyzed in this study. I discuss the merits of using the policy feature as the basic unit of 
analysis later in this chapter. 
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 It hopefully is clear from the above discussion that it is the adoption of policy 
features that makes a state RPS regime operable. States choose different policy features, 
and it is the sum of a given state’s policy feature adoption choices that give that state’s 
RPS regime its character. Michigan’s RPS regime, for example, consists of policy 
features from five of the six groups delineated above: (1) Michigan adopted policy 
features defining the sources that are considered to be “renewable” in its RPS regime 
(three such examples are tidal energy, wind, and gasification); (2) Michigan adopted a 
policy feature specifying the type of standard that is levied on electric utility companies 
operating in the state (percentage of retail); (3) Michigan adopted a policy feature 
specifying how much electricity (10%) electric utility companies should procure from 
renewable sources; (4) Michigan has not adopted policy features specifying that electric 
utility companies must meet part of their RPS obligations using specific renewable 
sources, meaning that Michigan’s RPS regime has no technology minimums; (5) 
Michigan adopted a policy feature allowing for electric utility companies to meet their 
RPS obligations by trading credits; and (6) Michigan adopted a policy feature requiring 
electric utility companies operating in the state to participate in the state’s RPS regime. 
Michigan’s experience with mixing policy features together to create a comprehensive 
RPS regime is not atypical, and other states have also crafted their own RPS regimes 
through the selective adoption of policy features. In the next section, I discuss why the 
policy feature is a good candidate to use to distinguish innovation from emulation. 
 
2.3 Using Policy Features to Distinguish Innovation from Emulation  
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The mix of individual policy features adopted by Michigan is what gives 
Michigan’s RPS regime its character and allows us to differentiate Michigan’s RPS 
regime from that of other states and account for the diversity of RPS policymaking within 
and across states. In fact, looking at state policymaking at the level of policy feature 
adoption gives the analyst a more accurate picture of the true uniqueness of a state’s RPS 
regime compared to looking at state policymaking at the level of RPS regime adoption. 
Imagine that I compare the RPS regimes of Michigan and Ohio but ignore adoption at the 
level of policy features and only look at whether Michigan and Ohio established RPS 
regimes. The RPS regimes of the two states would appear identical even though they 
differ in terms of what sources are considered to be “renewable” and whether electric 
utility companies must satisfy technology minimums. Focusing on policy feature rather 
than policy regime adoption allows us to better discern the diversity of RPS 
policymaking within and across states.      
Since focusing on policy feature adoption reveals the diversity and uniqueness of 
state policymaking more than focusing on policy regime adoption, it follows that tracing 
the innovative or emulative quality of policy features within a state’s RPS regime allows 
us to better discern the innovative or emulative quality of a state’s RPS regime compared 
to tracing innovation and emulation at the level of the state’s RPS regime. Analyzing 
policy innovativeness at the level of policy features represents a divergence from existing 
literature (Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 1990; and Boushey 2010), which 
has largely looked at the adoption of entire policy regimes rather than policy features. 
One prominent example of this existing approach comes from Berry and Berry (1990), 
who model innovation based on whether a state has or has not established a lottery 
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regime but ignore the adoption of various policy features that could distinguish one 
state’s lottery regime from the lottery regime of another state.    
While the extant literature’s focus on adoption at the level of the entire policy 
regime rather than the policy feature is understandable, the choice to analyze entire policy 
regimes has affected how we in political science study policy innovation. Looking at the 
adoption of entire policy regimes rather than policy features may lead to misleading 
inferences about the innovative or emulative quality of a given state’s RPS regime. If I 
only looked at the initial adoption of state RPS regimes (shown in table 1 in chapter 1) 
rather than the adoption of RPS policy features, I may conclude that later states emulated 
the policies of earlier states even in cases when the later states were actually big 
innovators and adopted several policy features that had not previously been adopted by 
other states. 
The mistaken conclusion mentioned above can occur with respect to the RPS 
policy domain. If I only looked at the initial adoption of RPS regimes, I may conclude 
that West Virginia, the third to last state to even adopt an RPS regime, is a laggard that 
has emulated the policymaking choices of states that established their RPS regimes 
earlier. However, looking at the adoption of policy features reveals West Virginia to be a 
major innovator that has adopted many policy features, mainly related to the 
incorporation of coal and fossil fuel technologies within an RPS framework, that were not 
previously adopted by any state. 
Focusing on the initial adoption of state RPS regimes rather than the adoption of 
RPS policy features also prevents us from identifying when states innovate by amending 
or modifying already established RPS regimes. Many states continue to add policy 
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features to their RPS regimes after these regimes have been established, and the added 
policy features can be prominent examples of both innovation and emulation: Nevada, for 
example, initially established its RPS regime in 1997 and adopted 8 policy features 
corresponding to 5 instances of innovation and 3 instances of emulation. In 2001, 2002, 
2003, and 2007, however, Nevada amended its RPS regime and adopted 11 more policy 
features across that timespan corresponding to 3 instances of innovation and 8 instances 
of emulation. If I only looked at the initial adoption of Nevada’s RPS regime, I would 
throw away important policy adoption activity that occurred in Nevada subsequent to the 
initial adoption of that state’s RPS regime. Analyzing innovation and emulation at the 
level of policy features and tracing the adoption of policy features at both the time of an 
RPS regime’s initial creation and the time of an RPS regime’s modification allows us to 
better visualize the diversity of RPS policymaking within and across the states and also 
gives us a much more detailed picture of innovation and emulation within and across the 
states. The benefit of much greater detail about state policymaking activity justifies the 
use of the policy feature as the unit of analysis in this project. 
 
2.4 Coding Policy Features as Innovation or Emulation 
In this project, I define innovation and emulation at the level of policy features 
and now discuss how to identify innovation and emulation in the adopted policy features 
associated with state RPS regimes. While I utilize my coding process with respect to the 
policy domain of RPS, I emphasize that this process is extendable to policy domains 
besides RPS: the one caveat, however, is that the analyst must have knowledge about 
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what policy features are actually associated with a policy domain.22 In this project, I 
utilize policy features that have already been identified by analysts at DSIRE. Analysts at 
DSIRE work in collaboration with the U.S. Department of Energy and state governments 
(like North Carolina legislature) and have detailed expertise about the RPS policy 
domain: this detailed expertise is important insofar as it adds to the overall 
trustworthiness of the DSIRE database and gives us confidence that analysts at DSIRE 
have correctly identified the policy features associated with the RPS policy domain. My 
use of policy features already identified by DSIRE consequently represents a robustness 
check against the possibility of incorrectly identifying policy features associated with the 
RPS policy domain. While every policy domain may not have an organization like 
DSIRE that provides rich information about state policymaking within that particular 
policy domain, I reemphasize here that using my policy features approach requires the 
analyst to possess detailed knowledge about the specific policy features associated with a 
policy domain. 
 My coding strategy centers on two main assumptions. First, I assume that 
innovation and emulation are distinct and separable types of policy adoption available to 
policymakers. The distinction between innovation and emulation, I argue, boils down to 
whether a specific policy feature that is being adopted by state i has already been adopted 
by at least one other state j. If state i adopts a specific policy feature that has never been 
adopted by another state, then I claim that state i’s policymakers are innovating; if state i 
adopts a specific policy feature that has already been adopted by another state, then I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This is to avoid the situation where a naïve analyst incorrectly identifies (or fails to 
identify) the policy features that are associated with a policy domain and then mistakenly 
inflates (or deflates) the number of instances of policy feature adoption that occur in his 
or her dataset.    
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claim that state i’s policymakers are emulating. Innovation and emulation differ because 
emulation provides adopting policymakers with a visible track record while innovation 
does not. Emulating policymakers in state i in some sense know what to expect from 
adopting a policy feature that has already been adopted in state j because the 
policymakers in state i can observe what happened when state j adopted the same policy 
feature; innovating policymakers in state i know comparatively less about what to expect 
when adopting a novel policy feature because they do not have access to some other 
state’s track record with that same policy feature. Following Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 
(2008) and Cai and Treisman (2009), I assume that the existence of a track record 
generally makes emulation less risky than innovation, and I use the idea that emulation 
offers adopting policymakers a visible track record while innovation does not to give 
emulation and innovation different empirical forms.23 
 Readers may take issue with the idea that innovation is so easily distinguishable 
from emulation and may believe that the distinction between innovation and emulation is 
more nuanced than I suggest here. I acknowledge this concern and argue that using 
qualitative methods to tease out innovation and emulation represents a fruitful direction 
for future research. However, I also argue, along with Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 
(2008), Cai and Treisman (2009), and Walker (1969), that innovation and emulation 
represent distinctly different choices from one another, and my assumption about the 
separability of innovation and emulation allows for social scientists to utilize quantitative 
analytical techniques to identify the determinants of innovation and emulation. The use of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Although there may be certain instances when emulation is riskier than innovation, I 
follow the lead of Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008) and Cai and Treisman (2009) and 
assume that the existence of a track record generally makes emulation less risky than 
innovation. 
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quantitative techniques is useful insofar as it produces general findings based on the 
investigation of large sample sizes. 
My second main assumption deals with how I empirically distinguish innovation 
from emulation: namely, I code the adoption of a specific policy feature as an example of 
innovation if state i adopts that same policy feature before any other state has adopted the 
same policy feature or if state i adopts that same policy feature within one year of the date 
when another state j innovated and became the first state to adopt that same policy 
feature; I code the adoption of a specific policy feature as an example of emulation, on 
the other hand, if state i adopts that policy feature at least one year after another state j 
already adopted that same policy feature. 
Concrete examples of innovation and emulation help here. Including wind energy 
as a renewable source within a state’s RPS regime is a common RPS policy feature that 
has been adopted across many states. In 1983, Iowa was the first state to adopt wind 
energy as an eligible renewable source within its RPS regime and consequently innovated 
because it adopted this policy feature. In 1997, Nevada established an RPS regime and 
included wind energy as an eligible renewable source within its RPS regime. Since 
Nevada included wind energy as an eligible renewable source thirteen years after Iowa 
did so, Nevada’s adoption of this policy feature represents a case of emulation.     
The passage of one year from the date of the first state’s adoption of a specific 
policy feature distinguishes innovation from emulation and represents enough time for 
policymakers in an emulating state to at least observe the short-term effects of a specific 
policy feature’s adoption in the original innovating state. I am not alone in believing that 
the passage of one year is sufficient to distinguish innovation from emulation: Volden, 
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Ting, and Carpenter (2009), Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley (2006), and Swank (2006) 
all argue that the passage of one year allows policymakers in state i to learn from the 
choices of policymakers in state j. However, I acknowledge the possibility that the 
passage of one year may not be enough time to generate the observable track record 
needed to distinguish innovation from emulation, and I suggest ways to remedy this issue 
in the dissertation.24  
Another potential issue with my method of empirically separating innovation 
from emulation is that it—like earlier studies on innovation and diffusion including 
landmark work from Walker (1969); Gray (1973); Berry and Berry (1990); Volden 
(2006); and Boushey (2010)—relies too much on the passage of time to identify the act 
of emulation. It is possible, as pointed out in Shipan and Volden (2008) and Volden, 
Ting, and Carpenter (2009), that a later state may appear to be copying the action of an 
earlier state even though the later state is coincidentally and independently adopting the 
same policy feature. It is also possible (as also pointed out in Shipan and Volden 2008) 
that an innovating state i may copy the actions of another innovating (and influential) 
state j in order to look like state j.25 While I acknowledge that using the passage of time 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The easiest remedy is to extend the definition of innovation to two years from the date 
of the first state’s adoption of a specific policy feature. Results from my dissertation do 
not substantively change when I modify the definition of innovation in this manner.    
25 Shipan and Volden (2008) call this imitation and claim that it occurs when state i 
adopts a policy feature right after an influential leader state j adopted the same policy 
feature in hopes of looking like state j. In my RPS data, Massachusetts was the first state 
to adopt landfill gas energy as part of its RPS regime on November 25, 1997. 
Connecticut followed suit less than five months later on April 15, 1998. I code both 
policy feature adoptions as innovations because they lie within the passage of one year 
from the date of the first state’s (Massachusetts) adoption of landfill gas energy as an 
eligible renewable source. Shipan and Volden (2008) may argue, however, that 
Connecticut is imitating a leader state (Massachusetts) in order to look like 
Massachusetts.      
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to separate innovation from emulation has its limits, I argue that my method still 
represents a useful way to distinguish innovation and emulation from one another. Even 
in the hypothetical case where a later state coincidentally adopts a policy feature that has 
already been adopted by earlier states, we cannot rule out that the later state’s 
policymakers may have been indirectly influenced by the track record of the policy 
feature’s adoption in the earlier states.26 In the case where a second innovating state 
imitates the policy feature adoption of a leading innovating state, policymakers in the 
second state still undertake the risk of innovation insofar as they cannot use an existing 
track record to learn about the potential effects of adopting that specific policy feature.  
Ultimately, I advance the policy adoption and diffusion literatures by devising a 
way to model innovation and emulation as separate outcomes. These separate outcomes 
can be analyzed using conventional statistical techniques to determine how various 
factors—political, economic, or otherwise—differentially affect the probabilities of 
innovation and emulation. I deliberately apply this process at the level of policy features 
rather than entire policy regimes since greater diversity in policymaking is found at the 
level of policy features. 
An example of how looking at policy features more accurately captures the 
diversity of state policymaking compared to looking at policy regimes can be found in the 
RPS policy domain. In this domain, 37 states adopted RPS regimes during the timeframe 
analyzed in the study, meaning that there would be 37 cases of adoption (that would then 
be coded as innovation or emulation) if I used the RPS regime as the unit of analysis. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 The public in the later state may be aware of the track record of the policy feature and 
put pressure on policymakers to adopt the policy feature. Similarly, interest groups in the 
later state may be aware of the track record of the policy feature and put pressure on 
policymakers to adopt the policy feature. 
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However, there are 84 unique policy features within the RPS policy domain. Assuming 
that each of the 37 states with RPS regimes incorporated all 84 policy features within 
their own RPS regimes, there could potentially be 37*84 (or 3108) cases of adoption that 
are then coded as innovation or emulation.27 The 3108 RPS policy feature adoption cases 
provide much greater diversity than looking at 37 cases of RPS regime adoption. Of 
course, not every state with an RPS regime adopted all 84 unique policy features, but 
there are still have 609 cases of policy feature adoption in this project’s master dataset 
(these 609 cases correspond to 110 cases of innovation and 499 cases of emulation). 
These 609 cases of policy feature adoption provide much more diversity in state 
policymaking than could have been gleaned using 37 cases of RPS regime adoption. 
I now discuss how I trace innovation and emulation in policy feature adoption 
using official state decision-making documentation. The first step is to gather the names 
of all unique policy features associated with a particular policy domain. This is a very 
important step, as the analyst’s selection of policy features determines the number of 
adoption (and consequently, innovation and emulation) choices that are available to 
policymakers across the states. In order to make sure that I was using correctly identified 
and unique policy features, I gathered the names of the policy features evaluated in this 
study from RPS policy experts at DSIRE.  
The policy experts at DSIRE identified the policy features and provide (on their 
website)28 the names of the policy features that they identified: examples of actual policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This did not happen but I discuss it for demonstrative purposes. 
28 The address for this website is http://www.dsireusa.org. The website (prior to its 
redesign in early 2015) had a webpage devoted to each state that had adopted an RPS 
regime. Within each state-specific RPS webpage, policy experts at DSIRE listed the 
names of all policy features that had been adopted by the state in question. I compiled the 
	  37	  
features include when a state includes hydroelectric energy as an eligible renewable 
source within its RPS regime, when a state includes wind energy as an eligible renewable 
source within its RPS regime, when a state includes coal mine methane as an eligible 
renewable source within its RPS regime, when a state specifies that electric utility 
companies meet RPS obligations by procuring a percentage of retail electricity from 
renewable sources, and when a state allows for electric utility companies to meet RPS 
obligations by trading credits. An analyst desiring to apply this step to a different policy 
domain could do so by gathering the names of the policy features associated with that 
policy domain. 
The next step is to identify whether a state has adopted each of the policy features 
whose names were gathered in the previous step. My goal is to code innovation and 
emulation at the level of policy features and since innovation and emulation are distinct 
types of adoption, I must first identify whether a state adopted a particular policy feature. 
In this project, the policy experts at DSIRE also identified whether a state adopted a 
particular policy feature and provide this information in the same area—the state-specific 
RPS webpages within the DSIRE website—where they identify the names of policy 
features that have been adopted in the RPS policy domain. An analyst desiring to apply 
this step to a different policy domain will need to comb through state governmental 
documents to identify whether a state adopted a particular policy feature if he or she does 
not have access to data from an organization (such as DSIRE) that has already compiled 
this information. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
full list of policy features identified by the DSIRE experts by gathering the names of 
adopted policy features across each state-specific RPS webpage. The names of some 
policy feature adoptions are repeated across different states, and it is this repetition or the 
lack thereof that becomes the basis for distinguishing innovation from emulation.   
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The third step is to identify when a given state adopted a particular policy feature. 
Since innovation and emulation are differentiated from one another by the passage of 
time, it is crucial to know when a state adopted a particular policy feature so that I can 
code that state’s policy feature adoption as an example of innovation or emulation. In this 
project, the policy experts at DSIRE did not identify when states adopted policy features 
but did (again, in the state-specific RPS webpages section of the DSIRE website) provide 
the names of government documents in which each state adopted RPS policy features or 
clarified rules pertaining to its RPS regime. I identify when a state adopts a particular 
policy feature by searching through the state government documents named by DSIRE 
and looking for the oldest government document in which a state explicitly mentions that 
a particular policy feature is included in that state’s RPS regime. I then use the approval 
date of this oldest government document as the adoption date for the particular policy 
feature that is added to the state’s RPS regime by that government document.29 
  Examples are helpful here. Maryland has an aggressive RPS regime, and experts 
at DSIRE have identified 15 government documents between 2004—the year in which 
Maryland established its RPS regime—and 2011—the most recent year for which the 
DSIRE experts have verified their RPS data as well as the final year included in this 
study—that pertain to Maryland’s RPS regime. Experts at DSIRE have also identified 
several policy features associated with Maryland’s RPS regime, and here I highlight four: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The approval date of a government document depends on what type of governmental 
actor does the policymaking. The three actors that adopted RPS policy features were state 
legislatures, state public utilities commissions, and citizens using the ballot initiative 
process. For state legislatures, the date of approval was the date during which the final 
version of a bill passed both chambers of a legislature. For state public utilities 
commissions, the date of approval was the date during which commissioners approved 
the final version of a rule. For ballot initiative-driven legislation, the date of approval was 
the date during which voters approved the final version of a ballot proposition.  
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the adoptions of wind, tidal, wave, and solar water heat energy as eligible renewable 
sources within Maryland’s RPS regime. Experts at DSIRE have not identified when 
Maryland adopted the four policy features, so I must search through the 15 government 
documents identified by DSIRE in chronological order and look for the oldest document 
in which Maryland explicitly mentions that each of the four policy features is included in 
its RPS regime. Maryland includes wind, anaerobic decomposition, and wave energy 
sources within its RPS regime with the passage of House Bill 1308 in 2004, and the text 
of the bill explicitly states that a “renewable source means one or more of the following 
types of energy sources” and includes “wind,” “methane from the anaerobic 
decomposition of organic materials,” and “energy from waves” among its listed eligible 
renewable sources (2004). Since Maryland established its RPS regime with House Bill 
1308, I do not need to worry that the state adopted the wind, anaerobic decomposition, 
and wave energy policy features prior to the passage of House Bill 1308 and 
consequently claim that the date of House Bill 1308’s passage (April 10, 2004) is the date 
during which Maryland adopted the wind, anaerobic decomposition, and wave energy 
policy features. 
House Bill 1308 does not mention the fourth policy feature (solar water heat), so 
I must search in chronological order through Maryland’s 14 other government documents 
to identify when Maryland explicitly included solar water heat as an eligible renewable 
source in its RPS regime. I find that Maryland included solar water heat as an eligible 
renewable source under its RPS regime with the passage of Senate Bill 717 in 2011. 
Senate Bill 717 explicitly states that “energy from a solar water heating system is 
eligible for inclusion in meeting the renewable energy portfolio standard” (2011): I 
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therefore claim that Maryland adopted the policy feature of solar water heat on the same 
day (April 5, 2011) that the Maryland legislature passed the final version of Senate Bill 
717.  
It is hopefully clear from the Maryland examples why I start with the oldest 
Maryland document and work in chronological order to the most recent Maryland 
document when I am determining when Maryland adopted its respective policy features. 
It is important to start with the oldest document in order to record the correct date during 
which a state adopted a particular policy feature. Many states (including Maryland) 
repeat the names of the policy features listed in older documents in newer documents in 
order to maintain consistency and reduce ambiguity in legislation and rulemaking. This 
means that Maryland repeats that wind, anaerobic decomposition, and wave energy are 
included as eligible renewable sources within its RPS regime in multiple documents 
between House Bill 1308 (2004) and Senate Bill 717 (2011). If I started with Senate Bill 
717 instead of House Bill 1308, I may incorrectly conclude that Maryland adopted the 
policy features of wind, anaerobic decomposition, and wave energy in 2011 rather than 
2004. Giving the wrong date to the adoption of a policy feature is a serious problem since 
the date of a policy feature’s adoption is used to distinguish innovation from emulation.   
I repeat the process described in the Maryland examples across every state with 
an RPS regime and identify when each state adopted each policy feature within its RPS 
regime.30 This process is extendable to policy domains beyond RPS; however, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 I search through 306 government documents to find out when the 37 states with RPS 
regimes adopted their own respective policy features. The list of government documents 
analyzed in this project is available in the general appendix of this dissertation.  
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challenge for the analyst is to locate government documents that pertain to the policy 
domains under investigation.31 
The fourth and final step involves coding each policy feature adoption from each 
state as a case of innovation or emulation. In the previous step, I time-stamped each 
policy feature of every state, meaning that I now know when each state adopted a 
particular policy feature. Here, I look at the adoption of a particular policy feature across 
the set of states that have adopted that same policy feature, and I look at when each state 
in this set of states adopted that same policy feature in order to determine whether a state 
innovated or emulated when it adopted that particular policy feature.32 
Examples are again useful here, and I return to Maryland’s adoption of the policy 
features of including wind, anaerobic digestion, wave energy, and solar water heat 
within its RPS regime. The operative question to answer is how I should characterize 
each of Maryland’s four policy feature adoptions: is each adoption an example of 
innovation or emulation? 
I begin with Maryland’s adoption of wind as an eligible renewable source within 
its RPS regime. Maryland adopted this policy feature in 2004 while Iowa included wind 
as an eligible renewable source within its RPS regime in 1983. Since Maryland adopted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This “challenge” is predicated on the assumption that other policy domains do not have 
organizations like DSIRE that have already identified the names of government 
documents pertaining to those policy domains An analyst could use keywords and search 
through libraries of government documents to find documents that pertain to a policy 
domain of interest.  
32 Recall the coding rule used here. A particular policy feature’s adoption counts as an 
innovation if state i adopts the particular policy feature before any other state has adopted 
the same policy feature or within one year of state j’s adoption of the same policy feature 
if state j was the first state across all states to adopt the same policy feature. A particular 
policy feature’s adoption counts as an emulation if state i adopts the same policy feature 
as state j but adopts this policy feature at least one year after state j has adopted it.      
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wind as an eligible renewable source over one year after the first state (Iowa) adopted 
wind as an eligible renewable source, Maryland’s adoption of wind as an eligible 
renewable source counts as an example of emulation. I can also work through Maryland’s 
adoption of anaerobic digestion, wave energy, and solar water heat. Maryland adopted 
anaerobic digestion in 2004 while Massachusetts was the first state to adopt anaerobic 
digestion in 2002; since Maryland’s adoption occurred more than one year after the 
adoption by Massachusetts, Maryland’s adoption of anaerobic digestion counts as a case 
of emulation. Maryland also emulated with respect to wave energy, since it adopted this 
policy feature more than six years after Massachusetts became the first state to include 
wave energy as an eligible renewable source within its RPS regime. Finally, Maryland 
emulated with respect to solar water heat since it adopted this policy feature in 2004 
while Texas first adopted solar water heat in 1999.33 
I repeat the coding process described in the aforementioned Maryland examples 
for each case of policy feature adoption34 for every state that has an RPS regime and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 The adoptions of wind by Iowa, of anaerobic digestion and wave energy by 
Massachusetts, and of solar water heat by Texas all represent cases of innovation since in 
all of these cases, policymakers in the adopting states adopted a particular policy feature 
before any other state had adopted that same policy feature or within one year of the first 
state’s adoption of that same policy feature.    
34 I would like to emphasize that in this project, I use all policy features identified by 
DSIRE experts except for those policy features that correspond to the actual amount of 
electricity that electric utility companies must procure from renewable sources (concrete 
examples include Michigan’s policy feature stipulating that electric utility companies 
procure 10% of electricity sold to consumers from renewable sources and Maryland’s 
policy feature stipulating that electric utility companies procure 20% of electricity sold to 
consumers from renewable sources). I do not include policy features dealing with 
standard amounts because it is difficult to see how one standard amount may be a case of 
innovation while other standard amounts may be cases of emulation even though the 
standard amounts in all of the cases are virtually the same. Suppose that four states had 
standard amounts of 10% and that a fifth state developed a new standard amount of 
10.1%. Assume that the fifth state is the only state to have adopted the 10.1% standard 
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thereby create a master dataset that documents innovation and emulation at the level of 
RPS policy features across all states that have established RPS regimes. My coding 
process is agnostic to the type of governmental actor that adopts a particular policy 
feature. This is to say that a policy feature’s adoption registers as an innovation or 
emulation regardless of the type of actor adopting the policy feature: in short, a 
legislature can emulate a regulatory agency and vice versa. My RPS policy feature master 
dataset includes examples where legislatures and public utilities commissions innovate 
and also includes examples where legislatures, public utilities commissions, and citizens 
(operating through the ballot initiative process) emulate.  
I make my coding process agnostic to the type of governmental actor adopting 
policy in order to reflect the possibilities that different kinds of governmental actors can 
take on the risk of innovating; and that (2) legislatures, public utilities commissions, and 
citizens can observe and learn from the policy choices made by other governmental 
actors.35 This coding process is again extendable to policy domains besides RPS and can 
potentially bring insights about the determinants of innovation and emulation in social, 
education, and welfare policy among other policy domains. 
 
2.5 How I Utilize My Coding Process in this Dissertation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
amount. Since the fifth state adopted the 10.1% standard amount before any other state 
has done so (and is actually the only state to have adopted the 10.1% standard amount), 
the fifth state gets coded as an innovator. However, it is difficult to see how the fifth 
state’s adoption of the 10.1% standard amount represents a stark departure from the more 
widespread standard amount of 10%. Although I could utilize my coding method with 
standard amounts, I choose not to do this and only analyze policy features (like what 
sources to include as eligible sources in an RPS regime, or whether to allow utilities to 
trade credits) that represent unique and qualitatively distinct choices from one another.    
35 This is a departure from the work of Walker (1969), who only looked at innovation 
among legislators and ignored the role that regulatory agencies play in policy innovation. 
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Here, I take my master dataset of innovation and emulation in RPS policy feature 
adoptions and use the master dataset as my point of departure for answering theoretically 
important questions about the conditions under which state governments innovate or 
emulate. In chapter 3, I extract legislative instances of innovation and emulation from the 
master dataset and use event history analysis to evaluate how variation in legislative 
professionalism and electoral vulnerability affect the innovation and emulation activity of 
state legislatures. Chapter 3 represents a novel attempt to use the richness and granularity 
of policy feature adoption data combined with the empirical and theoretical 
differentiation of innovation and emulation to explore why legislatures choose a riskier 
form of policy adoption (Bednar 2007; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008; and Cai and 
Treisman 2009). 
 In chapter 4, I extract regulatory instances of innovation and emulation from the 
master dataset and use event history analysis to evaluate whether elected public utilities 
commissioners are more likely to innovate than are appointed public utilities 
commissioners. Chapter 4 represents a novel attempt to evaluate how regulatory agencies 
approach decisions to innovate or emulate and is also novel in terms of how it evaluates 
how a major institutional cleavage, whether public utilities commissioners are elected or 
appointed, affects the innovation and emulation activity of regulatory agencies. 
 In chapters 3 and 4, I do not account for the possibility that unmeasured aspects of 
a legislature’s decision to delegate policy authority to regulatory agencies could decrease 
legislative adoption, increase regulatory adoption, and otherwise affect legislative and 
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regulatory innovation and emulation activity.36 It is possible that a legislature in a 
particular state could simply allow a regulatory agency in that same state to adopt policy 
because the regulatory agency has a history of being an active and influential 
policymaker, and this possibility if true would probably affect estimates about legislative 
and regulatory innovation and emulation activity. A major goal of this project moving 
forward is to understand how the interplay of legislative and regulatory actors within the 
same state could affect the innovation and emulation behavior of legislatures and 
regulatory agencies. 
 In chapter 5, I extract legislative instances of innovation and emulation from the 
master dataset and use these extractions to evaluate when individual legislators embrace 
higher or lower risk when cosponsoring policy features. This chapter applies the 
innovation and emulation distinction to a legislative action—cosponsorship—that has not 
been studied using this distinction. However, my dataset on cosponsorship only includes 
observations from adopted policy features and does not include non-cosponsorship. 
Another goal of this project moving forward is to use the same coding process employed 
in this project to gather data on the cosponsorship of unadopted policy features. I will 
augment data on the cosponsorship of unadopted policy features with data on non-
cosponsorship in order to get a better idea about the determinants of innovation and 
emulation in policy feature cosponsorship. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I did not find evidence (save for the states of Arizona, New York, and Wisconsin after 
2011) of legislatures formally authorizing public utilities commissions to manage all 
aspects of a state’s RPS regime. Uncovering new ways in which a legislature and 
regulatory agency of the same state may influence the choices of one another is a fruitful 
avenue for future work. 
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 Finally, in chapter 6, I discuss a potential opportunity for future analysis that 
utilizes the coding process developed in this project. In this project, I evaluate state 
governmental innovation and emulation at one level of direct federal influence on state 
governments: a negligible level of direct federal influence. While this analysis is useful in 
order to determine why state governments would innovate or emulate absent direct 
federal influence, it does not help evaluate how changes in the amount of federal 
influence exerted on state governmental officials affect the innovation and emulation 
behavior of those state governmental officials. I plan on using my coding process in an 
area where there is variation in federal influence on state governmental officials in order 
to determine how federal influence affects state governmental innovation and emulation.    
 The procedure that I have laid out in this chapter advances the field of policy 
adoption and diffusion in three ways. First, I identify a way to separate innovation from 
emulation and make them distinct outcomes that can be analyzed using the tools of 
quantitative social science. Although a number of scholars, including Walker (1969), 
Gray (1973), Boushey (2010), and Boehmke and Skinner (2012), have analyzed the 
determinants of policy innovativeness in the American states and also described 
innovation and emulation as representing distinct choices, none of these scholars devised 
a method of disentangling innovation from emulation and analyzed two outcomes as a 
single continuous outcome. My method of separating innovation from emulation allows 
analysts to determine how exogenous factors may differentially influence these two 
related but distinct types of policy adoption. 
 Second, the method that I develop here unites work on policy adoption with work 
on the diffusion, or spread, of policy. Early scholarship on policy innovativeness (Walker 
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1969 is a preeminent example) sought to identify unit-specific and non-spatial 
determinants of innovation in state policymaking (Franzese and Hays 2010). However, 
pioneering work by Berry and Berry (1990) linking the use of event history analysis to 
the study of diffusion ushered in a wave of research (Mintrom 1997; Volden 2006; and 
Pacheco 2012 are examples) where the focus of scholarship was no longer on unit-
specific determinants of state policy innovativeness but rather directed toward the spatial 
determinants of the spread of policy across states. My method, which directly models the 
innovation and emulation distinction within the event history framework that largely 
made the switch to the study of diffusion possible, could allow for analysts to 
simultaneously study policy innovativeness and diffusion. 
 Third, my focus on the policy feature as the unit of adoption introduces a richness 
and granularity to the study of policy adoption and diffusion that is difficult to reproduce 
when employing the policy regime as the unit of adoption. The use of the policy feature 
as the unit of analysis opens up opportunities for the study of adoption by allowing 
scholars to incorporate greater diversity in state policymaking into their datasets of 
interest.              
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CHAPTER 3 
Professionalism, Reelection, and Legislative Policy Innovation in the 
American States 
 
Abstract 
Scholars and policymakers have long argued that devolution promotes 
policy innovation. Possessing local knowledge and responding to local concerns, 
state lawmakers in a devolutionary environment engineer innovative solutions 
that are tailored to local problems and make their states “laboratories” of 
innovation. However, recent formal work in political science suggests that state 
lawmakers in a devolutionary environment may emulate (or copy policy) rather 
than innovate, as these lawmakers may face resource limitations and not want to 
endanger reelection prospects by innovating. Here, I leverage an original dataset 
from a developed policy area—renewable energy portfolio policy between 1983 
and 2011—to empirically examine how variation in legislative professionalism 
and electoral vulnerability affects whether state-level lawmakers innovate or 
emulate. Modeling innovation and emulation as distinct and alternate choices and 
using multiple statistical analyses, I find that lawmakers are more likely to prefer 
emulation to innovation given increases in legislative professionalism or electoral 
vulnerability. The results challenge the view that state lawmakers naturally 
innovate given devolution and suggest that some federalization or subsidization of 
risk may be necessary to spur innovation by state lawmakers.
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3.1 Introduction 
The idea that devolution fosters innovative policy outcomes has a long history 
within political science as well as the broader policymaking community. Justice 
Brandeis, for example, mentioned (that) “a single courageous state may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country”  (New State Ice Company v. Liebmann 1932). Several decades 
later, politicians from both parties invoked the view that devolution increases innovation 
to “end welfare as we know it” and transform welfare into a decentralized program 
(quoted in Apple 1995). Political scientists have also corroborated this view and 
investigated the process of state policy innovation (Walker 1969). 
    The argument linking devolution to the view that the states are innovation 
laboratories is straightforward. Giving policy responsibility to the states takes policy 
responsibility away from one actor (the federal government) and distributes it among fifty 
actors. Lawmakers in each of the fifty states respond to fifty different median voters and 
craft policies that they hope will appeal to each of those median voters. The result is a 
diversity in policymaking that would arguably be diminished if policy responsibility were 
centralized in the hands of a federal actor. Indeed, a rich literature on the diffusion of 
innovations across the states (Gray 1973; Berry and Berry 1990; Mintrom 1997; Volden 
(2002b, 2006); Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Boehmke and Witmer 
2004; Berry and Baybeck 2005; Nicholson-Crotty 2009; and Pacheco 2012) lends 
credence to the belief that devolution fosters innovation. 
However, there is also reason to believe that devolution may not unlock the 
innovation potential of the states. If we take Brandeis’s discussion of “novel” 
	  50	  
policymaking literally and define innovation as a state’s adoption of a policy that has not 
been adopted before (meaning that it is “untested”) in another state, then there are two 
potential impediments to innovation. One impediment, demonstrated in a formal piece by 
Kollman, Miller, and Page (2000), comes from the view that innovation is resource 
intensive: lawmakers must figure out how to turn untested proposals into effective 
policies, and this task is easier if lawmakers possess resources that they can utilize to 
research about prospective innovations. Lawmakers at the state-level may not possess 
such resources, meaning that innovation at the state-level may not be likely. 
The second impediment comes from formal work by Rose-Ackerman (1980), Volden, 
Ting, and Carpenter (2008), and Cai and Treisman (2009), and reflects the idea that the 
risk-aversion of lawmakers may inhibit innovation. If we believe Mayhew (1974) and 
think that lawmakers prioritize and pursue reelection, then it is possible that electorally 
vulnerable lawmakers may refrain from innovating due to the concern that innovating is 
risky because policy candidates for innovation have not been tested in comparable 
settings: simply put, the risk of innovating scares away reelection-seeking lawmakers. 
 The possibility that state-level lawmakers refrain from innovating suggests that 
they may prefer emulation, or the copying of a policy that already exists in another state. 
A policy candidate for emulation in state i has already been tested in state j, meaning that 
lawmakers in state i can free-ride off of the experiences of lawmakers in state j and tell 
voters that they are replicating “successes” found in state j (Volden 2006; and Pacheco 
2012). A low legislative resource capacity may increase the likelihood of emulation as 
lawmakers operating in low informational environments view free-riding as a more 
accessible alternative to innovation. And since devolution involves transferring policy 
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responsibility from a (better resourced) federal legislature to (less resourced) state 
legislatures, it may increase emulation. At the same time, reelection-seeking lawmakers 
may prefer emulation to innovation since they gain the benefits of policy experimentation 
without paying the costs. And since devolution increases the number of comparable 
sources to emulate, it may increase emulation.37 
 Formal contributions from Kollman, Miller, and Page (2000), Rose-Ackerman 
(1980), Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008), and Cai and Treisman (2009), highlight the 
possibility that devolution could foster copycatting and turn the states into laboratories of 
emulation and not innovation. This possibility has normative implications because it 
suggests that a major justification for devolution (the increased diversity and 
innovativeness of policymaking) may not actually transpire given devolution. In this 
chapter, I analyze the policy adoption behavior of state legislatures in a devolved policy 
area—the development of renewables portfolio standards (or RPS programs) specifying 
that electricity used within the states come from renewable sources—and empirically 
evaluate how state-level variation in legislative professionalism (a common proxy for 
legislative resource capacity in the state politics literature) and electoral vulnerability 
affects the innovation and emulation behavior of state legislatures. I look at state 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 A major assumption in the policy adoption literature, which I follow here, is that 
lawmakers emulate choices that have been made in comparable or peer settings. This 
assumption reflects the idea that choices made in comparable units are more likely to be 
successful in unit i compared to choices made in dissimilar units. Therefore, while the 
federal government could ostensibly emulate the states and vice versa, I do not take up 
this matter here because the federal and state governments are not comparable units (they 
are exposed to problems of different scale and scope due to differences in jurisdictional 
responsibilities). An extension of this assumption is that a given state government has 
more potential peer units to emulate than the federal government. The federal 
government could ostensibly emulate Mexico or France, but the differences between the 
United States and France are assumed to be greater than the differences between Illinois 
and Indiana.         
	  52	  
legislative behavior under devolution to get a picture of how state legislatures act given 
an absence of federal involvement: a hallmark of devolution is a drastic reduction or even 
lack of federal involvement in the state policymaking process through rulemaking and 
grant giving (Peterson 1995); the federal government left RPS program development in 
the hands of the states (Rabe 2006), suggesting that the RPS policy area serves as a good 
laboratory to explore state legislative behavior in the absence of federal incentives. 
    Here, I also depart from convention in the empirical state policy adoption 
literature and frame innovation and emulation as distinct choices that state legislatures 
can make when they are adopting policy. Reframing innovation and emulation as distinct 
choices allows us to see whether legislative professionalism and electoral vulnerability 
have differential effects on innovation and emulation behavior and also allows us to 
evaluate empirically whether high legislative professionalism increases (decreases) the 
likelihood of innovation (emulation) and high electoral vulnerability decreases 
(increases) the likelihood of innovation (emulation). Using multiple statistical estimation 
techniques, I find support for the claim that removing federal influence from the state 
policymaking process may inhibit the innovativeness of state legislatures. Although high 
electoral vulnerability does not appear to lower the likelihood of innovation, it does 
increase the likelihood of emulation, suggesting that lawmakers who believe that they are 
facing an electoral threat will want to copy existing policy rather than create novel 
solutions. Moreover, I find no evidence that high legislative professionalism increases the 
likelihood of innovation but find strong evidence that high legislative professionalism 
increases the likelihood of emulation: this result is attributable to the idea that highly 
professional legislatures may be using their resources to conduct wider and more 
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thorough searches of existing policy rather than creating novel solutions. Taken together, 
the results suggest that I, in future research, explore whether federal involvement in the 
state policymaking process may increases the innovativeness of state policymaking. 
 The chapter proceeds as follows. I first situate my definitions of innovation and 
emulation within the broader policy adoption literature and explain why I believe that 
these new definitions map on nicely to the idea that innovation and emulation represent 
qualitatively distinct choices to policymakers. I then list hypotheses specifying potential 
ways in which legislative professionalism and electoral vulnerability could differentially 
affect the innovation and emulation behavior of state legislatures operating under 
devolution. I next describe my empirical procedure and results. Finally, I recap findings 
and discuss implications of the study. 
 
3.2 Making Innovation and Emulation Distinct Types of Policy Adoption 
 While policy adoption scholars have long recognized that adopting untested 
policy and copying existing policy represent different conceptual actions, they have 
refrained largely from modeling innovation and emulation as distinct policy adoption 
choices.38 Walker (1969), for example, characterizes innovation as the adoption of “a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Important exceptions are Volden (2006) and Shipan and Volden (2008). Volden (2006) 
analyzes state-level legislative and bureaucratic emulation in a policy area with 
substantial federal intervention (the Children’s Health Insurance Program) but does not 
model innovation explicitly or analyze how state-level legislative professionalism and 
electoral vulnerability comparatively affect the likelihood of innovation and emulation 
under devolution (the object of this study). In their 2008 study on the adoption of 
municipal antismoking policies, Shipan and Volden describe imitation as the act of 
copying another unit’s policies in order to look like that unit but do not investigate 
innovation as a separate choice. Unlike Shipan and Volden, I do not identify different 
kinds of emulation but rather compare emulation to innovation. I also assume, in line the 
policy adoption literature, that a chief benefit of emulating is that state i can learn from 
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program or policy, which is new to the states adopting it, no matter how old the program 
may be or how many other states have adopted it,” implying that a state could be an 
innovator regardless of when (with respect to other states) it chooses to adopt policy 
(1969: 881). Gray (1973) uses the same definition of innovation and shows that a given 
policy diffuses across the states in a S-shaped pattern.39 Boehmke and Skinner (2012) 
modify Walker’s measure of innovativeness to distinguish non-adopters from late 
adopters but do not make innovation and emulation distinct. Other foundational work on 
policy adoption and diffusion, including Berry and Berry (1990) and Mintrom (1997), 
also utilizes Walker’s conceptualization of innovation and does not frame innovation and 
emulation as separate choices. 
 The decision to define innovation based on novelty to state i rather than novelty 
across all states is understandable in light of the fact that novel advances in policymaking 
sometimes occur in enforcement and implementation rather than adoption. However, this 
definition does not acknowledge that untested policy adoptions are different from tested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the experiences of state j: thus while state i may emulate state j in order to look like state 
j, it is also hoping to learn from state j.    
39 Walker (1969) and Gray (1973), to be fair, mention “early” and “late” adopters. 
Walker devises an “innovativeness score” for state i that equals the number of years 
between state i’s adoption of a policy and the first state’s adoption of that same policy 
divided by the total number of years in which states have been adopting the policy (if 
Massachusetts adopts policy X ten years after the Iowa becomes the first state to adopt X 
and states have been adopting X for twenty years, Massachusetts receives a score of 0.5). 
However, the innovativeness score does not account for the possibility that a state (for 
example, Ohio) adopting X two years after Iowa adopted it may encounter a very 
different choice risk from Iowa because Ohio can learn from Iowa. Ohio may still appear 
to be “innovative” since states have been adopting X for twenty years, but Ohio is still 
able to learn from Iowa and may even find the recency of Iowa’s experience to be 
especially informative! Making innovation and emulation distinct choices allows us to 
capture a scenario where Ohio learns from and values the recency of Iowa’s experiences. 
Gray (1973) defines early adopters as the first ten states to adopt a law but this again does 
not account for the possibility that the fourth state to adopt a law could be learning from 
the experiences of the first state. 
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policy adoptions because the lack of a track record potentially makes the untested 
adoptions riskier than tested adoptions. By categorizing innovation and emulation as 
distinct choices, we can compare the effects of legislative professionalism and electoral 
vulnerability on innovation and emulation under devolution and thus explore empirically 
whether the concerns of Rose-Ackerman (1980), Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008), 
and Cai and Treisman (2009) are borne out. 
 Here and throughout the dissertation, I define innovation as the choice by 
policymakers to adopt a policy before any other state has adopted that same policy. Since 
it is possible that policymakers across multiple states could be deciding simultaneously 
whether to innovate with respect to the same policy, I also define innovation as the choice 
by policymakers in a given state to adopt a policy within one calendar year after another 
state became the first state to adopt that same policy.40 I consider emulation to be the 
choice by policymakers in a given state to adopt a policy at least one calendar year after 
another state became the first state to adopt that same policy. Distinguishing innovation 
from emulation based on a one-year (from the date of first adoption) timespan is not 
arbitrary: the diffusion literature assumes that learning takes time, and one-year is 
commonly employed (see Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006; Swank 2006; and 
Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008 for examples) to reflect the amount of time required 
for policymakers in state i to learn about decision-making in state j. Since the choice to 
emulate assumes that policymakers in state i free-ride (and learn) from the experiences of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 By way of example, suppose that Ohio is the first state to adopt a specific policy in 
May 2009 while Michigan adopts that same policy in June 2009. We cannot claim fairly 
that Ohio innovated while Michigan emulated because the two states were likely 
simultaneously deciding whether to adopt that same policy. Relaxing the definition of 
innovation to include adoptions within one calendar year of the first state’s adoption gets 
around the simultaneous adoption problem.  
	  56	  
policymakers in state j, using the standard temporal representation of learning (one-year) 
to distinguish innovation from emulation makes sense. We can now turn to investigating 
whether state-level variation in legislative professionalism and electoral vulnerability has 
different effects on innovation versus emulation in devolved policy settings. 
 
3.3 Examining Legislative Innovation and Emulation under Devolution 
 Before I list hypotheses about how variation in legislative professionalism and 
electoral vulnerability affect the innovation and emulation choices of legislatures, it is 
useful to discuss why legislatures innovate or emulate in the first place. Innovation and 
emulation are types of policy adoption; therefore, a discussion of why legislatures choose 
to innovate or emulate must consider why legislatures adopt policy. The literature on 
policy adoption clearly states why a legislature adopts policy: because members of the 
legislature desire reelection (Mayhew 1974), they adopt policy that they believe voters 
demand in hopes of gaining electoral support from those voters. Many scholars 
(including Walker 1969; Berry and Berry 1990; and Pacheco 2012) have linked policy 
adoption to the reelection desires of members of a legislature, and I follow this 
assumption here. 
 Since a legislature adopts policy when its members believe that doing so will 
improve their reelection chances and does not adopt policy when its members believe that 
doing so will not improve their reelection chances, the question shifts to why a legislature 
chooses to innovate rather than emulate when it adopts policy. Voters expect that their 
legislative members will both adopt the policies that they (the voters) desire and also 
serve as competent policy adopters (Pitkin 1967; and Volden 2006), and voters will 
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electorally reward or punish legislative members based on their opinions about the 
members’ performances with respect to policymaking (Fiorina 1981; Ashworth 2012; and 
Bartels 2014). Based on their motivation for reelection, legislative members also want to 
be seen as competent policy adopters, and one way to develop a reputation for 
competence is to avoid adopting policies that could create significant and unanticipated 
costs for voters (Arnold 1990).            
Adopting policies that create significant and unanticipated costs for voters could 
harm the reelection prospects of legislative members if voters are cost minimizers (as 
Arnold 1990 suggests they are) and view the significant and unanticipated costs from 
policy adoption as evidence of policymaking incompetence on the part of legislative 
members (Ashworth 2012; and Bartels 2014). A hypothetical example from RPS policy 
illustrates how adopting a policy that creates significant and unanticipated costs for voters 
could jeopardize the electoral security of legislative members. Suppose that voters in 
Michigan want their representatives to lessen the state’s dependence on foreign oil, and 
suppose that the Michigan legislature responds to the concerns of voters by requiring that 
electric utility companies procure 40% of the electricity sold to consumers from 
renewable sources. Now suppose that Michigan’s electric utility companies see their 
profitability threatened by this new regulation and initiate large rate increases to maintain 
profitability. Although Michigan voters desired legislative action to foster energy 
independence, they may be unhappy with the costs—large rate increases—associated 
with the legislature’s policy choice and may punish legislative members for perceived 
incompetence in policymaking. 
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 Members of a legislature therefore want to avoid adopting policies that could 
potentially create significant and unanticipated costs for voters, and one way to avoid this 
situation is to emulate when adopting policy. Emulation reduces the uncertainty 
associated with adopting a policy because an emulating legislature in state i can utilize 
the track record of a policy’s performance in other states to determine whether the policy 
will generate significant and unanticipated costs for voters upon that policy’s adoption in 
state i (Volden 2006). However, emulation requires the legislature in state i to import a 
policy that was designed in the context of a different state and hope that the imported 
policy will be deemed a good fit and be well received by voters in state i upon adoption 
(Volden 2006). Innovation, on the other hand, allows for the legislature in state i to 
uniquely tailor an adopted policy to the specific context of state i and may receive more 
support from the state’s voters than emulation since it does a better job of addressing 
their particularistic and specific concerns. The risk of innovation for members of the 
legislature, however, is that it carries greater uncertainty than emulation since legislative 
members cannot utilize an existing track record to determine whether an innovative 
policy will create significant and unanticipated costs for voters upon adoption.  
 The choice between innovation and emulation thus represents a tradeoff between 
adopting a policy that is uniquely tailored to the context of a specific state but that carries 
high uncertainty about whether the policy will generate significant and unanticipated 
costs upon adoption versus adopting a policy that is not uniquely tailored to the context 
of a specific state but that carries low uncertainty about whether the policy will generate 
significant and unanticipated costs upon adoption (Bednar 2007). 
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 This situation described above arguably occurred in 1994, when Minnesota 
became the first state to mandate that electric utility companies must meet part of their 
RPS obligation by procuring electricity from biomass-derived energy when its legislature 
passed Senate File 1706. Although the measure had support from the state’s agricultural 
and environmental communities, many advocated for a pared down RPS system that 
more closely followed Iowa’s existing RPS program out of fear that Minnesota’s electric 
utility companies would push for unpopular rate increases in response to the biomass 
requirement. Minnesota became a leader in the area of biomass-based renewables, 
although one could see how rate increases by electric utility companies could have 
derailed the 1994 effort.    
In sum, a legislature that innovates may be able to uniquely fit a policy to its 
state-specific context but cannot utilize the existing track record of that policy’s adoption 
to determine whether the policy will create significant and unanticipated costs upon 
adoption. A legislature that emulates may not be able to uniquely fit a policy to its state-
specific context but can utilize the existing track record of that policy’s adoption to 
determine whether the policy will create significant and unanticipated costs upon 
adoption. Increases in legislative professionalism may change the nature of the choice 
between innovation and emulation by providing legislatures with the research tools 
needed to better predict whether innovation will generate significant and unanticipated 
costs upon adoption. Increases in electoral vulnerability may also change the nature of the 
choice between innovation and emulation by making legislative members more apt to 
avoid adopting policies that carry high degrees of outcome uncertainty. I now show how 
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legislative professionalism and electoral vulnerability influence a legislature’s likelihood 
to innovate and emulate.  
I first analyze how variation in legislative professionalism affects the innovation 
and emulation behavior of state legislatures. Although they use a different definition of 
innovation from the one employed here, scholars such as Walker (1969) and Boushey 
(2010) argue that higher levels of legislative professionalism correspond with an 
increased likelihood of innovation.41 According to Walker and others, higher levels of 
legislative professionalism raise the likelihood of innovation because highly professional 
legislatures can devote more resources (in terms of time, money, and staff) toward 
researching how “new” proposals can meet some area of voter demand.42 Walker even 
claims, for example, that “the states which provide the most extensive staff and research 
facilities in their legislatures ought to pioneer in the adoption of new programs” (1969: 
885). 
 The positive association found between legislative professionalism and innovation 
in Walker (1969) should persist when we use the more stringent definition of innovation 
developed in this paper. This is because the same resources—time, compensation, and 
staff size—that lower the cost to legislatures of researching how “new” proposals (where 
“new” equals Walker’s definition) meet some area of voter demand also lower the cost to 
legislatures of researching how untested and novel (“new” in my parlance) proposals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Recall that Walker (1969) defines innovation as the adoption of a policy that is “new” 
to the state adopting it while I define innovation as the adoption of a policy that is “new” 
(within one-year of the first state’s adoption) across the states adopting it.  
42 A “voter,” if we follow Brandeis’s claim that a legislature in state i experiments with 
policy if “its citizens so choose” is assumed to be the median voter in state i. The 
literature also assumes that a legislature’s choice occurs with the consent of the median 
legislator. 
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meet some area of voter demand. In fact, work that links devolution to potential decreases 
in innovation on the grounds that the federal government possesses more resources than 
state governments (e.g. Kollman, Miller, and Page 2000) assumes implicitly that 
increased professionalism in state government should correspond with greater state-level 
innovation. I therefore expect that higher levels of legislative professionalism correspond 
with an increased likelihood of innovation, or the adoption of untested policy, by state 
legislatures. 
Legislative Professionalism Innovation Hypothesis: Higher levels of legislative 
professionalism correspond to an increased likelihood of innovation by state legislatures. 
A state’s level of legislative professionalism also potentially affects whether that 
state’s legislature emulates when it adopts policy. It may appear as if legislative 
professionalism should relate negatively with emulation since less professional state 
legislatures face higher costs to researching about prospective policy proposals (by virtue 
of not possessing sufficient time, money, and staff resources) and therefore have an 
incentive to emulate and free-ride off of the experiences of other states.  
This line of reasoning, however, is misleading because it assumes that more 
professional state legislatures do not benefit from free-riding off of the experiences of 
other states. More professional state legislatures arguably gain the same core benefit from 
free-riding that less professional state legislatures gain: the opportunity to learn from the 
lessons of other states and adopt policies that have the potential to replicate “successes” 
(Volden 2006) found elsewhere. Additionally, more professional state legislatures may 
have a greater capacity to learn from the experiences of other states compared to less 
professional peers. Highly professional legislatures can devote more resources toward 
	  62	  
doing the sorts of activities—establishing fact-finding commissions and authorizing staff 
to interview colleagues in other states—that foster learning. This implies that highly 
professional legislatures can conduct wider and more thorough searches than can less 
professional legislatures, leading to the possibility that legislative professionalism 
increases the likelihood of emulation by increasing the ability of legislatures to identify 
and vet policies that are potentially considered to be worthy of emulating.43 
The relationship between legislative professionalism and emulation does not end 
there: legislative professionalism may actually increase the likelihood of emulation more 
than it increases the likelihood of innovation. My explanation here centers on the relative 
ability of institutions within a professionalized legislature—think committees and 
subcommittees of well-compensated legislators, fact-finding commissions, and staff 
study groups—to gain information about the potential ramifications (with respect to 
meeting the demands of the median voter) of innovating versus emulating. The potential 
ramifications of an innovative proposal, by virtue of its untested nature, are hard to 
predict, meaning that committees and subcommittees, commissions, and staff study 
groups cannot give concrete information to the general legislature about how an 
innovation will affect constituents because these experts do not have a basis (either from 
their own experience or the experiences of other states) for evaluating how the innovation 
will affect constituents. Committees and subcommittees, commissions, and staff study 
groups possess a stronger basis for evaluating how an emulation will affect constituents 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 It may seem strange that legislative professionalism hypothetically increases the 
likelihood of innovation and emulation given that innovation and emulation are assumed 
to be distinct types of policy adoption. Remember, however, that the hypotheses describe 
trends in state policy adoptions over time, suggesting that an increase in the likelihood of 
innovation does not necessarily imply a decrease in the likelihood of emulation and vice 
versa.     
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and can even give the general legislature concrete examples—what Volden (2006) terms 
“evidence of success”—of how adoption of the policy played out in peer states. To the 
degree that a highly professional legislature values and follows confident advice from its 
institutional intelligence-gathering mechanisms, it will tend to emulate rather than 
innovate when adopting policy. 
Legislative Professionalism Emulation Hypothesis: Higher levels of legislative 
professionalism correspond to an increased likelihood of emulation by state legislatures. 
Moreover, legislative professionalism increases the likelihood of emulation more than it 
increases the likelihood of innovation. 
We now explore the relationship between electoral vulnerability and the 
innovation and emulation behavior of state legislatures.44 The extant policy adoption 
literature suggests two ways in which variation in electoral vulnerability differentially 
affects legislative innovation and emulation. One claim centers on the idea that 
lawmakers refrain from innovating when they face concerns about reelection, as the 
lawmakers do not want to jeopardize reelection chances by adopting policy that has not 
been tested before in a similar context. This claim suggests that a legislature experiences 
a decreased likelihood of innovating as the electoral vulnerability of members of that 
legislature increases. 
Electoral Vulnerability Innovation Hypothesis: As the electoral vulnerability of 
members of a legislature increases, that legislature experiences a decreased likelihood of 
innovating. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 One may imagine that legislative professionalism and electoral vulnerability have 
interactive effects on innovation and emulation. A term that captures Legislative 
Professionalism*Electoral Vulnerability fails to achieve statistical significance in any of 
the model specifications used in the paper. 
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The second claim centers on the idea that lawmakers experience an increased 
likelihood of emulating when they face concerns about reelection. What makes emulation 
so alluring for lawmakers is that they not only signal to constituents that they are 
adopting policies that advance the constituents’ demands but also offer empirical proof to 
constituents that desired policy solutions have worked in comparable settings (see Volden 
2006 or Pacheco 2012). Electorally vulnerable lawmakers may place added emphasis on 
pursuing policies that have demonstrated and observable results, as these lawmakers may 
be trying to maintain credibility with potentially skeptical constituents. As the electoral 
vulnerability of members of a legislature increases, that legislature potentially 
experiences an increased likelihood of emulating. 
Electoral Vulnerability Emulation Hypothesis: As the electoral vulnerability of 
members of a legislature increases, that legislature experiences an increased likelihood 
of emulating. 
 
3.4 Empirical Strategy for Evaluating Hypotheses 
 I evaluate my hypotheses by investigating state legislative innovation and 
emulation choices with respect to RPS policymaking. A RPS consists of a set of policies 
that seek to encourage the consumption of renewable energy by specifying that utilities 
produce or supply electricity from renewable sources (Rabe 2006).45 RPS serves as an 
excellent laboratory for examining the policy adoption activity of state legislatures under 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Specific RPS policies include what sources a state considers to be “renewable” (e.g. 
coal gasification, hydroelectric, and solar thermal electric, etc.), the type of standard (e.g. 
amount of retail electricity supplied, amount of generating capacity, etc.), and whether 
utilities can meet RPS requirements by trading renewable certificates, or “credits.” I 
document the full list of RPS policies in the appendix of the dissertation.  
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devolution because the federal government has ignored RPS policymaking and left this 
matter to the states. In 1983, Iowa’s legislature made Iowa the first state to adopt a set of 
RPS policies; between that year and 2011, the most recent year for which verifiable data 
are available, 36 other states have developed RPS programs.46 
 RPS also serves as a suitable laboratory for investigating legislative policy 
adoption because the vast majority of state RPS policies have been adopted through 
legislative means (Rabe 2006): of the 609 cases of state RPS policy adoption analyzed in 
this project, 496 (or 81.4%) occurred through legislative means while 87 (or 14.2%) 
occurred through public utility commission rulemaking and 26 (or 4.2%) occurred 
through the ballot initiative process. The dominance of the legislature as the preferred 
route of policy adoption continues if we decompose the cases of policy adoption into 
respective cases of innovation and emulation: of 110 total cases of innovation, 91 (or 
82.7%) occurred through legislative means while 19 (17.2%) occurred through public 
utility commission rulemaking (there is no record of any state innovating through the 
ballot initiative process); with respect to emulation, 405 out of 499 (81.1%) of cases 
occurred through legislative means while 68 out of 499 (13.6%) of cases occurred 
through public utility commission rulemaking and 26 out of 499 (5.2%) of cases occurred 
through the ballot initiative process. The overwhelming preponderance of legislative 
cases of policy adoption is a virtue of the data, as we want to evaluate how variation in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 My primary source of data was the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and 
Efficiency (DSIRE), the preeminent source for information on state RPS policymaking. 
The chief policy analyst at DSIRE informed me through telephone correspondence that 
2011 was the last year for which DSIRE had verified state RPS policy information. 
DSIRE is a collaborative endeavor of the United States Department of Energy, the 
Interstate Renewable Energy Council, and the North Carolina Solar Center. 
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the professionalism and electoral vulnerability of legislatures affects the innovation and 
emulation activity of those legislatures. 
 A huge component of this project’s data processing design involves distinguishing 
innovation from emulation in each RPS policy adoption and then isolating those cases 
where legislatures did the innovating and emulating. I first identify cases of state RPS 
policy adoption irrespective of the actor—whether it was a legislature, a public utility 
commission, or citizens using the ballot initiative process—adopting the policy. I then 
classify a specific RPS policy adoption as an example of innovation if state i adopts the 
policy before any other state adopted the same policy, or if state i adopts the same policy 
within a year after state j became the first state to adopt that same policy.47 I classify a 
specific RPS policy adoption as an example of emulation if state i adopts a policy at least 
one year after state j became the first state to adopt that same policy. Legislative 
innovation and emulation simply describe cases where a legislature did the innovating 
and emulating. 
 Deciphering innovation and emulation requires that we obtain information on 
what RPS policies each state adopted as well as when each state adopted those policies. I 
gathered information about whether a state adopted a particular RPS policy by consulting 
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, or DSIRE. Analysts at 
DSIRE created a comprehensive list of state RPS policies and identified the exact RPS 
policies that each state adopted. Analysts at DSIRE also name the enabling documents (a 
legislative act, public utility commission decision, or ballot amendment) that correspond 
to each state’s adoption of RPS policy. I organize the 306 enabling documents in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Remember that I relax the definition of innovation to account for the possibility that 
states i and j may simultaneously be considering whether to adopt the same policy.  
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chronological order and then assign a date to when state i adopted each of its RPS 
policies. I then code a specific policy adoption as a case of innovation or emulation based 
on whether a state adopted that policy within (or outside) of the one-year threshold 
discussed earlier. 
 In the chapter, I investigate two outcomes of interest. Legislative Innovation is a 
binary variable capturing those instances of state legislative RPS policy adoption that 
meet this paper’s definition of innovation while Legislative Emulation is a binary 
variable capturing those instances of state legislative RPS policy adoption that meet this 
paper’s definition of emulation. I structure the dependent data according to the 
conventions of event history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 2004): this 
means that the choice to adopt a specific RPS policy enters the risk set for all states 
during the same year in which state i becomes the first state to adopt (in other words, 
innovate) that policy.48 Once the choice to adopt a policy enters a state’s risk set, it 
remains in that state’s risk set until that state adopts the policy and the choice exits the 
dataset.49 In total, there are 35,381 legislative choice opportunities; innovation occurred 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 All states experience the risk of adopting a policy during the same year in which a state 
became the first state to adopt that policy since multiple states may be simultaneously 
considering whether to adopt that policy. 
49 This chapter is about legislative innovation and emulation. But I reemphasize here that 
policy adoption choices enter and exit the dataset based on adoption decisions made by 
all actors within and across the states. The 1996 decision by Arizona’s public utilities 
commission to innovate by classifying solar thermal process heat as an eligible RPS 
resource implies that Arizona’s legislature (from 1996 onward) does not have the choice 
to add solar thermal process heat since the adoption by Arizona’s public utility 
commission means that this choice has exited the risk set for Arizona’s legislature. 
Arizona’s 1996 innovation also implies that the opportunity to adopt solar thermal 
process heat as an eligible renewable resource enters the risk set of the legislatures of the 
49 other states in 1996. This opportunity exits the risk set of any one of the 49 other state 
legislatures if a legislature, a public utility commission, or citizens (through ballot 
initiative) in a given state adopts solar thermal process heat as an eligible resource.      
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in 91 (or 0.25%) of these opportunities while emulation occurred in 405 (or 1.14%) of 
these opportunities. The low probability of policy adoption (1.40% of opportunities, or 
(496/35,381)*100) is rightly low, as a specific kind of policy adoption (RPS 
policymaking) is not an everyday occurrence. Furthermore, the probability of innovation 
is correctly lower than the probability of emulation, as the policy adoption literature 
indicates that innovation is both riskier and rarer than emulation. 
There are three explanatory variables of interest in this chapter. The first, 
Legislative Professionalism, captures state i’s legislature’s level of professionalism in 
year t. I measure a state legislature’s level of professionalism using Squire’s (2007) index 
of state legislative professionalism. Squire’s index is the preeminent measure of 
legislative professionalism available in the state politics literature and compares a given 
state legislature to Congress—the prototypical professional legislature—with respect to 
three factors: time demands of legislative service (session length), salary and benefits, 
and staff resources.50 A positive and significant association between Legislative 
Professionalism and Legislative Innovation gives support for the Legislative 
Professionalism Innovation Hypothesis. The Legislative Professionalism Emulation 
Hypothesis receives support if Legislative Professionalism relates positively with 
Legislative Emulation and the magnitude of association between Legislative 
Professionalism and Legislative Emulation is greater than that between Legislative 
Professionalism and Legislative Innovation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Squire’s professionalism measure is the sum of three individual comparisons that 
capture state i’s legislature’s session length, salary, and staff resources as percentages of 
Congress’ amount of these three items.   
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The second and third explanatory variables capture different characterizations of 
legislative electoral vulnerability. Legislative Election Year is a binary variable capturing 
whether an election is held for seats in state i’s legislature in year t. The assumption here 
is that electoral vulnerability of legislators increases during the year of a legislative 
election since voters arguably pay more attention to the actions of incumbents during 
election years compared to off-years. A negative and significant association between 
Legislative Election Year and Legislative Innovation gives support to the Electoral 
Vulnerability Innovation Hypothesis while a positive and significant association between 
Legislative Election Year and Legislative Emulation gives support to the Electoral 
Vulnerability Emulation Hypothesis.  
The second electoral vulnerability variable, Incumbent Vote Share, captures the 
median vote share value that was earned by an incumbent legislator running for 
reelection in state i in the most recent election before time t.51 Incumbent Vote Share 
reflects the possibility that the decisions of state i’s legislators in time t could be 
influenced by the mood of voters toward state i’s legislative incumbents in time t-1: an 
anti-incumbent mood in time t-1 may elicit the impression of vulnerability among 
legislators in time t and ultimately influence policy adoption activity. A positive and 
significant association between Incumbent Vote Share and Legislative Innovation gives 
support to the Electoral Vulnerability Innovation Hypothesis while a negative and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 State legislative election data comes from Klarner, Berry, Carsey, Jewell, Niemi, 
Powell, and Snyder. I thank Anthony Fowler for providing this data.   
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significant association between Incumbent Vote Share and Legislative Emulation gives 
support to the Electoral Vulnerability Emulation Hypothesis.52 
I incorporate a battery of controls, which fall into four groups. The first group 
includes variables that could affect legislative professionalism and legislative policy 
adoption activity by potentially affecting the amount of resources that are available to 
legislators. Percentage of State Per Capita Income captures state i’s per capita income in 
year t as a percentage of U.S. per capita income in year t and accounts for the possibility 
that state wealth is the real driver of legislative professionalism and legislative innovation 
activity. Term Limits is binary and equals 1 if state i enacted legislative term limits by 
year t and 0 otherwise. Term Limits could reduce legislative professionalism (Kousser 
2005) and reduce the likelihood of legislative innovation as a result of reduced 
professionalism; at the same time, Term Limits could increase the likelihood of legislative 
innovation by weakening the reelection concerns of legislators. Laws Enacted captures 
state i’s legislative workload in year t and could relate to legislative professionalism and 
legislative policy adoption activity, as legislators may require greater resources to meet 
citizen demand for new laws.53 Finally, Prior Bureaucratic and Prior Initiative capture 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 As I mention in footnote 44, a term that interacts Legislative Professionalism*Electoral 
Vulnerability (using either form of electoral vulnerability) fails to achieve statistical 
significance in any of the model specifications used in this paper. But it is also possible 
that the effect of one form of electoral vulnerability on the policy adoption outcomes 
depends on the value of the other form of electoral vulnerability (meaning that a better 
operationalization of electoral vulnerability interacts Legislative Election Year and 
Incumbent Vote Share instead of keeping these as separate additive variables). However, 
a term that interacts Legislative Election Year and Incumbent Vote Share fails to achieve 
statistical significance in any of the model specifications used in this chapter.           
53 Laws Enacted reports the total number of laws adopted by a legislature regardless of 
whether those laws were adopted in regular or special sessions. I report this value 
because a professional legislature may utilize its resources to research special session 
lawmaking as well as regular session lawmaking. 
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the fractions of previous instances of policy adoption in state i that occurred through 
public utility commission rulemaking or the passage of a citizen ballot initiative. Public 
utility commissioners and ordinary citizens may take a lead in crafting a state’s 
renewable energy portfolio regime because that state’s legislature lacks the 
professionalism to handle the task. 
A second group of controls includes one variable, Unified Democratic 
Government, captures the Democratic Party’s dominance of state i’s government in year 
t and reflects the possibility that adoption of renewable energy portfolio policies by state 
i’s legislature is due to control by the Democratic Party, which is generally more 
favorable toward environmental regulation than is the Republican Party, rather than 
legislative professionalism or electoral vulnerability. 
The next group of controls captures the role that energy interests could play in 
influencing the legislative adoption of renewable energy portfolio policies. Percentage of 
Coal Consumption, Percentage of Natural Gas Consumption, Percentage of Petroleum 
Consumption, and Percentage of Renewable Consumption reflect the percentages of 
total energy consumption in state i in year t that come from coal, natural gas, petroleum, 
or “renewable” sources.54 Increases in these variables could correspond with an increased 
likelihood of legislative policy adoption, as energy interests try to create protections to 
preserve retail markets. Three additional energy-related variables are Solar Average, the 
average daily amount of solar radiation received in state i over year t (units are in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 The U.S. Energy Information Administration, which compiles energy pricing and 
consumption data, includes the following sources under its definition of “renewable” 
energy: hydroelectric, wood and waste, ethanol, ethanol co-products, geothermal, solar, 
photovoltaic, and wind-based power. Many individual states, of course, have included 
conventionally nonrenewable sources (for example, coal-based energy sources) in their 
own renewable portfolio programs.  
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kilowatt-hours per square meter per day); River Miles, the total mileage for perennial 
rivers in state i (units are in thousands of miles); and Shoreline, the total mileage of 
coastline for any state that borders an ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, or any of the Great 
Lakes (units are in thousands of statute miles). Higher values in these variables may 
correspond to an increased likelihood of legislative policy adoption, as firms argue that 
exploiting these resources produces economic growth. Finally, I include state i’s Change 
in the Rate of Unemployment from year t-1 to year t and state i’s consumer Energy Price 
(in 2011 dollars per million BTUs) to account for the possibility that different sectoral 
interests in the energy industry could use increases in these variables to either advocate or 
oppose the adoption of RPS policies. 
The last group of controls accounts for the possibility that intrinsic state-specific 
properties and/or influences from neighboring states drive legislative innovation and 
emulation activity. Prior Innovation is the total number of previous instances of 
innovation that occurred in state i divided by the total number of previous instances of 
innovation that occurred across all states. Prior Emulation is the total number of 
previous instances of emulation that occurred in state i divided by the total number of 
previous instances of emulation that occurred across all states. These variables capture 
the innate propensity of a state to favor a particular form of policy adoption. Neighbor 
Innovation and Neighbor Emulation measure the fractions of total previous instances of 
innovation and emulation that occurred in states adjacent to state i and capture the 
influence that innovation and emulation behavior in neighboring states have on 
legislative innovation and emulation activity in state i. Year Count reflects the possibility 
that the hazard of adopting a specific RPS policy increases as the temporal distance from 
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that policy’s first adoption increases. I finally include a Logged Year variable in all 
specifications using Legislative Emulation as the dependent outcome to account for the 
role that time plays in influencing legislative emulation activity.55 In table 2, I display 
descriptive statistics for the variables used throughout analyses in this chapter. 
TABLE 2: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Type Structure Mean 
Legislative Innovation Dependent 
 
Binary 0.26% of Observations = 
Innovation 
Legislative Emulation Dependent 
 
Binary 1.15% of Observations = 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Explanatory Continuous 0.18 
Legislative Election Year Explanatory Binary 54.79% of Observations = Non-
Election Years 
Incumbent Vote Share Explanatory Continuous 72.86 
% Per Capita Income Control Continuous 95.90 
Term Limits Control Binary 69.05% of Observations = 
States without Term Limits 
Laws Enacted Control Continuous 384.08 
Prior Bureaucratic Control Continuous 0.05 
Prior Initiative Control Continuous 0.01 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
Control Binary 22% of Observations = 
Democratically Unified 
Governments 
% Coal Consumption Control Continuous 23.23 
% Natural Gas 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 20.80 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 35.82 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 8.82 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Although Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) suggest using year dummy variables to 
account for the influence of time in discrete event history data, I do not utilize this 
strategy here. Year dummies consume many degrees of freedom but also perfectly predict 
outcomes in the years during which no policy adoptions occur. This means that we 
cannot (as Beck, Katz, and Tucker recommend) conduct likelihood ratio tests between 
constrained (no time variable) and unconstrained (year dummies) models, as perfectly 
predicted observations are dropped. Here, I follow the advice of Box-Steffensmeier and 
Jones (2004) and use likelihood ratio tests to assess the fit of and choose among four 
competing ways to model the effect of time (no temporal trend, a linear year trend, a 
quadratic year trend, and a logged year trend) on innovation and emulation.  
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Variable Type Structure Mean 
Change in 
Unemployment Rate 
Control Continuous 0.24 
Energy Price Control Continuous 17.15 
Solar Average Control Continuous 3.96 
River Miles Control Continuous 26.30 
Shoreline Control Continuous 2.14 
Prior Innovation Control Continuous 0.01 
Prior Emulation Control Continuous 0.01 
Neighbor Innovation Control Continuous 0.07 
Neighbor Emulation Control Continuous 0.06 
Year Count Control Continuous 5.65 
Logged Year Control Continuous 3.02 
Quadratic Year Control Continuous 526.37 
 
I estimate three different model specifications in this chapter. In model 1, I 
evaluate the determinants of Legislative Innovation and Legislative Emulation using 
logistic regression. In model 2, I analyze the same outcomes but use bivariate probit 
regression. A bivariate probit specification allows for the error structures of Legislative 
Innovation and Legislative Emulation to be related to one another, and this is desirable 
since I define the outcomes to be distinct types of the same process (policy adoption). In 
model 3, I evaluate the determinants of Legislative Innovation and Legislative Emulation 
using logistic regression but change the structure of the event history dataset in two ways: 
first, the choice to emulate with respect to a specific policy only enters the dataset once 
an innovation has occurred with respect to that same policy; and second, the choice to 
innovate with respect to a specific policy exits the dataset one calendar year after the first 
instance of the innovative policy’s adoption. I include model 3 to check the robustness of 
the event history data structure utilized in models 1 and 2; however, making the risk sets 
of innovation and emulation nearly disjoint creates the theoretically strange situation 
where innovation has a higher choice probability ((91/4227)*100 or 2.15%) than 
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emulation ((405/31151)*100 or 1.30%).56 To reflect the idea that no two choices made by 
a legislature in the same state are independent, I cluster standard errors within state for all 
specifications. 
 
3.5 Results 
In table 3, I display results from statistical analysis for models 1 and 2. In table 4, 
which immediately follows table 3, I display empirical results associated with model 3. 
TABLE 3: Results from Empirical Analysis for Models 1 and 2 
 
Variable/Model Logit (1) Bivariate Probit (2) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
2.245 
(1.875) 
5.546*** 
(2.004) 
0.911 
(0.672) 
2.218*** 
(0.737) 
Legislative  
Election Year 
-0.352 
(0.480) 
-0.305 
(0.362) 
-0.142 
(0.176) 
-0.143 
(0.142) 
Incumbent  
Vote Share 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
% Per Capita  
Income 
0.031 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.014) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Term Limits 0.373 
(0.548) 
-0.449 
(0.442) 
0.154 
(0.197) 
-0.188 
(0.163) 
Laws  
Enacted 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
0.0001 
(0.0002) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
Prior  
Bureaucratic 
-1.212 
(1.533) 
-1.460 
(1.967) 
-0.444 
(0.475) 
-0.671 
(0.697) 
Prior  
Initiative 
-0.312 
(1.201) 
-1.222 
(0.807) 
-0.168 
(0.394) 
-0.501** 
(0.257) 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
-0.039 
(0.615) 
0.161 
(0.382) 
-0.001 
(0.209) 
0.063 
(0.151) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Results do not change substantively when I use rare events logistic regression (King 
and Zheng 2001). Results also do not change substantively when I use multinomial 
logistic regression. I do not utilize multinomial logistic regression as a main estimation 
technique due to the violation of the IIA assumption: this is discernible theoretically since 
specific RPS policy adoption choices (say, including solar thermal energy and 
photovoltaic energy as eligible renewable sources) may serve as substitutes for one 
another. This is also discernible empirically, as results from the Seemingly Unrelated 
Hausman Test and Small-Hsiao Test indicate the violation of IIA. Results are available in 
the appendix of this chapter.      
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Variable/Model Logit (1) Bivariate Probit (2) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
% Coal Consumption 0.044 
(0.026) 
0.015 
(0.016) 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
% Natural Gas Consumption 0.011 
(0.038) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
% Petroleum Consumption 0.069*** 
(0.026) 
0.059** 
(0.023) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
% Renewable Consumption 0.021 
(0.032) 
0.0006 
(0.030) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
0.0002 
(0.010) 
Change in Unemployment 
Rate 
0.019 
(0.263) 
-0.019 
(0.159) 
-0.0003 
(0.084) 
-0.018 
(0.057) 
Energy Price 
 
-0.015 
(0.066) 
-0.050 
(0.086) 
-0.005 
(0.022) 
-0.030 
(0.030) 
Solar Average 
 
-0.447 
(0.412) 
-0.178 
(0.247) 
-0.159 
(0.128) 
-0.081 
(0.090) 
River Miles 
 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.0005 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.183 
(0.127) 
-0.311** 
(0.127) 
-0.071 
(0.044) 
-0.124** 
(0.049) 
Prior  
Innovation 
0.327 
(4.420) 
-13.121 
(10.281) 
0.151 
(1.096) 
-3.946 
(3.271) 
Prior  
Emulation 
-18.180 
(15.037) 
-36.457 
(28.933) 
-6.440 
(4.318) 
-10.903 
(7.024) 
Neighbor  
Innovation 
0.920 
(1.898) 
-0.517 
(2.557) 
0.362 
(0.659) 
0.109 
(0.658) 
Neighbor 
Emulation 
0.951 
(2.451) 
0.939 
(2.718) 
0.441 
(0.849) 
0.257 
(0.799) 
Year Count 
 
-1.653*** 
(0.293) 
0.128*** 
(0.006) 
-0.617*** 
(0.080) 
0.058*** 
(0.002) 
Logged Year/ 
Quadratic Year 
- 3.545*** 
(1.042) 
- 1.370*** 
(0.375) 
Observations 35332 (91) 35332 (405) 35332 (91) 35332 (405) 
Wald Χ2 393.59*** 1787.99*** 1.6 x 10^6*** 
Rho - - -0.883*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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TABLE 4: Results from Empirical Analysis for Model 3 
Variable/Model Logit (3) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
2.496 
(1.698) 
5.497*** 
(2.009) 
Legislative  
Election Year 
-0.443 
(0.461) 
-0.294 
(0.359) 
Incumbent  
Vote Share 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
% Per Capita  
Income 
0.031 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
Term Limits 0.327 
(0.551) 
-0.497 
(0.440) 
Laws  
Enacted 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
Prior  
Bureaucratic 
-1.347 
(1.621) 
-1.442 
(1.985) 
Prior  
Initiative 
-0.372 
(1.204) 
-1.251 
(0.810) 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
-0.032 
(0.620) 
0.147 
(0.381) 
% Coal Consumption 0.044 
(0.027) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
% Natural Gas Consumption 0.012 
(0.040) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
% Petroleum Consumption 0.075** 
(0.031) 
0.059** 
(0.023) 
% Renewable Consumption 0.022 
(0.032) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
Change in Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.083 
(0.285) 
-0.017 
(0.152) 
Energy Price 
 
-0.043 
(0.099) 
-0.482 
(0.085) 
Solar Average 
 
-0.462 
(0.442) 
-0.175 
(0.244) 
River Miles 
 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.201 
(0.131) 
-0.310** 
(0.126) 
Prior  
Innovation 
0.331 
(4.521) 
-13.339 
(10.224) 
Prior  
Emulation 
-20.132 
(15.785) 
-36.844 
(29.011) 
Neighbor  
Innovation 
0.987 
(1.988) 
-0.575 
(2.582) 	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Variable/Model Logit (3) 
Neighbor 
Emulation 
0.840 
(2.507) 
0.984 
(2.745) 
Year Count 
 
-1.499*** 
(0.440) 
0.108*** 
(0.006) 
Logged Year/ 
Quadratic Year 
- 3.472*** 
(0.994) 
Observations 8148 (91) 27184 (405) 
Wald Χ2 243.86*** 1058.38*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
 
Empirical results lend support to some but not all hypothetical claims. Legislative 
Professionalism does not achieve statistical significance with respect to Legislative 
Innovation in any of the models, thereby casting doubt on the Legislative Professionalism 
Innovation Hypothesis. At the same time, however, Legislative Professionalism achieves 
strongly positive statistical significance with respect to Legislative Emulation in models 
1, 2, and 3. Moreover, the size of the coefficient ascribed to Legislative Professionalism 
is consistently larger in the case of emulation as opposed to the case of innovation across 
all specifications. Legislative Professionalism’s larger coefficient size (not to mention its 
stronger statistical robustness) in the case of emulation suggests that the likelihood of 
emulating increases more sharply given higher levels of legislative professionalization 
than does the likelihood of innovating. A comparison of Legislative Professionalism’s 
differential relationship with innovation versus emulation offers strong support for the 
Legislative Professionalism Emulation Hypothesis. Free-riding is not limited solely to 
semi-professional legislatures; rather, professional legislatures also free-ride, and 
professional legislatures may even have a greater capacity to learn from free-riding 
insofar as they possess the resources to conduct meticulous and far-reaching 
investigations of existing policy and select candidates that appear to offer the best fit. 
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The finding linking higher legislative professionalism to a sharper increase in the 
probability of emulation compared to innovation suggests that giving legislatures more 
resources and an increased capacity for research does not make these legislatures more 
likely to embrace the higher risk of innovating and creating uniquely tailored policy 
compared to choosing the lower risk option of emulating and importing a potentially less 
well tailored policy from another state. One reason for this may be that increased 
legislative professionalism might not reduce the uncertainty associated with innovating in 
a way that is meaningful for legislative members compared to how increased legislative 
professionalism reveals the merits (albeit not uniquely tailored merits) of emulation. 
Future research will borrow from the framework of Bednar (2007) and identify other 
factors that might reduce or otherwise make less important the uncertainty associated 
with innovating and increase the likelihood of legislative innovation.             
   Results in tables 3 and 4 also shed light on how legislative electoral 
vulnerability relates to Legislative Innovation and Legislative Emulation. The non-
significance of Legislative Election Year with respect to both outcome variables and 
across all model specifications suggests that legislative electoral vulnerability may not 
increase during years in which legislators are running for reelection.57 The other electoral 
vulnerability variable, Incumbent Vote Share, relates negatively (though nonsignificantly) 
with Legislative Innovation, reducing support for the Electoral Vulnerability Innovation 
Hypothesis. Incumbent Vote Share relates negatively but also achieves significance with 
respect to Legislative Emulation across all model specifications used in the analysis, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Legislative Election Year remains non-significant (and the paper’s substantive findings 
remain unchanged) if we drop states whose legislatures do not convene during election 
years from the analysis. I show these results in the chapter’s appendix. 
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thereby lending support to the Electoral Vulnerability Emulation Hypothesis. The 
negative association between Incumbent Vote Share and Legislative Emulation confirms 
research by Volden (2006) and Pacheco (2012) and suggests that electorally vulnerable 
lawmakers use policy adoptions to signal to voters that they will try to replicate successes 
found elsewhere. But the significance of Incumbent Vote Share with respect to 
Legislative Emulation combined with the non-significance of this variable with respect to 
Legislative Innovation gives some empirical heft to the concern noted by Rose-Ackerman 
(1980), Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008), and Cai and Treisman (2009) that the desire 
for reelection increases the attractiveness for lawmakers to free-ride.58 
The finding linking increased electoral vulnerability to an increased likelihood of 
emulation suggests that legislative members are more willing to adopt potentially less 
well tailored but low uncertainty policies as their own electoral security diminishes. 
While I cannot conclude that increased electoral vulnerability diminishes the likelihood 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Here, Term Limits relates positively with innovation and negatively with emulation but 
does not achieve statistical significance. In chapter 5, where I analyze cosponsorship 
instead of adoption, term limits still relates positively with innovation and negatively 
with emulation but also achieves statistical significance. Term limit provisions increase 
the likelihood that a cosponsor innovates (provided, of course, that the cosponsor likes 
the innovation) by shortening the time horizons of the cosponsor and reducing the 
probability that the cosponsor will be subject to electoral damage if the innovation 
produces unanticipated and undesired effects. A cosponsor from a state without term 
limits, in contrast, may have longer time horizons and like an innovation but choose to 
emulate in order to reduce the possibility that unanticipated and undesired effects of 
innovation create voter backlash. Term limits, I argue, have a stronger effect on the 
behavior of individual cosponsors rather than collective legislatures (the units responsible 
for adopting policy) because legislative decision-making requires a multitude of 
legislators to support an innovative policy proposal and believe that their own short time 
horizons will protect them from electoral damage caused by unanticipated and undesired 
effects from the innovative policy proposal. And while it is easy for an individual 
legislator from a state with term limits to support an innovative policy proposal and 
believe that his or her short time horizons reduce the probability of electoral damage from 
the unanticipated and undesired effects of innovation, it is harder to see a majority of 
voting legislators from a state with term limits making that same conclusion.            
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that legislatures innovate (since there is not a statistically significant and negative 
relationship between Median Incumbent Vote Share and Legislative Innovation, the 
differential findings of Median Incumbent Vote Share with respect to Legislative 
Emulation and Legislative Innovation provide a direction for future research and suggest 
that other currently unmeasured dimensions of electoral vulnerability could affect the 
tradeoff between innovation and emulation.   
Since I employ logistic regression here, coefficients do not represent effects. In 
figure 1, I show predicted probabilities of legislative innovation and legislative emulation 
on the y-axis for increasing and substantively relevant values of Legislative 
Professionalism on the x-axis.59 The predicted probabilities in figure 1 come from 
estimation using the bivariate probit specification (model 2 in table 3). Additionally, 
while I vary Legislative Professionalism along the x-axis, I hold continuous independent 
and control variables fixed at their sample means. I also hold three binary variables—
Legislative Election Year, Term Limits, and Unified Democratic Government—fixed at 0 
since this is the most common value for these variables. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The mean value for Legislative Professionalism is 0.18. The lowest plotted value for 
Legislative Professionalism is 0.027, which is the professional score ascribed to New 
Hampshire, the state with the least professional legislature. The largest plotted value for 
Legislative Professionalism is 0.416, which corresponds to a distance of two standard 
deviations from the mean value of this variable. Legislative Professionalism is a stable 
slow moving variable and ranges from 0.027 (New Hampshire) to 0.659 (New York).      
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FIGURE 1: Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Innovation and Legislative 
Emulation as Legislative Professionalism Increases 
 
 
 
Figure 1 reiterates findings from the Legislative Professionalism Emulation 
Hypothesis. The slope of the main (bolded) predicted probability curve associated with 
legislative emulation increases by a greater magnitude given increases in Legislative 
Professionalism than does the slope of the main predicted probability curve associated 
with legislative innovation, suggesting that the resources from professionalism allow 
legislatures to cast a wide net, scrutinize among a menu of policies that exist elsewhere, 
and adopt those existing policies that they believe have a high probability of generating 
desired results. The lower bound of the 95% confidence curve for emulation, shown as 
the lower solid unbolded line in figure 1, is even located near the main curve for 
innovation for values of Legislative Professionalism ranging from 0.20 (near the mean 
value of this variable) to 0.30 (an almost two standard deviation increase from the mean), 
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suggesting that we can be reasonably certain about this finding.60 Professionalism also 
increases the predicted probability of innovation. However, the more gradual slope 
associated with innovation suggests that professionalism simply does not provide 
legislators with as much information about innovation than it does about emulation. This 
is explainable since innovation is by its very nature largely unknown. 
 In figure 2, I show predicted probabilities for legislative innovation and legislative 
emulation on the y-axis for increasing and substantively relevant values of Incumbent 
Vote Share on the x-axis. The sample mean of Incumbent Vote Share is 72.78, and the 
standard deviation of this value is 21.46. I plot a range stretching from 50 (denoting when 
the median vote share earned by an incumbent legislator running for reelection in state i 
in the most recent election does not even exceed 50%) to 95 (denoting when the typical 
incumbent legislator running for reelection in state i faced little to no opposition in the 
most recent election). Here, note again that emulation has a steeper predicted probability 
curve than innovation. However, unlike in the case of professionalism, increases in 
Incumbent Vote Share markedly reduce the probability of emulation and gradually reduce 
the probability of innovation. This result is also explainable, as electorally vulnerable 
policy adopters may embrace emulation since they can credibly promise (to voters) to 
replicate successes found elsewhere. The difference in slopes between emulation and 
innovation as a function of decreasing electoral vulnerability gives weight to the concern 
that reelection concerns may spark copycatting in a devolutionary environment. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In figures 1 and 2, the unbolded solid lines correspond to the upper and lower 95% 
confidence curves for emulation while the unbolded dashed lines correspond to the upper 
and lower 95% confidence curves for innovation.  
	  84	  
FIGURE 2: Predicted Probabilities of Legislative Innovation and Legislative 
Emulation as Incumbent Vote Share Increases 
 
 
 
 One concern about the predicted probability curves in figures 1 and 2 is that the 
sharper slope for legislative emulation could be the result of scaling. In other words, 
emulation may appear to have a sharper slope than innovation because the probability for 
emulation is much higher (and more observable) than the probability for innovation. To 
show that results are not due to scaling differences between innovation and emulation, I 
reproduce figures 1 and 2 but plot the change in the difference in the predicted 
probability of a legislature emulating versus innovating for given values of Legislative 
Professionalism and Incumbent Vote Share. The change in difference in the predicted 
probability of a emulating versus innovating represents the change in the relative 
preference of emulating over innovating and does not suffer from the same scaling issue 
as the predicted probability curves shown in figures 1 and 2. 
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FIGURE 3: Plotted Change in the Difference in the Probability of a Legislature 
Emulating Versus Innovating for Legislative Professionalism 
 
 
 
 The intensifying preference for emulation over innovation as Legislative 
Professionalism increases provides validation for the predicted probability results plotted 
in figure 1. A decreasing intensity of preference for emulation over innovation as 
Incumbent Vote Share increases provides similar validation for the predicted probability 
results plotted in figure 2. 
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FIGURE 4: Plotted Change in the Difference in the Probability of a Legislature 
Emulating versus Innovating for Incumbent Vote Share 
 
 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I evaluate the policy adoption decisions of state-level 
policymakers under devolution. A number of scholars and political actors have linked 
devolution to increased innovativeness in policymaking even though a sizeable amount of 
formal work suggests that governmental resource limitations and risk-aversion among 
elected officials at the state-level not only reduces the likelihood of innovation but 
increases the possibility that state policy adopters will emulate. I attempt here to provide 
empirical clarity to this debate by analyzing how legislative resource capacity and 
legislative electoral vulnerability affect the innovation and emulation choices of state 
legislatures in a policy area—renewable energy portfolio regulation—that has been 
characterized by a noticeable lack of federal involvement. 
0 
0.0001 
0.0002 
0.0003 
0.0004 
0.0005 
0.0006 
0.0007 
0.0008 
55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
 
Change  
in 
Predicted 
Probability 
of 
Emulation - 
Innovation 
(Abs. Value) 
Median Vote Share of Incumbent 
	  87	  
 Findings from my analysis do not completely challenge the view that the states 
are innovation laboratories under devolution: while the positive (albeit nonsignificant) 
relationship between legislative professionalism and innovation taps into concerns that 
governmental resource disparities across the states may inhibit the ability of the states to 
act as innovation laboratories, the slightly negative (again, albeit nonsignificant) 
relationship between legislative electoral vulnerability and innovation allays some of the 
concern that lawmakers’ reelection fears will severely limit the production of innovative 
policy.61 However, the greater strength of the positive association between increasing 
legislative professionalism and legislative emulation compared to that between increasing 
legislative professionalism and legislative innovation gives rise to the concern (if we 
value innovative policymaking as a desirable end) that well-resourced states with 
professional legislatures, precisely the type of states that theoretically are most 
enthusiastic about taking up innovation, would much rather emulate than innovate. This 
in turn suggests that a different factor besides legislative professionalism is driving the 
adoption of uniquely tailored but high uncertainty policy over less well tailored but less 
uncertain policy.   
 The second concern, again from the vantage point of those who view innovation 
as a desirable end, is the greater strength of the negative association between legislative 
incumbent vote share and legislative emulation compared to that between legislative 
incumbent vote share and legislative innovation. This result not only links electoral 
vulnerability to emulation but also suggests that emulation will continue to be favored so 
long as lawmakers are concerned about reelection. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 The concern that lawmakers’ reelection fears reduce innovation would receive stronger 
empirical support if electoral vulnerability decreased the likelihood of innovation.  
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 One implication of this research is that in programs that have not been completely 
devolved, the federal government can spur innovative policymaking at the state-level 
through strategic grant giving and rulemaking. Astute observers like Peterson (1995) 
have known this fact for a long time, of course, but what is unknown (at least from an 
empirical perspective) is how increases in the magnitude and form of federal intervention 
affect state-level innovation and emulation. An empirical analysis that relates variation in 
the magnitude and form of federal influence on state-level policymaking to variation in 
state-level innovation and emulation behavior would go a long way toward unpacking 
exactly how and when state-level innovation can be maximized.  
A second implication of this research is that bureaucrats, by virtue of being 
nonelected, may potentially serve as wellsprings of innovation provided that their fear of 
upsetting elected bosses does not cause them to shy away from innovating. My renewable 
portfolio dataset, which focuses on a policy area where state legislatures dominate 
policymaking, largely precludes evaluation of how appointees approach the decision to 
innovate. An analysis of the factors that affect policy innovation behavior by appointees 
would add much to our understanding of state policy adoption and is an ideal extension to 
this project, and in the next chapter, I compare the innovation behavior of elected and 
appointed officials. 
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3.7 Appendix62 
TABLE 5: Results for Models 1-2 Dropping States where Legislatures Skip 
Election Years 
 
Variable/Model Logit (1) Bivariate Probit (2) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
1.393 
(2.410) 
8.153*** 
(2.365) 
0.625 
(0.822) 
3.041*** 
(0.820) 
Legislative  
Election Year 
-0.110 
(0.495) 
-0.097 
(0.385) 
-0.039 
(0.181) 
-0.046 
(0.153) 
Incumbent  
Vote Share 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
% Per Capita  
Income 
0.027 
(0.022) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
Term Limits 0.278 
(0.627) 
0.571 
(0.397) 
0.084 
(0.217) 
-0.221 
(0.168) 
Laws  
Enacted 
-0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.0008 
(0.0007) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Prior  
Bureaucratic 
-18.637* 
(10.214) 
-18.195** 
(9.196) 
-6.437* 
(3.329) 
-6.407* 
(3.350) 
Prior  
Initiative 
0.139 
(1.230) 
-0.835 
(0.812) 
-0.003 
(0.382) 
-0.350 
(0.257) 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
0.349 
(0.625) 
0.148 
(0.532) 
0.114 
(0.217) 
0.087 
(0.195) 
% Coal Consumption 0.048* 
(0.028) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.0002 
(0.007) 
% Natural Gas 
Consumption 
0.024 
(0.043) 
-0.018 
(0.027) 
0.011 
(0.016) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
0.084*** 
(0.032) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
0.052 
(0.038) 
-0.052 
(0.062) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
Δ Unemployment 0.128 
(0.244) 
0.015 
(0.165) 
0.042 
(0.085) 
-0.004 
(0.063) 
Energy  
Price 
0.014 
(0.067) 
-0.065 
(0.091) 
0.005 
(0.024) 
-0.039 
(0.032) 
Solar Average 
 
-1.118** 
(0.518) 
-0.068 
(0.317) 
-0.396*** 
(0.148) 
-0.073 
(0.118) 
River Miles 
 
0.022 
(0.026) 
-0.033* 
(0.020) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.179 
(0.117) 
-0.276** 
(0.127) 
-0.072 
(0.044) 
-0.098** 
(0.043) 
Prior  
Innovation 
1.273 
(4.369) 
-13.663 
(11.132) 
0.284 
(1.247) 
-3.790 
(3.445) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 I cluster standard errors by state in all statistical analyses displayed in the appendix. 
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Variable/Model Logit (1) Bivariate Probit (2) 
Prior  
Emulation 
-23.977 
(18.553) 
-37.062 
(30.045) 
-8.453 
(5.242) 
-11.392* 
(6.873) 
Neighbor  
Innovation 
1.240 
(1.830) 
0.516 
(2.170) 
0.470 
(0.653) 
0.415 
(0.611) 
Neighbor 
Emulation 
-0.051 
(3.025) 
0.391 
(2.454) 
0.067 
(1.061) 
0.075 
(0.808) 
Year Count 
 
-1.665*** 
(0.329) 
0.127*** 
(0.006) 
-0.644*** 
(0.093) 
0.057*** 
(0.002) 
Logged Year/ 
Quadratic Year 
- 4.855*** 
(1.366) 
- 1.857*** 
(0.479) 
Observations 31410 (81) 31410 (352) 31410 (81) 31410 (352) 
Wald Χ2 694.75*** 2694.24*** 1.5 x 10^9*** 
Rho - - -0.816*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
TABLE 6: Results for Model 3 Dropping States where Legislatures Skip Election 
Years 
 
Variable/Model Logit (3) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
2.126 
(2.050) 
8.098*** 
(2.368) 
Legislative  
Election Year 
-0.273 
(0.490) 
-0.086 
(0.382) 
Incumbent  
Vote Share 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.020** 
(0.009) 
% Per Capita  
Income 
0.031 
(0.026) 
0.018 
(0.015) 
Term Limits 0.183 
(0.614) 
-0.581 
(0.398) 
Laws  
Enacted 
-5.2x10^-6 
(0.001) 
0.0007 
(0.0007) 
Prior  
Bureaucratic 
-20.541* 
(10.602) 
-18.298** 
(9.272) 
Prior  
Initiative 
-0.006 
(1.246) 
-0.869 
(0.813) 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
0.403 
(0.649) 
0.130 
(0.529) 
% Coal Consumption 0.048* 
(0.028) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
% Natural Gas 
Consumption 
0.022 
(0.047) 
-0.017 
(0.026) 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
0.098** 
(0.039) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
0.054 
(0.038) 
-0.050 
(0.061) 
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Variable/Model Logit (3) 
Δ Unemployment -0.032 
(0.278) 
0.017 
(0.165) 
Energy  
Price 
-0.057 
(0.110) 
-0.063 
(0.090) 
Solar Average 
 
-1.182** 
(0.568) 
-0.064 
(0.313) 
River Miles 
 
0.021 
(0.027) 
-0.033* 
(0.020) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.211 
(0.134) 
-0.273** 
(0.127) 
Prior  
Innovation 
1.788 
(3.990) 
-13.855 
(11.062) 
Prior  
Emulation 
-28.812 
(18.828) 
-37.197 
(29.830) 
Neighbor  
Innovation 
1.542 
(1.941) 
0.465 
(2.194) 
Neighbor 
Emulation 
-0.525 
(3.116) 
0.368 
(2.467) 
Year Count 
 
-1.514*** 
(0.499) 
0.107*** 
(0.006) 
Logged Year/ 
Quadratic Year 
0.002 
(0.002) 
4.761*** 
(1.325) 
Observations 7206 (81) 24204 (352) 
Wald Χ2 368.00*** 1642.02*** 
*Significant 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
TABLE 7: Results using Rare Events Logistic Regression 	  
Variable/Model Logit (1) Logit (3) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
2.218 
(1.874) 
5.497*** 
(2.002) 
2.426 
(1.693) 
5.447*** 
(2.007) 
Legislative  
Election Year 
-0.343 
(0.479) 
-0.304 
(0.361) 
-0.429 
(0.459) 
-0.292 
(0.359) 
Incumbent  
Vote Share 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
-0.022** 
(0.009) 
% Per Capita  
Income 
0.029 
(0.020) 
0.016 
(0.014) 
0.029 
(0.021) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
Term Limits 0.377 
(0.534) 
-0.470 
(0.423) 
0.321 
(0.539) 
-0.477 
(0.428) 
Laws  
Enacted 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.001** 
(0.000) 
0.0006 
(0.0005) 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
Prior  
Bureaucratic 
-0.867 
(1.532) 
-1.390 
(1.966) 
-0.960 
(1.616) 
-1.371 
(1.984) 
Prior  
Initiative 
0.174 
(1.201) 
-0.980 
(0.806) 
0.123 
(1.200) 
-1.008 
(0.810) 
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Variable/Model Logit (1) Logit (3) 
 Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
-0.044 
(0.614) 
0.161 
(0.381) 
-0.039 
(0.618) 
0.147 
(0.381) 
% Coal Consumption 0.043 
(0.026) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
0.044 
(0.027) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
% Natural Gas 
Consumption 
0.011 
(0.038) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
 0.012 
(0.040) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
0.068** 
(0.026) 
0.059** 
(0.023) 
0.073** 
(0.031) 
0.058** 
(0.023) 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
0.021 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
0.001 
(0.030) 
Δ Unemployment 0.019 
(0.263) 
-0.017 
(0.152) 
-0.077 
(0.284) 
-0.015 
(0.152) 
Energy  
Price 
-0.017 
(0.066) 
-0.048 
(0.086) 
-0.039 
(0.099) 
-0.046 
(0.085) 
Solar Average 
 
-0.423 
(0.411) 
-0.175 
(0.247) 
-0.435 
(0.441) 
-0.173 
(0.243) 
River Miles 
 
0.0008 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.159 
(0.127) 
-0.305** 
(0.127) 
-0.176 
(0.131) 
-0.303** 
(0.126) 
Prior  
Innovation 
1.232 
(4.417) 
-12.737 
(10.274) 
1.192 
(4.508) 
-12.958 
(10.214) 
Prior  
Emulation 
-17.412 
(15.027) 
-36.028 
(28.912) 
-19.139 
(15.737) 
-36.411 
(28.984) 
Neighbor  
Innovation 
1.067 
(1.897) 
-0.480 
(2.555) 
1.112 
(1.982) 
-0.538 
(2.579) 
Neighbor 
Emulation 
0.862 
(2.449) 
0.964 
(2.716) 
0.766 
(2.499) 
1.011 
(2.743) 
Year Count 
 
-1.606*** 
(0.292) 
0.128*** 
(0.006) 
-1.462*** 
(0.438) 
0.108*** 
(0.006) 
Logged Year/ 
Quadratic Year 
- 3.469*** 
(1.041) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
3.394*** 
(0.993) 
Observations 35332 (91) 35332 (405) 8148 (91) 27184 (405) 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
TABLE 8: Results using Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Variable Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
2.441 
(1.799) 
5.550*** 
(2.006) 
Legislative  
Election Year 
-0.379 
(0.480) 
-0.305 
(0.362) 
Incumbent  
Vote Share 
-0.008 
(0.012) 
-0.023** 
(0.009) 
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Variable Legislative 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Emulation 
% Per Capita  
Income 
0.031 
(0.021) 
0.017 
(0.015) 
Term Limits 
 
0.324 
(0.546) 
-0.499 
(0.442) 
Laws  
Enacted 
0.0005 
(0.0005) 
0.001** 
(0.0005) 
Prior  
Bureaucratic 
-1.286 
(1.547) 
-1.461 
(1.968) 
Prior  
Initiative 
-0.334 
(1.207) 
-1.223 
(0.808) 
Unified Democratic 
Government 
-0.021 
(0.618) 
0.161 
(0.382) 
% Coal Consumption 0.045 
(0.027) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
% Natural Gas 
Consumption 
0.013 
(0.039) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
0.072** 
(0.029) 
0.059** 
(0.023) 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
0.023 
(0.033) 
0.0006 
(0.030) 
Δ Unemployment 0.002 
(0.273) 
-0.019 
(0.152) 
Energy  
Price 
-0.021 
(0.069) 
-0.050 
(0.086) 
Solar Average 
 
-0.447 
(0.425) 
-0.179 
(0.247) 
River Miles 
 
0.001 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.192 
(0.128) 
-0.311* 
(0.127) 
Prior  
Innovation 
0.336 
(4.466) 
-13.139 
(10.282) 
Prior  
Emulation 
-19.564 
(15.387) 
-36.509 
(28.946) 
Neighbor  
Innovation 
0.919 
(1.950) 
-0.516 
(2.560) 
Neighbor 
Emulation 
0.849 
(2.445) 
0.941 
(2.719) 
Year Count 
 
-1.654*** 
(0.293) 
0.128*** 
(0.006) 
Logged  
Year 
0.176 
(0.434) 
3.545*** 
(1.041) 
Observations 35332 (91) 35332 (405) 
Wald Χ2 3.5 x 10^6*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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TABLE 9: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Test Results following 
Multinomial Logistic Regression 
 
Omitted 
Outcome 
Chi2  
Value 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
P-value Result 
Hausman IIA Test 
Legislative 
Emulation 
0.581 24 1 For H0 (IIA 
upheld) 
Legislative 
Innovation 
0.338 23 1 For H0 (IIA 
upheld) 
Seemingly Unrelated Hausman IIA Test 
Legislative 
Emulation 
98.805 25 0.000 Against H0 (IIA 
violated) 
Legislative 
Innovation 
50.965 25 0.002 Against H0 (IIA 
violated) 
Small-Hsiao IIA Test 
Legislative 
Emulation 
248.893 25 0.000 Against H0 (IIA 
violated) 
Legislative 
Innovation 
476.441 25 0.000 Against H0 (IIA 
violated) 
 
TABLE 10: Value and Significance of Legislative Professionalism*Incumbent 
Vote Share across Model Specifications 
 
Variable/Model Large Logit Bivariate Probit Small Logit 
 Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
-3.174 
(6.477) 
4.404 
(4.972) 
-1.102 
(2.280) 
1.456 
(1.678) 
-2.749 
(6.535) 
4.574 
(5.028) 
Incumbent Vote 
Share 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.025** 
(0.011) 
-0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.024** 
(0.011) 
Legislative 
Professionalism* 
Incumbent Vote 
Share 
0.076 
(0.088) 
0.016 
(0.071) 
0.028 
(0.031) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
0.073 
(0.089) 
0.013 
(0.072) 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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TABLE 11: Value and Significance of Legislative Professionalism*Legislative 
Election Year across Model Specifications 
 
Variable/Model Large Logit Bivariate Probit Small Logit 
 Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
1.441 
(2.390) 
4.768** 
(2.368) 
0.568 
(0.893) 
1.943** 
(0.923) 
1.698 
(2.198) 
4.705** 
(2.371) 
Legislative 
Election Year 
-0.750 
(0.575) 
-0.663 
(0.629) 
-0.310 
(0.211) 
-0.268 
(0.255) 
-0.834 
(0.569) 
-0.659 
(0.624) 
Legislative 
Professionalism* 
Legislative 
Election Year 
1.787 
(2.346) 
1.652 
(2.066) 
0.770 
(0.835) 
0.592 
(0.909) 
1.757 
(2.369) 
1.689 
(2.054) 
 *Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
TABLE 12: Value and Significance of Legislative Election Year*Incumbent Vote 
Share across Model Specifications 
 
Variable/Model Large Logit Bivariate Probit Small Logit 
 Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Leg. 
Innovation 
Leg. 
Emulation 
Legislative 
Election Year 
-0.129 
(1.181) 
-0.599 
(0.925) 
-0.059 
(0.447) 
-0.258 
(0.406) 
-0.240 
(1.181) 
-0.587 
(0.922) 
Incumbent Vote 
Share 
-0.006 
(0.017) 
-0.024** 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.024** 
(0.011) 
Legislative 
Election Year* 
Incumbent Vote 
Share 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.017) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The Institutional Determinants of Regulatory Innovation: Evidence from 
State Renewables Portfolio Standards 
 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I evaluate whether elected regulators are more likely to 
accept risk in the policy adoption process and innovate compared to appointed 
regulators. Elected regulators face reelection and may exhibit risk-aversion when 
adopting policies to safeguard reelection chances. At the same time, appointed 
regulators face scrutiny from legislative and executive bosses and may exhibit 
risk-aversion when adopting policies to reduce the chance of backlash at the 
hands of their bosses. Here, I compare the renewable energy portfolio standard 
policy adoption behavior of elected versus appointed state public utility 
commissioners and find that elected regulators are more willing to innovate than 
are appointed regulators. I argue that this result stems from elected regulators 
facing diminished oversight compared to appointed regulators, and this result 
implies that taking policy responsibility away from elected officials may not 
necessarily increase risk-taking in the policy adoption process.
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4.1 Introduction 
In 1999, the appointed commissioners of the Public Utility Commission of 
Texas—the agency charged with regulating that state’s electric and telecommunications 
industries—made Texas the first state in the United States to include solar water heat as 
an eligible renewable source within Texas’s renewables portfolio standard (RPS).63 The 
action of the PUCT commissioners exemplifies what many regard as a key virtue of 
federalism: that individual states can innovate (Brandeis 1932; Walker 1969; and Gray 
1973) and adopt untested policies to solve challenges; and that effective innovations (or 
“best practices”) from any state or set of states can diffuse or spread to other states (Berry 
and Berry 1990; Case, Hines, and Rosen 1994; Mintrom 1997; Volden 2006; Shipan and 
Volden 2008; and Pacheco 2012) that face similar challenges. 
 The action of the PUCT commissioners is also noteworthy because a regulatory 
agency did the innovating. Much of the scholarship on policy innovation in the American 
states, including the opinion of Brandeis in New State Ice Company v. Liebmann, when 
he described the states as “laboratories” of innovation, focuses on legislative instances of 
innovation and ignores the role that regulatory agencies can play in adopting innovative 
policies (New State Ice Company v. Liebmann 1932). While the focus on legislative 
instances of innovation is understandable since state legislatures are the primary 
institutions responsible for writing and adopting laws, there are two reasons to investigate 
the policy adoption behavior of regulatory agencies.64 First, regulators have high levels of 
policy-specific expertise (Wilson 1887; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Gailmard 2002; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 A renewables portfolio standard is a set of policies specifying that electricity providers 
generate some amount of electricity from renewable sources. 
64 I hereafter refer to “regulatory agencies” as “regulators.” 
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and Huber and Shipan 2002) and may hold strong opinions about the kinds of policy 
options (including untested policy options) that are most appropriate to address specific 
programmatic challenges. 
Second, regulators can either be appointed by the state executive (subject to 
confirmation by the state legislature) or elected in statewide races, and the method of 
regulator selection may influence the willingness of regulators to embrace the risk of 
adopting untested policy. At least three important pieces of scholarship (Rose-Ackerman 
1980; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008; and Cai and Treisman 2009) suggest formally 
that elected officials may forego innovation, or the adoption of untested policy, for 
emulation, or the borrowing of existing and tested policy, as they may not want to 
jeopardize reelection chances by adopting a policy that has not been adopted before in a 
comparable setting.65 This finding suggests hypothetically that reelection concerns may 
make elected regulators less likely to innovate compared to appointed regulators, who do 
not face reelection concerns. At the same time, appointed regulators also face pressures—
they can be dismissed, sanctioned, or forced to resign by legislative and executive 
bosses—and the fear of discipline by legislative and executive bosses may hypothetically 
make appointed regulators less likely to innovate compared to elected regulators, 
especially if elected regulators are willing to take more risks with respect to voters than 
appointed regulators are willing to take with respect to legislative and executive bosses. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 As I make clear later in the chapter (and consistent with the definition used throughout 
the dissertation), innovation refers generally to when a state adopts a policy before any 
other state adopts that policy. Emulation refers generally to when a state adopts a policy 
after any other state has adopted that policy. Innovation is assumed to be riskier than 
emulation because policymakers in state i are unable to free-ride off of the experiences of 
state j when they are deciding whether to adopt an innovative policy proposal.    
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In this chapter, I analyze the policy adoption behavior of elected versus appointed 
regulators and evaluate whether elected regulators are more or less likely to innovate 
compared to their appointed peers. This topic merits attention because the advocates of 
devolution argue that giving the states policy responsibility increases the innovativeness 
of policymaking and because regulators play a major role in developing state 
policymaking.66 By investigating how the method of choosing regulators (a key 
distinction separating regulators into two groups) affects the willingness of regulators to 
innovate, we can better understand how institutional constraints influence the ability of 
regulators to act as wellsprings of innovative policymaking. 
Here, I compare the policy adoption choices of elected and appointed state public 
utility commissioners with respect to the crafting of RPS programs and analyze the link 
between regulator type and innovation. State public utility commissions have historically 
been tasked with overseeing the actions of electric utilities and setting the rates that 
electric utilities charge customers; in recent years, these commissions have also played an 
increasingly prominent role in developing state RPS programs. Variation across the states 
in terms of whether regulators are elected or appointed may explain variation across the 
states in terms of the amount of policy risk that is accepted by regulators. RPS adoption 
data are well suited for theory testing for two reasons: first, the states have adopted RPS 
policies in the absence of federal intervention on state policymaking, which is important 
since such federal intervention (giving program-related grants to state governments, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 There are many instances where devolution advocates claim that giving states policy 
responsibility increases innovative policymaking. A canonical example comes from the 
transformation of need-based welfare from a primarily federal (AFDC) to a more state-
based (TANF) program. See Peterson (1995) for a detailed explanation about the 
arguments for and against devolution.    
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example, or requiring states to force utilities to generate electricity from renewable 
sources) can distort the policy adoption behavior of regulators67; and second, cases of 
innovation do not exclusively occur in states that have the same type of regulator.68 
Conducting an empirical analysis of regulatory RPS policymaking across the fifty 
states, I find using several statistical techniques that elected regulators are more likely to 
innovate than are appointed regulators. Building on work from Besley and Coate (2003) 
and extending their theory to account for the policy risk choices of regulators, I argue that 
the difference in the risk acceptances of elected versus appointed regulators stems from a 
difference in how elected and appointed regulators are scrutinized by their respective 
principals (the median voter in state i for elected regulators, and a governor and/or 
interested members of the legislature in state j for appointed regulators). The median 
voter primarily cares about regulatory policy insofar as that policy affects his or her 
electricity rates (Besley and Coate 2003), meaning that elected regulators may be willing 
to accept the risk of innovating if they can convince the median voter that the innovation 
will not translate into substantial increases in consumer electricity rates. Governors and 
especially interested members of the legislature, on the other hand, care about broad 
aspects of regulatory policy (including but not limited to matters relating to consumer 
electricity rates), scrutinize how the actions of appointed regulators affect their own 
constituents (who may include representatives from regulated utilities that want higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 I want to analyze the innovation behavior of state regulators under devolution. A 
hallmark of devolution is the absence of consistent federal financial inducements or rules 
on state policymaking. Throughout the time period (1983-2011) analyzed here, the RPS 
policy area was devolved to the states and featured a lack of federal intervention on state 
policymaking, thus making the RPS policy area an ideal candidate for exploration.    
68 This is to say that innovation has occurred in states with elected regulators as well as 
states with appointed regulators.  
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electricity rates), and could potentially try to punish appointed regulators.69 Appointed 
regulators may try to protect themselves from the scrutiny of legislative and executive 
principals by choosing not to accept the risk of innovating.  
Results in this chapter suggest that elected rather than appointed regulators may 
act as the central drivers of regulatory policy innovation. This may be a normative 
“good” in the sense that democratically accountable policymakers (rather than appointed 
policymakers) are taking the risk of adopting untested policies. However, it may be a 
normative “bad” in the sense that appointed regulators, who ostensibly possess greater 
policy expertise than their executive and legislative bosses, are unable or unwilling to 
translate that expertise into sound public policy.70 
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first review literature pertaining to policy 
innovation and specifically policy innovation by regulators and introduce a new 
definition of innovation that in my opinion better captures the inherent risk embraced by 
innovators. In the second section, I state my hypothesis; and in the third section, I 
describe and state results from the statistical evaluation of the hypothesis. I then offer 
concluding remarks. 
 
4.2 Adding Regulators to the Policy Innovation Story 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 When I use the phrase “interested members of the legislature,” I am referring to 
legislative members who have issue-specific interests, sit on committees and 
subcommittees overseeing regulatory decision-making, and attempt to steer regulatory 
decisions in a direction benefitting specific constituents and/or industries. Oklahoma 
Senator James Inhofe’s scrutinization of the Environmental Protection Agency as a 
member of the Senate’s Environment and Public Works Committee is a prominent 
national level example that comes to mind.  
70 The meaning of “sound public policy,” of course, is subject to wide interpretation. 
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The bulk of extant scholarship on policy innovation generally follows two trends. 
First, the literature focuses largely on legislative policy innovation and ignores how 
regulators approach the policy adoption process.71 This is unfortunate since regulators, by 
virtue of their policy-specific expertise and experience “on the frontlines” administering 
regulatory policy, may play a direct role in making the states laboratories of innovation. 
And second, the literature follows the lead of Walker (1969) and defines innovation as 
the adoption of “a program or policy, which is new to the states adopting it, no matter 
how old the program may be or how many other states have adopted it” (1969: 881). 
Scholars who study regulatory policy adoption, such as Berry (1994), who looks at the 
adoption of strategic planning practices by state agencies, and Teodoro (2009), who looks 
at the adoption of professional practices by municipal police and water chiefs, similarly 
consider a unit’s adoption of a policy to be an example of innovation regardless of 
whether that policy was already adopted in a different unit.72 
 Making the definition of policy innovation independent of the order in which a 
unit adopted a particular policy is understandable in light of the view that much of the 
novelty in policymaking occurs in enforcement or implementation rather than adoption. 
However, this definition of policy innovation fails to account for the idea that untested 
policy adoptions may represent qualitatively different choices from another kind of 
adoption in which policymakers in one state can free ride off of the experiences of 
policymakers in other states. Untested policy adoptions are qualitatively different from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Examples include foundational pieces of work such as Walker (1969), Gray (1973), 
Berry and Berry (1990), Mintrom (1997), and Nicholson-Crotty (2009). 
72 Neither of these works discusses the relationship between the method of selecting 
regulators (in terms of whether regulators are elected or appointed) and the policy 
adoption behavior of those regulators. This is justifiable, as these scholars did not study 
policy areas exhibiting a distinction between elected and appointed regulators. 
	  103	  
tested policy adoptions insofar as the lack of a track record makes the untested policy 
adoptions riskier than tested policy adoptions. Theoretical work from Rose-Ackerman 
(1980), Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008), and Cai and Treisman (2009) claims that 
emulating, or adopting a policy that already has been adopted in another state, is a 
distinct alternative to innovating, or adopting a policy that has not been adopted in 
another state, and also claims that elected officials may refrain from innovating due to the 
fear that adopting policies that have not been vetted elsewhere could harm reelection 
chances. This theoretical work therefore suggests that variation in regulator type affects 
the kind of policy adoption choices that regulators make and necessitates that I frame 
innovation and emulation as separate kinds of policy adoption choices. 
 Here, I define innovation as the choice by policymakers in a given state to adopt a 
policy before any other state has adopted that same policy. To account for the possibility 
that two states could be deciding simultaneously whether to innovate with respect to the 
same policy, I also define innovation as the choice by policymakers in a given state to 
adopt a policy within one calendar year after another state became the first state to adopt 
that same policy.73 I define emulation as the choice by policymakers in a given state to 
adopt a policy at least one year after another state became the first state to adopt that 
same policy. The choice to use one year (from the date of first adoption) to differentiate 
innovation from emulation is not arbitrary: much of the literature on the diffusion or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 A hypothetical example helps here. Suppose that Michigan is the first state to require 
that utilities purchase hybrid vehicles in May 2008 while Ohio requires that utilities 
purchase hybrid vehicles in July 2008. We cannot say definitively that Michigan 
innovated while Ohio emulated since the two states were probably simultaneously 
deciding whether to adopt the same policy. Extending the definition of innovation to 
include instances of adoption that occur within one year of the first instance of adoption 
gets around this simultaneous adoption issue.   
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spread of policy across units assumes that learning takes time, and one year is a common 
way (see Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley 2006; Swank 2006; Shipan and Volden 2008; 
and Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008 for examples) to capture the time required for 
policymakers in unit B to learn about decision-making in unit A. Since emulation implies 
that policymakers in unit B are free riding (and thus learning) off of the experiences of 
policymakers in unit A, I utilize the standard temporal characterization of learning found 
in the diffusion literature to isolate innovation from emulation. Having separated 
innovation from emulation and justified my definitions based on standard practice in the 
diffusion literature, I now analyze how elected versus appointed regulators behave 
differently from one another in the policy adoption process. 
 
4.3 Regulator Type and Policy Innovation 
 In this chapter, I specify and test one hypothesis: that elected regulators are more 
likely to innovate than are appointed regulators. I argue that differences in the 
institutional constraints faced by elected versus appointed regulators account for why 
elected regulators are comparatively more willing to accept the risk of innovating. 
Elected regulators serve statewide voters, and statewide voters primarily care about 
regulatory policy choices insofar as those regulatory policy choices will not drive up 
electricity rates. This suggests that elected regulators face low opposition from statewide 
voters toward innovating provided that the regulators can convince voters that innovating 
will not translate into higher electricity rates. And since regulators actually set consumer 
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electricity rates, the claims of elected regulators may have some credibility with the 
voters electing them.74 
 In this chapter, I assume that regulators (regardless of whether they are elected or 
appointed) are career oriented and prefer not want to adopt policies that will generate 
backlash from principals. This does not mean that regulators do not care about policy as 
an end; rather, the policy goal is subordinate to the desire to satisfy the principal. In the 
paper, I do not explicitly model or formalize individual or group-level regulatory 
preferences. Public utility commission decisions are reached through a majority vote 
among commissioners.     
 Appointed regulators face incentive structures that are markedly different from 
those of elected counterparts. Appointed regulators serve governors and members of state 
legislatures, and these principals care about a range of regulatory issues including and 
going beyond the matter of consumer electricity rates. Principals with ties to utilities or 
from districts economically dependent upon utilities may seek to safeguard utility 
interests and punish appointed regulators whose decisions are perceived to be 
jeopardizing the health of utilities. At the same time, principals who are generally 
supportive of environmentally friendly regulatory choices (such as innovating with 
respect to RPS policy) may blame or otherwise punish appointed regulators if the choices 
of the appointed regulators produce unintended consequences that could jeopardize the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Regulators must balance the profit needs of utilities with the desire among consumer-
voters for lower electricity rates. A key insight from Besley and Coate (2003) is that 
states with elected regulators—who do not have to contend with oversight from 
legislatures or governors—typically have lower electricity rates than states with 
appointed regulators. However, there are limits to “how low” elected regulators can set 
rates. Utilities can challenge regulatory rate decisions in court, and elected regulators 
ostensibly do not want to set rates so low that utilities go out of business. 
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electoral security of those supportive principals.75 Choosing not to adopt untested 
policy—in other words, choosing not to innovate—protects appointed regulators because 
the appointed regulators limit their own exposure to untested policies that could produce 
unintended consequences and heavily restrict their attention to tested policies of other 
states whose results have been observed and can be communicated to potentially 
skeptical principals. 
 Elected Regulator Innovation Hypothesis: Elected regulators are more likely to 
innovate than are appointed regulators. 
 I will now show that in the Elected Regulator Innovation Hypothesis, I extend 
Besley and Coate’s (2003) analysis of the relationship between the election of regulators 
and electricity rates by demonstrating that their logic also connects the election of 
regulators to increased regulatory innovation.  
Besley and Coate start by assuming that in all states, a majority of voters 
(including the median voter in each state) is “pro-consumer” and ceteris paribus favors 
lower electricity rates; a minority of voters in each state, on the other hand, is “pro-
utility” and ceteris paribus favors higher electricity rates, as higher electricity rates imply 
higher profits for regulated utilities.76 The authors also assume that the most salient 
aspect of regulatory policy for the median voter in any state (regardless of whether that 
state elects or appoints its regulators) is the rate that the median voter pays for his or her 
electricity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 For example, appointed regulators may mandate that 20% of the electricity produced in 
a state come from solar thermal sources. If that 20% requirement generates 
unemployment in the fossil fuel sector, then a pro-environment governor or legislator 
could suffer electorally due to the actions of the appointed regulators.  
76 The minority ostensibly favors higher electricity rates because their welfare is tied to 
the welfare of regulated utilities. 
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Besley and Coate then show why median voters in states with elected regulators 
are better able to translate their rate preferences into policy outcomes than are median 
voters in states with appointed regulators. While median voters in states with elected 
regulators can directly influence the electricity rate choices of elected regulators, median 
voters in states with appointed regulators select governors and legislators on their 
handling of a “bundle” of issues; Besley and Coate among others (Hagerman and 
Ratchford 1978; Navarro 1982; Boyes and McDowell 1989; and Smart 1994) 
hypothesize that within this bundle, regulatory issues are not as salient to median voters 
as are non-regulatory issues. The low salience of regulatory issues in gubernatorial and 
legislative elections allows for regulated utilities and gubernatorial and legislative allies 
to steer regulatory choices in a “pro-utility” direction, implying that electricity rates are 
higher in states with appointed regulators versus states with elected regulators. 
The extension of Besley and Coate’s argument to the matter of regulatory 
innovation is straightforward. Elected regulators know that median voters care 
predominantly about one regulatory issue—electricity rates—and infer from this 
knowledge that median voters are unlikely to oppose innovative policies so long as the 
regulators can convince median voters that innovating will not cause a spike in electricity 
rates. Appointed regulators know that policy experts in governors’ offices and state 
legislatures care about several regulatory issues and may monitor a substantial amount of 
regulatory choices; the appointed regulators consequently reduce innovation to lower the 
chance of backlash from gubernatorial and legislative principals. 
 
4.4 Empirical Analysis of the Argument 
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 Here, I evaluate the Elected Regulator Innovation Hypothesis by using regression 
analysis to determine whether a regulator’s method of selection (elected versus 
appointed) affects that regulator’s propensity to accept risk and innovate when adopting 
policy. I specifically investigate the Elected Regulator Innovation Hypothesis through 
analyzing regulatory innovation with respect to RPS policymaking. An RPS refers to a 
set of policies that attempt to encourage renewable energy use by specifying that utilities 
generate or provide some amount of electricity from renewable sources (Rabe 2006).77 
During the 1983-2011 timespan of this study, the federal government left RPS 
policymaking in the hands of the states, and since Iowa became the first state to adopt a 
set of RPS policies in 1983, 36 other states have developed their own RPS programs.78 
 In many states, the adoption of RPS policies has been a purely legislative 
phenomenon. In 18 of the 37 states, however, regulators have adopted all (or more 
typically, some) of their states’ respective RPS policies. My task empirically is to 
determine whether regulator type affects the likelihood of regulatory innovation. 
 Key steps, then, involve identifying cases of innovation in RPS policymaking as 
well as identifying those cases of innovation where regulators did the adopting. I identify 
cases of innovation by first identifying cases of policy adoption, regardless of who 
(whether it was a legislature, a regulatory agency, or a citizen-led ballot initiative) did the 
adopting, and then classifying a given policy adoption as an innovation if a state adopts 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Examples of RPS policies include what a state designates to be “renewable” energy 
(e.g. wind, photovoltaic, coal methane, etc.), the type of standard (e.g. amount of retail 
electricity supplied, amount of generating capacity, etc.), and whether utilities can trade 
credits to meet standards. All of the policies are listed in the dissertation’s appendix. 
78 37 states adopted RPS policies between 1983 and 2011. 2011 is the concluding year of 
my dataset, as it was the final year for which my primary data source, the Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, had verified the accuracy of its 
information.    
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the policy before any other state adopted the same policy.79 To account for the possibility 
that multiple states could choose simultaneously whether to innovate with respect to the 
same policy, I also classify a policy adoption as an innovation if a state adopts a policy 
within a year after another state became the first state to adopt the policy. Regulatory 
cases of innovation simply refer to those cases where public utilities commissions are the 
innovators. 
 Here, I leverage the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency 
(DSIRE) to identify cases of innovation and identify when regulators did the innovating. 
DSIRE—a collaborative effort between the United States Department of Energy, the 
Interstate Renewable Energy Council, and the North Carolina Solar Center—developed a 
list of policies that fall under the rubric of RPS, identified the states that have adopted 
specific RPS policies, and identified the enabling documentation (whether it is a piece of 
legislation, a regulatory decision, or a ballot amendment) in which the different states 
adopted their respective RPS policies. I arrange all of the enabling documentation in 
chronological order and search each enabling document for evidence that a policy 
identified by DSIRE has been adopted as part of a state’s RPS program. Here, “evidence” 
refers to finding text in the enabling documentation that explicitly links a policy 
identified by DSIRE to a state’s RPS program: for example, DSIRE identified that 
Arizona includes landfill gas as an eligible energy source in its RPS program; a scan of 
all of Arizona’s enabling documents reveals that Arizona first included landfill gas in its 
RPS program in Arizona Corporation Commission Decision 62506 (2000), which states 
that “an electric service provider shall be entitled to meet the portfolio requirement with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Some RPS policies were adopted through ballot initiative in three states: Colorado, 
Missouri, and Washington.  
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electricity produced in Arizona by environmentally-friendly renewable electricity 
technologies that are defined as in-state landfill gas generators…” (2000: Attachment B). 
Once I have identified when a state adopts a particular RPS policy, I assign a date to that 
particular policy adoption based on the adoption date of the corresponding enabling 
document. I then classify a policy adoption as an innovation or emulation; emulation 
means that a state adopted a particular RPS policy at least one year after another state 
became the first state to adopt that same particular RPS policy.80 
 The main dependent outcome, Regulatory Innovation, is a binary variable 
capturing when regulators innovate with respect to RPS policy adoption. My explanatory 
variable of interest is Direct Election, which is also a binary variable and captures 
whether a state’s regulators take office through direct election or appointment and 
confirmation by a governor and legislature. For the Elected Regulator Innovation 
Hypothesis to have a baseline amount of empirical support, I expect Direct Election to 
relate positively and significantly with Regulatory Innovation.  
I compare the statistical relationship obtained by regressing Regulatory 
Innovation on Direct Election to the statistical relationship obtained by regressing a 
second dependent variable, Regulatory Emulation, on Direct Election. Regulatory 
Emulation is a binary variable capturing when regulators emulate with respect to RPS 
policy adoption. Regressing Regulatory Emulation on Direct Election allows us to check 
the robustness of the statistical relationship between Direct Election and Regulatory 
Innovation by identifying whether the relationship captured in the Elected Regulator 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The date given to Arizona with respect to landfill gas was May 4, 2000 (the date of 
adoption for ACC Decision 62506). Arizona emulated with respect to including landfill 
gas in its RPS program, as Connecticut had already included landfill gas in its own RPS 
program via legislation (House Bill 5005) in 1998.   
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Innovation Hypothesis is actually germane to innovation. A significant and positive 
relationship between Direct Election and Regulatory Innovation combined with a 
significant and positive relationship between Direct Election and Regulatory Emulation 
would cast doubt on the validity of H1, as this merely shows that elected regulators adopt 
more regulatory policies than appointed regulators. A significant and positive relationship 
between Direct Election and Regulatory Innovation combined with a nonsignificant (and 
preferably weaker) relationship between Direct Election and Regulatory Emulation, on 
the other hand, gives a stronger degree of support to the Elected Regulator Innovation 
Hypothesis by illustrating that elected regulators accept a statistically different and higher 
level of risk from appointed regulators when the choice under consideration is whether to 
adopt the riskiest policy type that is generally available. 
I structure the dependent data according to the conventions of standard event 
history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, 2004). The choice to adopt a 
specific RPS policy enters the dataset during the same year in which an innovation with 
respect to that specific policy occurs. Once the choice to adopt a specific policy enters the 
dataset, a state that chooses not to adopt that policy receives a score of 0 until a policy 
adoption occurs and the corresponding state regulatory policy choice opportunity (the 
unit of analysis in this study) exits the dataset. 81 Over the 1983-2011 timespan, there are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Although I care here about regulatory choice, remember that policy adoption choices 
enter and exit the dataset based on adoption decisions that are made by all actors within 
and across the states. The decision by the Iowa legislature in 1983 to innovate by adding 
wind energy as an eligible RPS resource gave regulators and other governmental actors in 
the other 49 states the opportunity to innovate (by classifying wind energy as an eligible 
RPS resource within a year of the Iowa legislature’s decision) or emulate (by adding 
wind energy over a year after the Iowa legislature’s decision) with respect to the same 
policy. Iowa’s regulators, from 1983 onward, do not have the choice to add wind energy 
since the adoption by Iowa’s legislature means that this choice has exited the choice 
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34,922 regulatory choice opportunities and 19 cases of regulatory innovation, meaning 
that regulatory innovation occurred in 0.054% of cases; additionally, there are 68 cases of 
regulatory emulation, meaning that regulatory emulation occurred in 0.194% of cases. 
While the case numbers and percentages associated with regulatory innovation and 
regulatory emulation seem extremely small, it is useful to remember that these case 
numbers and percentages are correctly small, as regulatory policy adoption in an issue 
area where the federal government has not mitigated the risk incurred by state 
policymakers is rare. Therefore, while the number of adoptions (and especially 
innovations) in the dataset admittedly leaves room for improvement, the very low 
probability of innovation serves as a reminder of how much risk regulators undertake 
when they choose to innovate. In table 13, I display the number of regulatory policy 
adoptions by state, disaggregated into categories of innovation and emulation. 
TABLE 13: State RPS Policy Adoption by Public Utility Regulators82 
State Innovation Emulation Total Adoption 
Arizona 8 15 23 
Iowa 0 1 1 
Maine 0 2 2 
Massachusetts 1 1 1 
Michigan 0 1 1 
Nevada 0 4 4 
New Hampshire 0 1 1 
New Jersey 1 1 2 
New Mexico 3 12 15 
New York 4 15 19 
North Carolina 0 1 1 
North Dakota 0 1 1 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
dataset for Iowa’s regulators. Similarly, the 1994 decision by Minnesota’s legislature to 
emulate Iowa’s wind energy policy means that the choice to adopt a wind energy policy 
was no longer available to Minnesota’s regulators from 1994 onward.   
82 In the table, shaded rows refer to states with elected regulators. In this study, I list the 
following states as having elected regulators: Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
and Tennessee (prior to 1997). 
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State Innovation Emulation Total Adoption 
Ohio 0 1 1 
Pennsylvania 0 1 1 
Rhode Island 0 2 2 
Texas 1 1 2 
Vermont 0 5 5 
Washington 0 1 1 
Wisconsin 1 2 3 
Total 19 68 87 
 
 I use four statistical models to evaluate the relationship between Direct Election 
and Regulatory Innovation/Emulation. In models 1 and 2, I compare the influence of 
Direct Election on Regulatory Innovation (model 1) to that of Direct Election on 
Regulatory Emulation (model 2) using logistic regression. In models 3 and 4, I re-
estimate models 1 and 2 but utilize an alternate logistic procedure from King and Zheng 
(2001) that accounts for rare events data.83 In the appendix of the chapter, I show results 
obtained from estimating models 1 and 2 via bivariate probit and multinomial logistic 
regression.84 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 I assume that regulators decide simultaneously whether to innovate, emulate, or not 
adopt. One may believe that regulators choose to adopt a policy and then choose to 
innovate or emulate. This modeling decision seems implausible, however, as it assumes 
that regulators choose to adopt a policy before considering the risks that are associated 
with adopting that policy. Ample testimony from rulemaking documents (testimonies are 
appended to the rulemaking documents and come from hearings predating the decision 
date of the rulemaking) about the costs and benefits of various policy proposals suggests 
that regulators thought about risks before adopting policies.      
84 A bivariate probit setup links the error structure of Regulatory Innovation to the error 
structure of Regulatory Emulation. A multinomial logistic setup allows us to compare the 
influence of Direct Election across different nominally arranged outcomes (here, no 
adoption, emulation, and innovation). Results do not change substantively when using 
either of these alternate techniques. I do not utilize a multinomial logistic procedure as 
the primary regression technique, as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption is violated since the addition of new renewable technologies can change the 
preference ranking of older renewable technologies.   
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 I utilize the following controls for all model specifications, regardless of whether 
the dependent outcome is Regulatory Innovation or Regulatory Emulation.85 Energy 
Price measures (in 2011 dollars per million BTUs) the average cost of energy for a user 
in state i in year t.86 Higher energy prices could increase innovation if regulators—
regardless of whether they are elected or appointed—use innovative policymaking to try 
to bring future electricity rates down. At the same time, higher energy prices could 
decrease innovation if regulators, again regardless of type, worry that innovative 
policymaking may increase future electricity rates.87 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 As I am using the Regulatory Emulation outcome as a placebo to check the robustness 
of results from the Regulatory Innovation outcome, I generally describe control variables 
in terms of how they influence Regulatory Innovation rather than how they may 
differentially influence Regulatory Innovation versus Regulatory Emulation. There are 
only two controls, which I describe at the end of this section, that are used with 
Regulatory Emulation but not Regulatory Innovation.  
86 The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), which provides estimated energy 
price values, is agnostic in its technical notes about whether reported energy price 
estimates take consumer electricity rates into account or calculate user prices absent rate 
information (the cost of electricity for the end user typically includes raw energy 
generation and distribution costs plus a rate that allows a utility to make a profit). 
Regardless, Energy Price is important to include since it either captures raw inputs that 
factor heavily in the rate setting process or raw inputs plus contemporaneous rates. 
87 Here, I assume that Energy Price independently affects Regulatory Innovation. When I 
interact Energy Price with Direct Election, I fail to find statistical evidence that elected 
regulators innovate differently from appointed regulators when confronted with higher 
energy prices (there is nonsignificant evidence that elected regulators are more likely to 
innovate given higher energy prices than are appointed regulators). I do not believe that 
the lack of a significant Energy Price*Direct Election interactive term invalidates my 
argument supporting the Elected Regulator Innovation Hypothesis. The interactive term 
suggests that elected regulators innovate more than appointed regulators but restrictively 
attributes this difference in behavior to the condition of high energy prices. I argue that 
elected regulators innovate more because they serve principals who are largely 
uninterested in regulatory issues: elected regulators who want to innovate only need to be 
able to convince median voters that innovations will not raise electricity rates and may 
(given the non-significance of Energy Price*Direct Election) be able to make this 
argument in low as well as high energy price environments. I show estimation results for 
models including the Energy Price*Direct Election interaction term in the appendix of 
the chapter. 
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 A second group of controls accounts for the possibility that variation in legislative 
capacity and state wealth could affect the likelihood of regulators choosing to innovate. 
Legislative Professionalism is state i’s amount of legislative professionalism (reported 
using Squire’s index of professionalism) in year t and captures the idea that regulators are 
less likely to innovate in states with professional legislatures since these legislatures can 
turn to non-regulatory sources for policy-specific expertise (Squire 2007). Laws Enacted 
is a measure of state i’s legislative workload in year t and could increase or decrease the 
likelihood of regulatory innovation: legislatures enacting a high number of laws could 
face high workloads, giving regulators a greater opportunity to innovate; however, 
regulators in states with productive legislatures may be less likely to innovate since these 
legislatures are signaling that they are the prime adopters of policy. Legislative Election 
Year, a binary measure of whether some members of state i’s legislature face reelection 
in year t, also captures the time constraints of legislators and could increase the likelihood 
of regulatory innovation. Finally, State Per Capita Income Percent captures state i’s per 
capita income in year t as a percentage of the national per capita income in year t and 
reflects the possibility that regulators from wealthier states may be more likely to 
innovate, as they may have access to more resources than regulators from poorer states. 
 A third group of controls captures the affect that energy interests may play in the 
regulatory policy innovation process. Percentage of Coal Consumption, Percentage of 
Natural Gas Consumption, Percentage of Petroleum Consumption, and Percentage of 
Renewable Consumption reflect the total amounts of energy consumption in state i in 
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year t that come from coal, natural gas, petroleum, or “traditional” renewable sources.88 
Increases in these variables may spur regulatory innovation as sectoral interests attempt 
to carve out protections in retail markets by pushing for the inclusion of their sectors in 
RPS regimes. Three other energy-interest related variables are Solar Average, the 
average daily amount of solar radiation received in state i over year t (in kilowatt-hours 
per square meter per day); River Miles, the total mileage (in thousands of miles) for 
perennial rivers in state i; and Shoreline, the total mileage (in thousands of statute miles) 
of coastline for any state that borders an ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, or any of the Great 
Lakes. Higher values in any of these variables may translate into more regulatory 
innovation, as sectoral interests try to convince regulators that tapping into these 
resources can spur economic growth. Finally, I include state i’s Change in the Rate of 
Unemployment from year t-1 to year t to capture the possibility that regulators and/or 
sectoral interests could use rising unemployment to either call for or advocate against 
innovation with respect to RPS policies. 
 I include a binary measure of Unified Government to account for the possibility 
that opinions from the dominant party in state i in year t could influence the innovation 
choices of regulators by giving regulators a clearer signal (if a state’s governor and 
legislature belong to the same party) about whether prominent political actors in the state 
support or oppose the proposed innovation. I lastly include temporal and spatio-temporal 
controls. Prior Regulatory Innovation and Prior Legislative Innovation record the total 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 The U.S. EIA, the source of energy pricing and usage data, defines “traditional” 
renewable sources as the following: hydroelectric, wood and waste, ethanol, ethanol co-
products, geothermal, solar, photovoltaic, and wind-based power. States can (and do) 
include traditionally non-renewable sources in their RPS programs: Michigan, Ohio, and 
West Virginia all include coal and coal derivatives as eligible “renewable” sources in 
their RPS programs. 
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number of previous instances of innovation (regulatory in the case of Prior Regulatory 
Innovation and legislative in the case of Prior Legislative Innovation) that occurred in 
state i divided by the total number of previous instances of innovation (regardless of the 
actor doing the innovating) that occurred across all states. These variables account for the 
inherent “leader” qualities of a given state and of different institutionally situated actors 
within that state and control for the possibility that inherent leader qualities could 
determine regulatory innovation behavior. Prior Regulatory Emulation and Prior 
Legislative Emulation are analogous variables that control for the possibility that the 
inherent follower qualities of a state and its different institutionally situated actors could 
also determine regulatory innovation behavior. Prior Neighbor Innovation and Prior 
Neighbor Emulation record the fraction of total previous instances of innovation and 
emulation, regardless of the actor adopting the policy, that occurred in states adjacent to 
state i. While Prior Neighbor Innovation reflects the possibility that innovative 
policymaking could drive state i’s regulators to innovate in ways different from those of 
neighboring states’ policymakers, Prior Neighbor Emulation reflects the possibility that 
emulation in adjacent states could drive state i’s regulators to innovate by building on 
successful emulations that have diffused across adjacent states.89 
 The next two controls, Prior Initiative Emulation and Logged Year, only apply to 
Regulatory Emulation model specifications.90 Prior Initiative Emulation captures the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 An example from the RPS policy area would be if state A classified photovoltaic 
energy as an eligible renewable resource but did not require some percentage of 
electricity to be generated from photovoltaic sources. State B would then innovate by 
building on state A’s policy and requiring that utilities generate some percentage of 
electricity from photovoltaic sources. 
90 Some may be concerned that I include two variables in the “placebo” (Regulatory 
Emulation) models that I do not include in the “treatment” (Regulatory Innovation) 
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possibility that state i’s regulators may be less likely to emulate if citizens in the same 
state have already emulated via the ballot initiative process.91 Logged Year captures the 
effect that a general increase in time from 1983 onward may have on regulators’ 
emulation choices.92 The final control, Year Count, applies to both the Regulatory 
Innovation and Regulatory Emulation model specifications and records the number of 
years elapsed since the first instance across the states of a specific RPS policy’s adoption. 
Year Count reflects the possibility that the hazard of adopting a specific RPS policy 
increases as the temporal distance from that policy’s first adoption increases. In table 14, 
I display summary statistics and descriptions of the variables utilized in this chapter. 
TABLE 14: Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Type Structure Mean 
Regulatory Innovation Dependent 
 
Binary 0.05% of Observations = 
Innovation 
Regulatory Emulation Dependent 
 
Binary 0.19% of Observations = 
Emulation 
Direct Election Explanatory Binary 23.66% of Observations = 
Elected Regulators 
Energy Price Control Continuous 17.15 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
models. Results associated with the placebo do not substantively change when I use the 
same exact variables used in the treatment case. I include these results in the chapter’s 
appendix.   
91 I do not create a “Prior Initiative Innovation” variable because there are no cases of 
RPS innovation via ballot initiative. I also do not include “Prior Initiative Emulation” in 
the Regulatory Innovation model specification since there are no cases where a state’s 
regulators innovate after citizens have emulated through the ballot initiative process. 
92 Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) argue for using year dummies to capture the effects of 
time in discrete event history settings. Year dummies, however, consume many degrees 
of freedom and in this case, perfectly predict outcomes in the years for which no policy 
adoptions occur. The result is that we cannot conduct a likelihood ratio test between the 
constrained (no time variable) and unconstrained (year dummies) models, as the software 
drops observations where failure is perfectly predicted. I therefore use likelihood ratio 
tests to assess the fit between competing parameterizations of time (I evaluate a linear 
year trend, a quadratic year trend, and a logged year trend) and include Logged Year, 
measured from the beginning of the dataset in 1983 onward, in the emulation 
specification. I do not include a general time trend in the innovation specification, as 
likelihood ratio tests do not support including the general time trend.  
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Variable Type Structure Mean 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Control Continuous 0.18 
Laws Enacted Control Continuous 383.38 
Legislative Election Year Control Binary 54.50% of Observations = Non-
Election Years 
% State Per Capita 
Income 
Control Continuous 95.86 
% Coal Consumption Control Continuous 23.21 
% Natural Gas 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 20.83 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 35.79 
Solar Average Control Continuous 3.97 
River Miles Control Continuous 26.33 
Shoreline Control Continuous 2.16 
Change in the Rate of 
Unemployment 
Control Continuous 0.24 
 Unified Government Control Binary 50.86% of Observations = 
Divided Governments 
Prior Regulatory 
Innovation 
Control Continuous 0.04 
Prior Legislative 
Innovation 
Control Continuous 0.20 
Prior Regulatory 
Emulation 
Control Continuous 0.06 
Prior Legislative 
Emulation 
Control Continuous 0.25 
Prior Neighbor 
Innovation 
Control Continuous 0.07 
Prior Neighbor Emulation Control Continuous 0.06 
Prior Initiative Emulation Control Continuous 0.01 
Logged Year Control Continuous 3.02 
Year Count Control Continuous 5.77 	  
 
4.5 Results 
 In tables 15 and 16, I show results from the logistic and rare events logistic 
analyses of Regulatory Innovation and Regulatory Emulation. In table 15, I also show 
estimates as odds ratios in order to facilitate the interpretation of results. In all analyses in 
this study, I cluster standard errors within state to reflect the idea that any two choices 
from the same state are not independent from one another.  
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TABLE 15: Estimation Results using Logistic Regression 
Variable/Model Regulatory Innovation Regulatory Emulation 
Direct Election 
 
2.373** 
(0.967) 
10.735 (+) 0.333 
(0.689) 
1.395 (+) 
Energy Price 
 
0.021 
(0.131) 
1.021 (+) -0.072 
(0.077) 
0.929 (-) 
Laws Enacted 
 
0.0004 
(0.001) 
1.000 (+) 0.00001 
(0.001) 
1.000 (+) 
Legislative Professionalism 7.077*** 
(2.157) 
1185.264 (+) 6.586*** 
(2.387) 
725.178 (+) 
Legislative Election Year 2.288*** 
(0.787) 
9.862 (+) 1.673*** 
(0.464) 
5.329 (+) 
% Per Capita Income 
 
0.013 
(0.024) 
1.013 (+) -0.018 
(0.029) 
0.981 (-) 
% Coal Consumption 
 
-0.062* 
(0.035) 
0.939 (-) -0.026 
(0.023) 
0.973 (-) 
% Natural Gas Consumption -0.062 
(0.052) 
0.939 (-) -0.009 
(0.025) 
0.990 (-) 
% Petroleum Consumption -0.039 
(0.049) 
0.961 (-) -0.007 
(0.035) 
0.992 (-) 
% Renewable Consumption -0.165*** 
(0.052) 
0.847 (-) 0.001 
(0.032) 
1.001 (+) 
Solar Average 
 
0.537 
(0.621) 
1.711 (+) 0.417 
(0.407) 
1.517 (+) 
River Miles 
 
-0.034 
(0.035) 
0.966 (-) -0.040* 
(0.022) 
0.960 (-) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.062 
(0.091) 
0.939 (-) -0.086* 
(0.050) 
0.916 (-) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.288 
(0.348) 
0.749 (-) -0.329 
(0.290) 
0.719 (-) 
Unified Government -0.215 
(0.356) 
0.806 (-) -0.948** 
0.450 
0.387 (-) 
Prior Regulatory Innovation -2.181 
(2.835) 
0.112 (-) 1.578 
(1.597) 
4.845 (+) 
Prior Legislative Innovation -0.365 
(1.135) 
0.694 (-) -0.477 
(0.902) 
0.620 (-) 
Prior Regulatory Emulation 1.346 
(2.743) 
3.845 (+) -1.286 
(1.597) 
0.276 (-) 
Prior Legislative Emulation -0.088 
(1.413) 
0.915 (+) 0.846 
(1.312) 
2.330 (+) 
Prior Neighbor Innovation 0.971 
(1.020) 
2.640 (+) 2.553* 
(1.451) 
12.855 (+) 
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Variable/Model Regulatory Innovation Regulatory Emulation 
Prior Neighbor Emulation 2.672* 
(1.479) 
14.469 (+) 1.154 
(0.924) 
3.172 (+) 
Prior Initiative Emulation - - 0.841 
(1.742) 
2.320 (+) 
Logged Year - - 1.655 
(2.241) 
5.235 (+) 
Yearcount 
 
-1.283*** 
(0.462) 
0.277 (-) 0.129*** 
(0.020) 
1.138 (+) 
Observations 34922 (19) 34922 (68) 
Wald χ2 2417.97*** 589.77*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
 Results from table 15 provide empirical support for the Elected Regulator 
Innovation Hypothesis: a positive relationship between Direct Election and Regulatory 
Innovation, significant at a threshold of 0.05, suggests that elected regulators are more 
likely to accept the risk of innovating than are appointed regulators. Expressed in terms 
of odds ratios, the odds of innovating are more than 10 times greater for elected 
compared to appointed regulators. This finding persists after controlling for other 
potential sources of innovation such as contemporaneous energy price, the influence of 
various energy sectoral interests, the influence of neighboring states, and previous 
innovative activity by state legislatures. Additionally, the significance of Direct Election 
with respect to Regulatory Innovation combined with the non-significance and weaker 
influence of Direct Election with respect to Regulatory Emulation suggests that the 
Elected Regulators Innovation Hypothesis is not an artifact of elected regulators simply 
choosing to adopt more policies than appointed regulators. Rather, elected regulators 
appear to embrace the risk of innovating while appointed regulators appear to reject this 
risk. 
 In table 16, I re-estimate the same models displayed in table 15 but use rare events 
logistic regression. Direct Election maintains a positive and significant relationship with 
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Regulatory Innovation, although Direct Election is now significant at the 0.10 threshold. 
Direct Election still fails to achieve significance and has a weaker (in terms of 
magnitude) relationship with Regulatory Emulation, implying that elected regulators 
demonstrate a greater risk acceptance than do appointed regulators. 
TABLE 16: Estimation Results using Rare Events Logistic Regression 
Variable/Model Regulatory Innovation Regulatory Emulation 
Direct Election 
 
1.653* 
(0.967) 
0.308 
(0.689) 
Energy Price 
 
0.012 
(0.131) 
-0.060 
(0.077) 
Laws Enacted 
 
0.0001 
(0.001) 
-0.00001 
(0.001) 
Legislative Professionalism 5.752*** 
(2.155) 
6.166*** 
(2.385) 
Legislative Election Year 2.046*** 
(0.786) 
1.619*** 
(0.463) 
% Per Capita Income 
 
0.003 
(0.024) 
-0.018 
(0.029) 
% Coal Consumption 
 
-0.039 
(0.035) 
-0.022 
(0.023) 
% Natural Gas Consumption -0.038 
(0.052) 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
% Petroleum Consumption -0.026 
(0.049) 
-0.005 
(0.035) 
% Renewable Consumption -0.068 
(0.052) 
0.006 
(0.032) 
Solar Average 0.498 
(0.621) 
0.410 
(0.407) 
River Miles -0.048 
(0.035) 
-0.041* 
(0.022) 
Shoreline 
 
0.226** 
(0.091) 
-0.022 
(0.050) 
Δ Unemployment 
 
-0.244 
(0.348) 
-0.300 
(0.290) 
Unified Government -0.233 
(0.356) 
-0.914** 
(0.449) 
Prior Regulatory Innovation -2.748 
(2.833) 
1.646 
(1.596) 
Prior Legislative Innovation -0.341 
(1.134) 
-0.453 
(0.901) 
Prior Regulatory Emulation 1.951 
(2.741) 
-1.313 
(1.596) 
Prior Legislative Emulation 0.079 
(1.412) 
0.880 
(1.311) 
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Variable/Model Regulatory Innovation Regulatory Emulation 
Prior Neighbor Innovation 1.592 
(1.020) 
2.548* 
(1.450) 
Prior Neighbor Emulation 2.526* 
(1.478) 
1.170 
(0.924) 
Prior Initiative Emulation - 1.322 
(1.741) 
Logged Year - 1.317 
(2.240) 
Yearcount 
 
-1.157** 
(0.462) 
0.129*** 
(0.020) 
Observations 34922 (19) 34922 (68) 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 My claim in this chapter is straightforward: due to a difference in institutional 
oversight, elected regulators are more willing than are appointed regulators to accept risk 
in the policymaking process and innovate when adopting policy. The difference in 
institutional oversight, one identified by Besley and Coate (2003), centers on the idea that 
elected regulators are accountable to median voters while appointed regulators are 
accountable to governors and state legislators. For median voters, the rate charged for 
electricity is the most salient aspect of regulatory policy; elected regulators consequently 
face low opposition to innovating from median voters provided that the regulators can 
convince median voters that innovating will not raise electricity rates. Governors and 
legislators, on the other hand, care about several aspects of regulatory policy including 
but going beyond electricity rates. These governors and legislators care about their own 
welfare and that of benefactors and constituents, and they may try to punish appointed 
regulators if they believe that those regulators are taking undesired or unnecessary risks. 
Appointed regulators may anticipate opposition from gubernatorial and legislative 
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principals and refrain from innovating in order to minimize possible backlash from these 
principals. 
 An issue that I do not address here is determining when elected regulators believe 
that they can convince median voters that innovating will not raise electricity rates. One 
plausible scenario, that the ability of elected regulators to convince voters depends on 
contemporaneous energy price levels, does not achieve statistical significance.93 Two 
other plausible scenarios, which I endeavor to test in future iterations of this work, are 
that the ability of elected regulators to convince voters (1) varies positively with the 
frequency with which elected regulators agree with each other in regulatory decision-
making; and (2) varies negatively with the amount of electoral vulnerability faced by 
those elected regulators.94 In order to adequately evaluate these two scenarios, I need to 
address data limitations in two areas. To construct variables capturing regulatory 
agreement and electoral vulnerability, I first need to gather data on the frequency of 
unanimous decision-making across public utility commissions and data on the electoral 
histories of regulators in those states where public utility commissioners are elected. I 
secondly need to increase the number of adoptions in my dependent data by replicating 
my coding process in multiple issue areas in which regulators possess policymaking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Recall that Energy Price*Direct Election does not achieve significance with respect to 
Regulatory Innovation or Regulatory Emulation. Using ΔEnergy Price*Direct Election as 
a substitute does not change results, as this interaction term fails to achieve significance 
with respect to Regulatory Innovation or Regulatory Emulation.  
94 A higher frequency of agreement among elected regulators in a given public utility 
commission indicates a higher degree of coalitional cohesion and could relate positively 
with the ability of regulators to convince voters if a higher degree of coalitional cohesion 
implies that regulators are sending voters a unified rather than divided message (a 
dissenting opinion is an example of a divided message). Higher electoral vulnerability 
could relate negatively with the ability of regulators to convince voters since the 
vulnerability implies that a substantial number of voters may not find the regulators to be 
credible. 
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authority. Expanding the dependent data will be challenging, as we still need to satisfy 
the criterion that dependent data come from policy areas where the federal government 
has largely refrained from interfering in state decision-making. However, expanding the 
dataset is crucial in order to gain enough variation in the data so that we can evaluate the 
interactive propositions outlined earlier in this paragraph. 
 This study has implications for how I evaluate advice from Rose-Ackerman 
(1980), Volden, Ting, and Carpenter (2008), and Cai and Treisman (2009) regarding risk-
aversion by elected policymakers. These works focus primarily on legislative actors and 
raise the possibility that elected officials will refrain from innovating due to reelection 
concerns: applying this logic to regulatory actors suggests that appointed regulators may 
demonstrate greater risk acceptance in the policy adoption process than elected regulators 
because the appointed regulators are unencumbered by their own electoral considerations. 
Results from this analysis, conducted in a policy area marked by the absence of 
significant federal influence on state policymaking, suggest that elected regulators may 
actually embrace the risk of innovation more than appointed peers. Greater risk-taking by 
elected officials may be normatively good for democracy insofar as elected officials are 
taking risks that their voters support. However, reduced risk-taking by appointed officials 
might be normatively bad for policymaking insofar as appointees are unable to translate 
their expertise into concrete policy outcomes. Future research should evaluate how 
democratic control of the policymaking process can be reconciled with the need for 
expert policy designers who more often than not may be appointed rather than elected. 
 In the next chapter, I move away from analyzing the innovation and emulation 
choices of collective-level decision-makers (such as legislatures or public utility 
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commissions) and instead examine the innovation and emulation activity of individual 
legislators during the policy sponsorship process. 
 
4.7 Appendix95 
TABLE 17: Results using Bivariate Probit Specification 
Variable/Model Regulatory 
Innovation 
Regulatory 
Emulation 
Direct Election 0.745*** 
(0.268) 
0.115 
(0.297) 
Energy Price -0.008 
(0.034) 
-0.027 
(0.023) 
Laws Enacted -0.00004 
(0.0003) 
0.000005 
(0.0002) 
Legislative Professionalism 2.268*** 
(0.689) 
2.354*** 
(0.736) 
Legislative Election Year 0.693*** 
(0.256) 
0.547*** 
(0.162) 
% Per Capita Income 0.00002 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
% Coal Consumption -0.023** 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
% Natural Gas Consumption 0.016 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
% Petroleum Consumption  -0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
% Renewable Consumption -0.053*** 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
Solar Average 
 
0.155 
(0.159) 
0.153 
(0.119) 
River Miles 
 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.017*** 
(0.005) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.017 
(0.020) 
-0.027* 
(0.014) 
Δ Unemployment -0.114 
(0.112) 
-0.111 
(0.087) 
Unified Government -0.031 
(0.129) 
-0.290** 
(0.127) 
Prior Regulatory Innovation -0.452 
(0.834) 
0.670 
(0.572) 
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 I use state-clustered standard errors for all statistical results displayed in the appendix. 
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Variable/Model Regulatory 
Innovation 
Regulatory 
Emulation 
Prior Legislative Innovation 0.051 
(0.338) 
-0.068 
(0.279) 
Prior Regulatory Emulation 0.485 
(0.843) 
-0.478 
(0.589) 
Prior Legislative Emulation 0.087 
(0.372) 
0.310 
(0.357) 
Prior Neighbor Innovation 0.445 
(0.359) 
0.929* 
(0.500) 
Prior Neighbor Emulation 0.863* 
(0.515) 
0.476 
(0.344) 
Logged Year 
 
- 0.547 
(0.591) 
Yearcount 
 
-0.377*** 
(0.132) 
0.047*** 
(0.006) 
Observations 34922 (19) 34922 (68) 
Wald Χ2 20921.75*** 
Rho -0.470 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 	  
TABLE 18: Results using Multinomial Logistic Regression 
Variable/Model Regulatory 
Innovation 
Regulatory 
Emulation 
Direct Election 2.274** 
(0.990) 
0.284 
(0.707) 
Energy Price -0.011 
(0.128) 
-0.072 
(0.078) 
Laws Enacted 0.0008 
(0.001) 
0.00003 
(0.001) 
Legislative Professionalism 7.873*** 
(2.815) 
6.574*** 
(2.390) 
Legislative Election Year 2.266*** 
(0.797) 
1.671*** 
(0.470) 
% Per Capita Income 0.013 
(0.026) 
-0.017 
(0.028) 
% Coal Consumption -0.060 
(0.038) 
-0.025 
(0.022) 
% Natural Gas Consumption -0.068 
(0.056) 
-0.008 
(0.024) 
% Petroleum Consumption  -0.037 
(0.055) 
-0.006 
(0.035) 
% Renewable Consumption -0.164*** 
(0.052) 
0.003 
(0.033) 
Solar Average 
 
0.605 
(0.622) 
0.513 
(0.415) 
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Variable/Model Regulatory 
Innovation 
Regulatory 
Emulation 
River Miles 
 
-0.044 
(0.033) 
-0.050*** 
(0.019) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.064 
(0.098) 
-0.088* 
(0.050) 
Δ Unemployment -0.388 
(0.438) 
-0.333 
(0.288) 
Unified Government -0.258 
(0.377) 
-0.953** 
(0.453) 
Prior Regulatory Innovation -2.394 
(3.042) 
1.592 
(1.651) 
Prior Legislative Innovation -0.389 
(1.144) 
-0.477 
(0.925) 
Prior Regulatory Emulation 1.236 
(2.922) 
-1.329 
(1.595) 
Prior Legislative Emulation -0.322 
(1.550) 
0.796 
(1.262) 
Prior Neighbor Innovation 1.611 
(1.558) 
2.586* 
(1.439) 
Prior Neighbor Emulation 2.086 
(1.408) 
1.119 
(0.923) 
Logged Year 
 
1.089 
(1.245) 
1.728 
(2.211) 
Yearcount 
 
-1.235*** 
(0.400) 
0.128*** 
(0.020) 
Observations 34922 (19) 34922 (68) 
Wald Χ2 84836.05*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01.	  
 
TABLE 19: Value and Significance of Direct Election*Energy Price Across Model 
Specifications 
 
Variable/Model Logit Rare Events Logit 
 Innovation Emulation Innovation Emulation 
Direct Election -0.015 
(3.323) 
1.441 
(2.230) 
-0.450 
(3.321) 
1.358 
(2.228) 
Energy Price -0.056 
(0.213) 
-0.052 
(0.081) 
-0.060 
(0.213) 
-0.041 
(0.081) 
Direct 
Election*Energy 
Price 
0.161 
(0.196) 
-0.071 
(0.130) 
0.147 
(0.196) 
-0.066 
(0.130) 
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TABLE 20: Results for Regulatory Emulation using Same Model used for 
Regulatory Innovation 
  
Variable/Model Logit Rare Events 
Logit 
Direct Election 0.391 
(0.741) 
0.358 
(0.740) 
Energy Price -0.013 
(0.063) 
-0.012 
(0.063) 
Laws Enacted -0.00008 
(0.008) 
-0.0001 
(0.0008) 
Legislative Professionalism 5.579*** 
(1.149) 
5.332*** 
(1.408) 
Legislative Election Year 1.672*** 
(0.471) 
1.617*** 
(0.471) 
% Per Capita Income -0.020 
(0.024) 
-0.019 
(0.024) 
% Coal Consumption -0.024 
(0.021) 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
% Natural Gas Consumption -0.003 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.023) 
% Petroleum Consumption  -0.011 
(0.028) 
-0.009 
(0.028) 
% Renewable Consumption 0.001 
(0.031) 
0.006 
(0.031) 
Solar Average 
 
0.417 
(0.407) 
0.410 
(0.407) 
River Miles 
 
-0.040* 
(0.022) 
-0.041* 
(0.022) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.086* 
(0.050) 
-0.022 
(0.050) 
Δ Unemployment -0.284 
(0.265) 
-0.264 
(0.265) 
Unified Government -0.863** 
(0.386) 
-0.852** 
(0.386) 
Prior Regulatory Innovation 1.710 
(1.509) 
1.750 
(1.508) 
Prior Legislative Innovation -0.357 
(0.853) 
-0.365 
(0.852) 
Prior Regulatory Emulation -1.125 
(1.533) 
-1.170 
(1.532) 
Prior Legislative Emulation 1.063 
(1.077) 
1.078 
(1.076) 
Prior Neighbor Innovation 1.601*** 
(0.585) 
1.741*** 
(0.585) 
Prior Neighbor Emulation 1.867* 
(1.082) 
1.808* 
(1.081) 
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Variable/Model Regulatory 
Innovation 
Regulatory 
Emulation 
Yearcount 
 
0.136*** 
(0.016) 
0.135*** 
(0.016) 
Observations 34922 (19) 34922 (68) 
Wald Χ2 511.07*** - 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Innovation in Policy Cosponsorship among State Legislators 
 
Abstract 
The extant literature on policy adoption has focused on collective-level 
legislative activity and ignored individual-level legislator-specific action, meaning 
that we know very little about how legislator-specific factors affect the innovation 
and emulation of policy. At the same time, the extent literature has 
overwhelmingly focused on policy adoption and ignored policy cosponsorship, 
meaning that we know very little about why legislators would cosponsor novel (or 
innovative) policy rather than emulate and support policy that already has been 
adopted. Assembling and analyzing a dataset of 7,079 cases of policy sponsorship 
pertaining to state renewable energy portfolio legislation, I argue and find that 
legislators are more likely to emulate when cosponsoring policy if they come 
from states with higher levels of legislative professionalism. At the same time, I 
argue and find that legislators are more likely to cosponsor innovative policy if 
they come from states with term limit provisions. The pro-emulation legislative 
professionalism result mirrors an earlier macro-level finding linking increased 
professionalism to a higher likelihood of emulation in policy adoption and 
suggests that individual legislators also respond to increases in legislative 
professionalism by favoring emulation over innovation. The pro-innovation term 
limits result suggests that reducing electoral accountability (by way of shortening 
legislators’ time horizons) makes legislators more likely to embrace the risk of 
cosponsoring innovative and untested policy. 
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5.1 Introduction 
In the first two empirical chapters of this dissertation, I evaluated the policy risk 
choices of collective state organizations operating under devolution. Regardless of 
whether the state organization consisted of legislators or public utilities commissioners, I 
characterized innovation and emulation choices as group-level decisions and ignored how 
individual state legislators view the choice to innovate or emulate.   
Here, I evaluate the innovation and emulation choice from the angle of individual 
state legislators operating under devolution and examine the drivers of policy innovation 
and emulation in the cosponsorship process. Focusing on individual rather than collective 
decision-making is a useful way to extend and tease out the limitations of some of the 
dissertation’s earlier findings. In chapter 3, for example, I identify legislative 
professionalism as a key factor influencing legislative policy emulation. While legislative 
professionalism could also positively influence individual-level emulation, it is possible 
that legislators may respond differently from legislatures to the absence or presence of 
legislative resources. Similarly, while chapter 3 also links a collective conceptualization 
of electoral vulnerability to increased emulation, it is possible that electorally vulnerable 
legislators may behave differently and choose, for example, to innovate instead of 
emulating.96 In this chapter, I relate findings from chapter 3 to the micro-level 
environment of legislators and investigate factors driving legislator innovation and 
emulation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 To borrow an analogy from sports, a vulnerable legislator could embrace the risk of 
innovation and view the act of innovation as a “Hail Mary” that may bolster reelection 
chances.  
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Here, I also depart from standard practice earlier in the dissertation and focus on 
legislator cosponsorship rather than adoption. Cosponsorship is an oft-neglected but 
important part of the legislative process, and cosponsors send a signal to constituents 
about their support for a policy by formally associating themselves with that policy 
proposal’s advancement in the legislature (Krehbiel 1995; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; 
Koger 2003; and Harward and Moffett 2010). While cosponsors do not take on the same 
level of commitment as sponsors—who are known for being the primary stewards of a 
policy proposal’s advancement in the legislature (Schiller 1995; and Wawro 2000)—
cosponsors still claim credit (Arnold 1990; and Koger 2003) for advancing the cause of a 
particular policy proposal and thus open themselves to blame from constituents if the 
policy proposal generates undesired effects upon adoption.  
The fact that cosponsors could face pushback from constituents for their policy 
decisions suggests that cosponsors are perceptive about the novelty or untestedness of the 
policy proposals they choose to endorse through cosponsorship, and I evaluate how the 
factors of legislative professionalism, individual-level electoral vulnerability, and term 
limits influence whether legislators innovate or emulate when cosponsoring policy.97 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 The bulk of the work (Krehbiel 1995; Schiller 1995; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Koger 
2003; and Harward and Moffett 2010) on sponsorship and cosponsorship deals with the 
data-rich environment of the U.S. Congress, where records distinguish sponsors from 
cosponsors. My state-level data unfortunately does not identify main sponsors, meaning 
that we can only conduct this analysis at the level of cosponsors (ideally, we would be 
able to compare the innovation and emulation choices of sponsors with those of 
cosponsors). My state-level data also lacks information about the vote choices (including 
but not limited to sponsors and cosponsors) of individual legislators with respect to 
innovation and emulation (ideally, we would also be able to compare innovation and 
emulation during sponsorship, cosponsorship, and actual vote choice). Comparing 
innovation and emulation choices during sponsorship, cosponsorship, and actual vote 
choice (and locating the data to make this comparison possible) is a major priority of this 
project moving forward.  
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The factors of legislative professionalism, individual-level electoral vulnerability, 
and term limits arguably represent important explanators of innovation and emulation 
during cosponsorship, as they respectively capture the amount of resources that a 
legislator can devote to choosing between innovation and emulation, the amount of job 
security (based on a legislator’s most recent electoral performance) that a legislator can 
draw upon in choosing to innovate or emulate, and the timeframe during which a 
legislator must deal with the aftermath of his or her decision. Analyzing the 
cosponsorship activity of 867 legislators from 30 states with respect to renewable 
portfolio standard (RPS) legislation and focusing on innovation or emulation during 
cosponsorship as a dependent variable, I find—in a result resembling a core finding from 
chapter 3—that increased legislative professionalism raises the chance that a legislator 
emulates during cosponsorship. At the same time and unlike in chapter 3, I fail to find a 
connection between individual-level electoral vulnerability (modeled here as a 
legislator’s vote share in his or her most recent election) and emulation, suggesting that 
electoral vulnerability may potentially not play the same role in individual-level 
cosponsorship that it plays in collective-level policy adoption.98 Finally, I find evidence 
that legislators from states with term limit provisions are more likely to cosponsor 
innovative policies than are legislators from states lacking term limits. 
Taken together, the results here provide a fascinating look into the nature of 
individual-level policymaking during cosponsorship. While an increase in legislative 
professionalism allows individual legislators (like the legislatures in chapter 3) to learn 
more about the benefits of emulation and ultimately embrace emulation over innovation, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 I discuss why this may be the case at the end of this chapter and in the conclusion of 
the dissertation. 
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electoral vulnerability in the form of legislator vote share does not appear to alter a 
legislator’s cosponsorship behavior.99 The positive association between state term limit 
provisions and innovation during cosponsorship, however, suggests that legislators 
consider the potential electoral implications of their decision-making, as cosponsors with 
longer and more open-ended time horizons (the cosponsors from states lacking term limit 
provisions) appear more likely to emulate during cosponsorship and try to shield 
constituents (as well as themselves) from the risk of innovation.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. I first review literature on the topic of 
cosponsorship and then hypothesize about how legislative professionalism, individual-
level electoral vulnerability, and term limit provisions could affect innovation and 
emulation in cosponsorship. I then discuss my empirical strategy and present results. In a 
concluding section, I link findings here to those of earlier chapters.   	  
5.2 Legislator Characteristics, Cosponsorship, and Innovation 
A large literature about cosponsorship exists within American politics. However, 
almost none of this work connects cosponsorship to the vast literature on policy 
innovation and diffusion. Krehbiel (1995), Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), Koger (2003), 
and Harward and Moffett (2010) describe cosponsorship as a useful way for legislators to 
show outward support for a policy proposal without needing to commit themselves to the 
much more consuming task of shepherding the policy proposal through the legislative 
process. Cosponsorship ostensibly helps legislators send two signals to constituents: first, 
cosponsors show constituents that they are “taking positions” on issues that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Failure to reject the null, of course, does not mean that the null is true or that the 
alternative is false.  
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constituents care about (Mayhew 1974; and Koger 2003); and second, to the degree that 
cosponsors can persuade constituents that they play a key role in getting policy proposals 
desired by constituents adopted, cosponsors show constituents that they are producing 
desired policy outputs (Woon 2009).100   
Much of the existing scholarship on cosponsorship deals with the legislator’s 
decision to cosponsor versus not cosponsor rather than the legislator’s decision to 
innovate or emulate during cosponsorship. A key question in many previous studies 
concerns the effect of a legislator’s electoral vulnerability on his or her cosponsorship 
activity. Wilson and Young (1997), Harward and Moffett (2010), and Makse (2013) link 
increased electoral vulnerability to greater amounts of cosponsorship by legislators, as 
vulnerable legislators attempt to send signals about their productivity to voters. At the 
same time, Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) and Garand and Burke (2006) fail to find an 
association between electoral vulnerability and cosponsorship activity. 
The existing literature’s association of electoral vulnerability with the legislator’s 
choice to cosponsor extends nicely into a central question of this chapter: how does 
electoral vulnerability affect whether a legislator innovates or emulates during 
cosponsorship? If legislators increase cosponsorship activity in response to rising 
electoral vulnerability, as some studies allege, then it is possible that legislators also 
adjust the type of cosponsorship that they pursue in response to electoral fortunes. A 
vulnerable legislator may emulate and cosponsor existing policy in order to signal to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 There is a debate within the cosponsorship literature as to whether cosponsors care 
more about position taking (Mayhew 1974, Kessler and Krehbiel 1996, and Koger 2003 
advocate this view) or helping to adopt policy (Woon 2009 makes this claim). I sidestep 
and do not take a strong stance in this debate, except to say that I believe that cosponsors 
care about position taking and producing policy.   
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constituents that he or she is trying to replicate successes found elsewhere (Volden, Ting, 
and Carpenter 2008; and Pacheco 2012). At the same time, electorally vulnerable 
legislators who are desperate to save their careers may innovate and cosponsor novel 
policy in hopes that taking unprecedented action may improve their electoral fortunes.101              
Existing literature on cosponsorship does not appear to mention legislative 
professionalism or term limits. This does not mean, however, that these two variables do 
not play roles in influencing innovation or emulation during cosponsorship. Legislative 
professionalism affects the amount of time, money, and staff that are available to 
legislators and may influence how the legislators approach the decision to innovate or 
emulate. And term limits alter the time horizons of legislators (Kousser 2005), arguably 
reduce electoral accountability (Ferraz and Finan 2011; and Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and 
Rose 2011), and may change how legislators view the relative risk levels associated with 
innovating and emulating. 
In the next section, I theorize about how legislative professionalism, electoral 
vulnerability, and term limits influence innovation and emulation during cosponsorship. 
First, however, I must clarify what I mean by “innovation and emulation during 
cosponsorship.” In chapters 3 and 4, I utilized standard definitions of innovation and 
emulation. Namely, I gathered data on the adoption of RPS policies and arranged each 
case of policy adoption chronologically (based on the date of adoption listed in the 
enabling document associated with each case of policy adoption). Then, regardless of 
whether an adoption occurred through legislative, regulatory agency (public utility 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 One way this could happen is if a legislator’s unprecedented action manages to 
convince members of some constituency that the legislator could be an advocate for that 
constituency’s interests. 
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commission), or ballot action, I classified the adoption as a case of innovation if a state 
adopted the policy before or within one year of the first state’s adoption of the same 
policy.102 Again, regardless of whether an adoption occurred through legislative, 
regulatory agency, or ballot action, I classified an adoption as a case of emulation if a 
state adopted the policy at least one year after another state’s adoption of the same policy. 
This classification process resulted in the creation of a master list of cases of innovation 
and emulation in policy adoption. In chapter 3, I extracted legislative instances of 
innovation and emulation from the master list and then examined the determinants of 
legislative innovation and emulation in policy adoption. In chapter 4, on the other hand, I 
extracted regulatory agency instances of innovation and emulation from the master list 
and then examined the determinants of regulatory agency innovation and emulation in 
policy adoption. 
Here, I use the same legislative instances of innovation and emulation in policy 
adoption that I used in chapter 3 to identify cases of legislator innovation and emulation 
in policy cosponsorship. A legislator in state i innovates if he or she is listed (at the time 
of state i’s adoption of a policy) as a cosponsor of a policy that has either not been 
adopted in any state but state i or has been adopted within one year of the first state’s 
(state j) adoption of the same policy. A legislator in state i emulates if he or she is listed 
(at the time of state i’s adoption of a policy) as a cosponsor of a policy that has been 
adopted in state i at least one year after the same policy was adopted by another state. It is 
important to tie innovation and emulation in cosponsorship to innovation and emulation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Recall that I relax the definition of innovation to account for the fact that 
policymakers from two states could simultaneously be deciding whether to innovate with 
respect to the same policy. Adding a one-year window to the definition of innovation 
helps us get around the simultaneous adoption issue.  
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in adoption so that cosponsors in state i can actually observe and learn (or not observe 
and learn, if they are innovating) from concrete policy outcomes in state j.103 Since my 
instances of legislator innovation and emulation in cosponsorship come from the 
legislative instances of innovation and emulation in adoption (used in chapter 3), and 
since the legislative instances of innovation and emulation in adoption come from a 
master list of innovation and emulation in adoption that is agnostic about the source 
(whether it be a legislature, a regulatory agency, or citizens acting through a ballot 
initiative process) of the adoption, it follows that legislators in my conceptualization of 
innovation and emulation in cosponsorship are agnostic about the policy adopters (they 
could be legislatures, regulatory agencies, or citizens) they are following when they 
choose to cosponsor an emulative policy.104 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 A potential issue that could affect results is that cosponsorship occurs before adoption. 
This could create complications in cases where there is a temporal mismatch between the 
time of cosponsorship and the time of adoption. Basically, state i may emulate state j and 
adopt a policy a little over a year after state j adopted the same policy. However, a 
legislator from state i may cosponsor the policy adopted in state j within one year of state 
j’s adoption, meaning that the cosponsor is actually innovating (although his or her 
cosponsorship is classified as an emulation) since he or she may not observe the effects 
of state j’s adoption. As a robustness check, I deal with this issue by lengthening the 
definition of innovation to include two years from the date of the first state’s adoption of 
a policy. A two-year definition of innovation allows us to claim that an emulating 
legislator in state i who cosponsors a policy that was first adopted by state j one year 
earlier has had at least one year to observe policy outcomes in state j before cosponsoring 
the policy in state i and (importantly) still has at least one year to observe policy 
outcomes in state j and decide whether he or she wants to remain a cosponsor of that 
policy in state i. Since I record the names of cosponsors at the time of a policy’s 
adoption, this means that all emulating cosponsors have had at least two years to observe 
external policy outcomes and decide whether they want to still be cosponsors of a 
particular policy. Findings from the two-year definition of innovation corroborate 
findings from a one-year definition of innovation, and I include both sets of findings in 
the results section of this chapter.       
104 This is to say that a legislator in state i can emulate by cosponsoring a policy that has 
already been adopted in state j through regulatory agency action. Two issues worth 
pointing out now (and that I discuss in the data section of this chapter) concern (1) the 
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5.3 Legislative Professionalism, Electoral Vulnerability, Term Limits, and 
Innovation in Cosponsorship 
As was in the case in chapter 3, I would like to first address why legislators even 
choose to innovate or emulate when cosponsoring policy. As with chapter 3, where 
innovation and emulation were simply different forms of adoption, here, innovation and 
emulation are different forms of cosponsorship. I therefore must establish why individual 
legislators choose to cosponsor policy. A fundamental reason why legislators cosponsor 
policy is to enhance their own reelection prospects (Mayhew 1974). Legislators know 
that constituents want them to advance policies that further constituent interests, and 
cosponsorship allows for legislators to concretely signal to constituents that they are 
furthering the interests of those constituents (Arnold 1990). A cosponsoring legislator 
therefore hopes that his or her cosponsorship activity will convince voters that the 
legislator takes the interests of constituents seriously and tries to further those interests 
(Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990; Schiller 1995; Wilson and Young 1997; Harward and Moffett 
2010; and Makse 2013). 
The connection linking a legislator’s desire for reelection to his or her decision to 
cosponsor policy is well established (as seen by the citations in the above paragraph), and 
I follow this assumption here.105 As was the case with a legislature’s choice to adopt 
policy, a legislator cosponsors a policy when he or she believes that doing so will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
fact that I only look at the cosponsorship of adopted policies in this chapter; and (2) the 
fact that I do not look at when legislators choose not to cosponsor policy.  
105 This does not mean, of course, that non-electoral factors are irrelevant in influencing a 
legislator’s decision to cosponsor policy. It does mean, however, that the desire for 
reelection is central to the legislator’s choice to cosponsor policy.   
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improve his or her reelection chances and does not cosponsor a policy when he or she 
believes that doing so will not improve his or her reelection chances; the question then 
again shifts to why an individual legislator chooses to innovate rather than emulate when 
he or she cosponsors policy. Voters at the individual district level, like their counterparts 
at the state level who were featured prominently in chapter 3, expect that their legislators 
will cosponsor policies that they (the voters) desire and serve as competent policymakers 
(Pitkin 1967; and Volden 2006) and cosponsor policies that will perform well if adopted; 
furthermore, voters will electorally reward or punish legislators based on their 
evaluations of legislators’ performances with respect to policymaking (Fiorina 1981; 
Ashworth 2012; and Bartels 2014). Individual legislators, who are motivated by 
reelection, also want to develop reputations as competent policymakers, and one way to 
build a reputation for competence is to avoid cosponsoring policies that could, if adopted, 
create significant and unanticipated costs for voters (Arnold 1990).     
 Cosponsoring a policy that if adopted creates significant and unanticipated costs 
for voters could damage the reelection chances of individual legislators if voters in the 
districts of those legislators are cost minimizers (Arnold 1990) and view the significant 
and unanticipated costs from the cosponsored and adopted policy as evidence of 
policymaking incompetence on the part of the individual legislators (Ashworth 2012; and 
Bartels 2014).  
 I use the same hypothetical RPS policy example from chapter 3 to illustrate how 
cosponsoring a policy that if adopted produces significant and unanticipated costs for 
voters could damage the electoral prospects of individual legislators. In this case, voters 
in a Michigan district want their representative to take action to increase energy 
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independence, and the Michigan representative responds by cosponsoring a policy 
requiring that electric utility companies in the state procure 40% of the electricity sold to 
consumers from renewable sources. Electric utility companies, including companies 
supplying energy to voters in the district of the cosponsor of the 40% requirement, 
initiate large electricity rate increases in order to assuage fears about firm profitability 
given the new requirement. Voters in the district of the cosponsor of the 40% requirement 
may be unhappy with the unanticipated costs, large electricity rate increases, associated 
with the 40% requirement and may punish the cosponsor for perceived incompetence in 
policymaking. 
 Individual legislators consequently want to avoid cosponsoring policies that if 
adopted could create significant and unanticipated costs for their voters, and a way to 
accomplish this goal is to emulate when cosponsoring policy. Emulation reduces the 
uncertainty associated with cosponsoring a policy because a cosponsor in state i can use 
the track record of a policy’s performance in other states to evaluate whether the policy 
will produce significant and unanticipated costs for voters in his or her district upon that 
policy’s adoption in state i (Volden 2006). Cosponsoring an emulation, however, requires 
that a legislator backs a policy that was designed in a different state, and it is possible that 
a policy designed in another state may not adequately fit the needs of voters—including 
voters in the district that the cosponsor represents—upon the adoption of the emulated 
policy in state i (Volden 2006). Cosponsoring an innovation, on the other hand, allows 
for a legislator to back a policy that is not only uniquely tailored to fit the specific context 
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of state i but may even fit much of the specific context of the district of the cosponsor106; 
the legislator consequently may receive more support from voters when he or she 
innovates rather than when he or she emulates since innovation can do a better job of 
addressing the particularistic concerns of voters. The risk of innovating for the individual 
legislator, however, is that innovation carries greater uncertainty than emulation since 
cosponsors cannot access an existing track record to evaluate whether an innovative 
policy that they support will create significant and unanticipated costs for voters upon 
adoption. 
 As with the case of legislative adoption in chapter 3, the choice between 
innovation and emulation here represents a tradeoff between cosponsoring a policy that is 
uniquely tailored to the context of a specific state and may even fit much of the context of 
a specific district within that state but that carries high uncertainty about whether the 
policy will generate significant and unanticipated costs upon adoption versus 
cosponsoring a policy that is not uniquely tailored to the context of a specific state, that 
may not adequately fit the context of a specific district within the importing state, but that 
carries low uncertainty about whether the policy will generate significant and 
unanticipated costs upon adoption (Bednar 2007). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  It is extremely difficult to uniquely fit a policy the specific context of a district 
because the process of getting a policy turned into law requires multiple phases of 
compromise (e.g. committee gatekeeping followed by a general vote) by legislators 
across districts and each phase of compromise reduces the ability of any one legislator to 
uniquely tailor policy to the particular needs of his or her district. Nonetheless, a 
legislator may be able to tailor an innovative policy to very closely fit the context of his 
or her district insofar as the legislator can convince other legislators within the legislature 
that the specific needs of his or her district are the same as those across the state at large 
and that the other legislators should also address these same specific needs. The legislator 
may have more trouble tailoring a policy borrowed from another state to the specific 
needs of his or her district because the legislator must assume that the other state and his 
or her district share the same context, which is probably not the case.     
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 I can now revisit the Minnesota example from chapter 3 to discuss the case of 
cosponsorship. In 1994, when Minnesota innovated and became the first state to require 
electric utility companies to meet part of their RPS obligations through the procurement 
of electricity from biomass-derived energy with the adoption of Senate File 1706, a 
number of legislators from districts dominated by agricultural interests not only 
cosponsored the biomass requirement, which incidentally was exceedingly well tailored 
to the needs of these districts since the requirement increased the demand for biomass 
products and established a captive buyer for those products, but convinced other 
members of the Minnesota legislature that it was also in their interest to support the 
biomass requirement. The cosponsors took a risk from innovating since allies of the 
electric utility companies claimed that the new regulation would raise consumer 
electricity rates. However, the cosponsors would not have adequately fit policy to the 
needs of their districts by simply emulating neighboring Iowa’s RPS system—Iowa’s 
program did not establish special obligations for electricity procurement from biomass 
materials and thereby did not provide a captive market for farmers—and successfully 
advanced policy that catered to the needs of their constituents by innovating. 
 In this chapter, I assume that a legislature and individual legislators respond to 
risk in the same way. I follow this assumption for two reasons. First, a legislature is an 
aggregation of individual legislators, and legislative decision-making occurs with the 
consent of a majority of legislators. Insofar as legislative decision-making merely 
captures the aggregation of legislator decision-making, I expect that a legislature and 
legislators respond to risk in the same way. My second reason for making this 
assumption, given that I am discussing cosponsorship, deals with the ubiquity of 
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cosponsorship within legislative policymaking. As Schiller (1995), Krehbiel (1995), 
Kessler and Krehbiel (1996), Koger (2003), Woon (2009), and Makse (2013) 
demonstrate, cosponsorship on a given policy is often practiced by a large group of 
legislators who are trying to show that a policy proposal has broad-based support within 
the legislature.107 As the number of legislators within a legislature who cosponsor a 
particular policy increases, the way in which the cosponsors respond to risk will 
approximate the way in which a legislature responds to risk. 
 I acknowledge that a potential issue with assuming that a legislature and 
individual legislators respond to risk in the same way is that individual legislators within 
a legislature may not experience the same consequences as one another if a policy 
generates significant and unanticipated costs to voters upon adoption. Voters across 
districts may not perceive policy costs in the same way as one another, meaning that what 
voters in one district consider to be significant policy costs may be regarded as less 
significant policy costs in a different district.108 Individual legislators may then 
differentially adjust their policy risk preferences based on their own opinions about how 
voters in their districts perceive the costs of policy. One way to account for the above 
issue would be to create heterogeneous risk functions for individual legislators based on 
knowing how voters in the districts of these legislators perceive policy costs in different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 This is definitely the case in the RPS policy domain, as 1051 legislators cosponsored 
Maryland’s RPS policies while 876 legislators cosponsored South Dakota’s RPS policies 
and 761 legislators cosponsored Illinois’s RPS policies. 
108 An example from the RPS policy domain of voters in two districts perceiving 
unanticipated policy costs in different ways from one another comes from our 
hypothetical example of Michigan requiring utilities to procure 40% of their electricity 
from renewable sources, which in turn causes the utilities to initiate rate increases. Voters 
in a wealthy district may not care about the rate increases and may still support the 40% 
requirement while voters in a poor district may turn against the 40% requirement based 
on the rate increases.     
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ways from one another. Although I do not take up this endeavor in this project, analyzing 
possible heterogeneity in the risk preferences of legislators is a useful direction for future 
research. 
 Here, I use the tradeoff between the well-specified fit but high uncertainty of 
innovation and the more general fit but low uncertainty of emulation to evaluate how 
variation in legislative professionalism, electoral vulnerability, and the presence of term 
limit provisions affects the choice by legislators to innovate rather than emulate when 
cosponsoring policy. Legislative professionalism may alter the nature of the choice 
between innovation and emulation by giving legislators the research tools needed to 
better predict whether an innovation will produce significant and unanticipated costs to 
voters upon adoption. Electoral vulnerability may also alter the choice between 
innovation and emulation by making legislators less likely to cosponsor innovative 
policies, as these policies have high amounts of outcome uncertainty. Finally, the 
presence of term limits may alter the choice between innovation and emulation by 
truncating the time horizons of a legislator and potentially making that legislator more 
willing to embrace the risk of cosponsoring innovative policy. I now discuss how 
legislative professionalism, electoral vulnerability, and the presence of term limits 
influence a legislator’s likelihood to innovate or emulate when cosponsoring policy. 
Here, I explain how legislative professionalism, electoral vulnerability, and term 
limits affect innovation and emulation in cosponsorship. I first hypothesize about the 
effect of legislative professionalism on innovation and emulation in cosponsorship and 
link expectations here to those from chapter 3. 
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In chapter 3, while analyzing the policy adoption choices of state legislatures, I 
discovered that increased legislative professionalism actually drives emulation more than 
it does innovation.109 I argued that increased legislative professionalism raises the 
likelihood of emulation more than innovation because increased professionalism raises 
the ability for members of a state legislature to learn about and vet the fit of a policy 
proposal that has already been adopted elsewhere more than it raises the ability for 
members of that legislature to learn about and vet the fit of a policy proposal that has 
never been adopted in any of the states.  
A benefit of higher legislative professionalism, according to Walker (1969) and 
Squire (2007), is that it increases the amount of resources that members of a legislature 
can use to explore potential policy options. Assuming that members of a legislature 
receive a sudden increase in on-the-job resources (that is, an increase in legislative 
professionalism), and assuming that members of the legislature can use the additional 
resources to research about the fit of a tested policy proposal (a candidate for emulation) 
or an untested policy proposal (a candidate for innovation), I argue that members of a 
legislature obtain a better return on their research investment for investigating the fit of a 
tested policy proposal compared to investigating the fit of an untested policy proposal. 
Members of a legislature in state i can use the additional resources to interview legislators 
and communities affected by a policy’s adoption in state j (or even states j and k)110 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 It is useful to remind readers that Squire (2007) argues that legislative professionalism 
consists of at least three components: session length (corresponding to the amount of time 
that a legislator spends on his or her job); legislator salary (corresponding to the amount 
of compensation that a legislator receives for performing his or her job; and staff size 
(corresponding to the number of individuals who work on behalf of the legislator). 
110 This is assuming that members of state i’s legislature are considering whether to adopt 
a policy that has already been adopted in states j and k.  
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get a good sense of how emulating states j and k could potentially succeed in state i. The 
members of state i’s legislature learn much less by spending the additional resources on 
researching about the fit of an untested policy proposal, as there are greater limits on how 
much research can uncover about a candidate for innovation compared to a candidate for 
emulation (which, unlike the untested candidate for innovation, has been tested and has 
an observable track record). The greater return on research investment associated with 
emulation leads to a situation where higher legislative professionalism increases the 
likelihood of emulation more than it increases the likelihood of innovation. 
The finding above, which applies to macro-level legislative decision-making, also 
applies to the cosponsorship activity of individual legislators. Legislators cosponsor in 
part in order to signal (to constituents) that they helped to advance “successful” policy.111 
Legislators want to make sure that they are cosponsoring policies that are likely to be 
successful—since legislators do not help and may even hurt their own reputations in the 
eyes of constituents by cosponsoring policies whose effects are disliked by the 
constituents—and will utilize the tools of legislative professionalism (such as consulting 
with staff) to determine whether a policy they are considering to cosponsor is likely to be 
successful or not. To the degree that legislative professionalism generates a greater return 
on research investment with respect to tested policy proposals compared to untested 
policy proposals, and to the degree that legislative professionalism reveals concrete 
examples of cases where an adopted policy has been successful in other states (compared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Here, “successful” policy refers to a policy that not only (1) addresses a problem that 
constituents believe needed to be addressed but (2) addresses the problem in such a way 
that constituents believe that they are receiving more from the policy than they are paying 
for it (constituents believe that they get more benefits from the policy than they lose in 
costs). 
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to not being able to reveal concrete cases of success with respect to an untested policy 
proposal), increases in legislative professionalism will correspond with an increased 
likelihood that legislators emulate rather than innovate when cosponsoring policy. 
Legislative Professionalism Cosponsorship Emulation Hypothesis: Rising 
legislative professionalism increases the likelihood that legislators will emulate rather 
than innovate when cosponsoring policy. 
In the above hypothesis, I expect that increased legislative professionalism raises 
the likelihood that a given case of cosponsorship is a case of emulation rather than 
innovation. I am not claiming that increased legislative professionalism decreases 
innovation and increases emulation: rather, I argue that the gap between the likelihood of 
emulating and innovating becomes larger as legislative professionalism increases.  
My next set of hypotheses deal with the relationship between individual-level 
electoral vulnerability and innovation or emulation during cosponsorship. Chapter 2’s 
macro-level analysis of electoral vulnerability and innovation or emulation during policy 
adoption showed that rising electoral vulnerability (modeled in chapter 2 as the median 
vote share earned by an incumbent legislator in his or her last election) increased the 
likelihood that a state legislature emulates when adopting policy.112 Emulation allows 
lawmakers to not only signal to constituents that they are adopting policies that advance 
the constituents’ demands but also lets lawmakers offer empirical proof to constituents 
that desired policy solutions have worked in comparable settings (Volden 2006; and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Since I use median vote share (which in chapter 3 ranges from 50 to 95) to capture 
legislative electoral vulnerability, it is worth reminding readers that a decrease in median 
vote share corresponds to an increase in legislative electoral vulnerability.  
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Pacheco 2012).113 Electorally vulnerable lawmakers may want to emulate more than their 
electorally secure counterparts because they can use the observable track record from an 
existing (already tested) policy to offer empirical proof to potentially skeptical 
constituents about their plans to replicate desired policy successes (Volden 2006) found 
elsewhere and try to sound more credible in the eyes of those constituents. Therefore, as 
the electoral vulnerability faced by members of a legislature increases, that legislature 
will be more likely to emulate when adopting policy. 
 Individual-level electoral vulnerability may also increase the likelihood of 
emulation during cosponsorship. A vulnerable legislator may also try to convince 
skeptical constituents that he or she, by cosponsoring a policy that has already been 
adopted in a comparable setting, is trying to replicate desired external policy successes 
and may use the external policy’s observable track record to try to increase constituent 
confidence in his or her policymaking ability.  
Electoral Vulnerability Cosponsorship Emulation Hypothesis: As the 
electoral vulnerability of a legislator increases, that legislator is more likely to emulate 
and cosponsor policy that has already been adopted in another state. 
 A different possibility, however, is that increased electoral vulnerability raises the 
likelihood that legislators innovate and cosponsor policy that has never been adopted in 
any state. The motivating idea here is that rising electoral vulnerability actually increases 
the risk acceptance of individual legislators, as legislators desperate to improve their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 While emulation and innovation may allow lawmakers to signal to constituents that 
they are adopting policies advancing the constituents’ demands, only emulation lets 
lawmakers give empirical proof to constituents that desired policy solutions have worked 
in comparable settings.  
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electoral prospects resort to taking unprecedented action in order to build inroads with 
various constituencies and bolster their own electoral fortunes.114 
 Electoral Vulnerability Cosponsorship Innovation Hypothesis: As the 
electoral vulnerability of a legislator increases, that legislator is more likely to innovate 
and cosponsor policy that has never been adopted in any state. 
 In both of my electoral vulnerability hypotheses, I argue that the gap between the 
likelihood of emulating and innovating changes as electoral vulnerability increases. 
 My final hypothesis concerns the effect of term limit provisions on a legislator’s 
likelihood to innovate or emulate when cosponsoring policy. The proliferation of term 
limit provisions across the U.S. states has been an institutional change of huge import. A 
number of interest groups have lauded term limit provisions as a way to reduce careerism 
and increase turnover in government.115 Term limits set a maximum amount of time 
(typically two terms) that a legislator can serve in his or her position and thereby shorten 
the time horizons associated with that legislator’s current position. The effect of 
shortened time horizons on the relationship between a legislator and his or her 
constituents has been the subject of considerable research within political science. 
Kousser (2005) mentions that term limits weaken the bond between a legislator and his or 
her constituents, as legislators have less of an incentive to maintain longstanding 
relationships with constituents. More recently, Ferraz and Finan (2011) and Alt, Bueno 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Taking unprecedented action, for example, may help a legislator convince members of 
some constituency that the legislator will be a reliable advocate for the interests of that 
constituency. Legislator vote share, the variable used to measure electoral vulnerability, 
nicely captures desperation among legislators since 23.4% of the observations for this 
variable are associated with a legislator vote share of less than 50%.  
115 One such group is the Heritage Foundation, which has been advocating the adoption 
of term limits at federal and state levels for over twenty years. Greenberg (1994) provides 
a good example of the popular case for term limits. 
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de Mesquita, and Rose (2011) show that term limits weaken the ability of voters to use 
elections to discipline the policymaking behavior of legislators. 
 Here, I argue that legislators from states with term limit provisions are more likely 
to cosponsor innovative policy compared to legislators from states without term limit 
provisions. Term limits, I argue, increase the likelihood that legislators cosponsor 
innovative policy by making legislators less worried about the downstream electoral risks 
associated with innovating. Legislators who come from states without term limit 
provisions may view their current positions as open-ended and long-term commitments 
and may refrain from innovating in order to reduce the possibility that unanticipated and 
undesired effects of innovation damage their electoral prospects. These legislators, to the 
degree that they cosponsor policy, may choose to emulate and cosponsor tested policy 
since they know more about the possible effects of the tested policy. Legislators who 
come from states with term limit provisions, on the other hand, may view their current 
positions as short-term commitments and be willing to cosponsor an innovative policy 
(provided, of course, that they support the innovative policy) since they may not be 
threatened electorally by unanticipated and undesired effects from the innovative 
policy.116 
 Term Limits Cosponsorship Innovation Hypothesis: Legislators from states 
with term limit provisions are more likely to cosponsor innovative policies than are 
legislators from states without term limit provisions. Legislators from states without term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 I acknowledge that a subset of legislators from states with term limit provisions may 
be upwardly mobile and may refrain from innovating in order to avoid jeopardizing their 
electoral prospects for higher office. However, in this chapter, I do not analyze the 
innovation and emulation behavior of this “upwardly mobile” group of legislators.     
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limit provisions are more likely to emulate and cosponsor tested policies compared to 
legislators from states with term limit provisions. 
 Here, I again argue that the gap between the likelihood of innovating and 
emulating changes if legislators come from a state that has term limit provisions.        
 
5.4 Data and Empirical Strategy 
In this chapter, I use regression analysis to evaluate the effects of legislative 
professionalism, electoral vulnerability, and term limit provisions on innovation and 
emulation during cosponsorship. I examine innovation and emulation during 
cosponsorship using the same renewables portfolio standard (RPS) data that has been 
employed throughout the dissertation. Recall that an RPS describes a set of policies that 
each promote renewable energy use by specifying that utilities provide some amount of 
electricity from renewable sources (Rabe 2006).117 
RPS policymaking represents an excellent venue for studying the determinants of 
innovation and emulation during cosponsorship. First, the states created their RPS 
programs in the absence of federal intervention: this point is important since it shows that 
the state governments had agency in crafting their RPS programs and shows that 
cosponsors were not simply responding to federal mandates. Second, the vast majority of 
state RPS programs were created and modified through legislative action (Rabe 2006): 
this point is important since it suggests that RPS is an issue area where legislators 
actually had the opportunity to cosponsor policies. Finally, I have individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 RPS policy examples include what a state counts as “renewable” energy (e.g. solar 
thermal electric, geothermal, etc.), the type of standard (e.g. amount of retail energy 
supplied, percentage of consumption, etc.), and whether utilities can trade credits to meet 
standards. All of the policies are listed in the dissertation’s appendix. 
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cosponsorship data for the overwhelming majority of states where legislatures played a 
role in adopting RPS policies, meaning that I have substantial cross-state variation in the 
sample of legislators analyzed in this study.118 
Creating the dependent variable—whether a legislator cosponsors an innovative 
policy or cosponsors a policy that has already been adopted in another state—is a two-
step process. I first repeat the same process used to identify legislative instances of 
innovation and emulation in policy adoption from Chapter 3. To recap briefly, I consult 
the Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) and obtain a list 
of major RPS policies as well as a list of the states that have adopted each RPS policy. 
From DSIRE, I also obtain the names of the 306 enabling documents that correspond to 
each state’s adoption of an RPS policy. I chronologically arrange the 306 documents and 
assign a date to when each state adopted a particular policy. Then, regardless of what 
governmental actor—a legislature, public utility commission, or citizens through a ballot 
process—adopts, I code a policy adoption as a case of innovation if a state adopts a 
policy within one calendar year of the first state’s adoption of that policy, and I code a 
policy adoption as a case of emulation if a state adopts a policy at least one calendar year 
after the first state’s adoption of that policy. 
In chapter 3, I used legislative cases of innovation and emulation in policy 
adoption to evaluate the legislative choice to innovate or emulate when adopting policy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 In between 1983 and 2011, 37 states adopted RPS policies. In 33 of these states (not 
including Arizona, New Mexico, and New York, where public utilities commissions 
adopted all state RPS provisions, and Washington, where citizens voting in a ballot 
initiative adopted all state RPS provisions), legislatures adopted all or some of the 
provisions making up a state’s RPS program. I have sponsor data for 30 of the 33 states 
where legislatures adopted RPS policies and unfortunately lack sponsor data for three 
states: Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts. In table 22, I give an overview of the number of 
instances of legislator innovation and emulation by state. 
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Here, I use legislative cases of innovation and emulation in policy adoption to identify 
cases of legislator innovation and emulation in policy cosponsorship. Namely, for each 
case of legislative innovation in policy adoption (from chapter 3), I find the names of all 
legislators who cosponsored the bill containing that innovation. I then code each 
legislator’s cosponsorship of a given adopted policy innovation as a separate case of 
innovation in policy cosponsorship. I use an identical procedure for each case of 
legislative emulation in policy adoption and find the names of all legislators who 
cosponsored the bill containing the emulation. I then code each legislator’s cosponsorship 
of a given adopted policy emulation as a separate case of emulation in policy 
cosponsorship. I importantly use the final versions of bills to identify the names of 
legislative cosponsors: this is done to avoid recording the names of cosponsors that 
rescind their cosponsorship prior to the adoption of a particular policy.  
TABLE 21: Examples of Innovation and Emulation in Policy Cosponsorship 
Policy Adoption Is Adoption 
Innovation or 
Emulation?   
Cosponsor Is 
Cosponsorship 
Innovation or 
Emulation? 
Geothermal (in Michigan RPS)  Emulation Jane Doe Emulation 
Geothermal (in Michigan RPS) Emulation John Doe Emulation 
Coal Methane (in Michigan 
RPS) 
Innovation Jane Doe Innovation 
Coal Methane (in Michigan 
RPS) 
Innovation John Doe Innovation 	  	   In table 21, I display the procedure linking a case of legislative innovation (or 
emulation) in policy adoption to a case of legislator innovation (or emulation) in policy 
cosponsorship. We see two hypothetical legislative policy adoptions: one where the 
Michigan legislature emulates and adopts geothermal energy as part of Michigan’s RPS, 
and another where the Michigan legislature innovates and adopts coal methane energy as 
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part of Michigan’s RPS. We also see that two legislators, Jane Doe and John Doe, 
cosponsored the legislation containing the cases of emulation and innovation. I code Jane 
Doe’s endorsement of geothermal energy (an emulation in policy adoption) as a case of 
emulation in policy cosponsorship, and I code her endorsement of coal methane energy 
(an innovation in policy adoption) as a case of innovation in policy cosponsorship. I use 
the same coding process for the other sponsor, John Doe. This process nets 2 cases of 
innovation and 2 cases of emulation in policy cosponsorship based on 1 case each of 
innovation and emulation in policy adoption (two legislators each cosponsor the 
respective cases of innovation and emulation in policy adoption).  
 Repeating this process for 30 states from 1994 to 2011, I end up with a dataset 
that includes 1,184 cases of innovation in policy cosponsorship and 5,895 cases of 
emulation in policy cosponsorship. 1994 is the starting year of the dataset since this is the 
first year for which I could obtain cosponsorship data on RPS legislation. As is the case 
in the rest of the dissertation, 2011 is the final year of the dataset since is the last year in 
which analysts at DSIRE were able to verify their RPS policy data. In table 22, I give a 
state-specific breakdown of the number of cases of innovation and emulation in 
cosponsorship and the number of legislators that are included in the dataset. 
TABLE 22: State Breakdown of Innovation and Emulation in Cosponsorship  
State Number of 
Legislators 
Number of Cases 
of Cosponsored 
Innovation 
Number of Cases 
of Cosponsored 
Emulation 
California 9 10 75 
Colorado 83 66 80 
Connecticut 43 256 230 
Delaware 27 0 289 
Hawaii 43 111 467 
Illinois 120 68 693 
Indiana 7 7 140 
Maine 21 63 58 
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State Number of 
Legislators 
Number of Cases 
of Cosponsored 
Innovation 
Number of Cases 
of Cosponsored 
Emulation 
Maryland 123 0 1051 
Michigan 6 12 84 
Minnesota 58 72 146 
Missouri 3 0 13 
Montana 2 0 10 
Nevada 26 22 33 
New Hampshire 6 12 102 
New Jersey 17 11 7 
North Carolina 19 35 225 
North Dakota 3 3 27 
Ohio 2 5 16 
Oklahoma 23 23 253 
Oregon 27 0 312 
Pennsylvania 13 65 221 
Rhode Island 5 0 45 
South Dakota 73 73 803 
Texas 10 10 100 
Utah 7 2 56 
Vermont 2 0 14 
Virginia 2 2 20 
West Virginia 2 16 32 
Wisconsin 85 240 293 
Total 867 5895 1184 
 
My cosponsorship dataset is clearly hierarchical in nature, as individual 
legislators are nested within states (there are 867 sponsors in 30 states). Despite the 
hierarchical nature of the dataset, there are many instances in which I have very few (and 
commonly, even only one) observations per legislator. The lack of a large number of 
repeated observations per legislator makes the use of a mixed model impractical, as the 
legislator-specific error component will be massive and uninterpretable (Gelman and Hill 
2007). I therefore follow the advice of Gelman and Hill (2007) and conduct my empirical 
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analysis using clustered errors at the higher level (the state level) observed in the 
dataset.119 
 The dependent variable, Cosponsorship Type, is binary and captures whether a 
legislator cosponsors an innovative policy or cosponsors a policy that has already been 
adopted in another state. Emulation in cosponsorship takes a value of 0 while innovation 
in cosponsorship takes a value of 1, meaning that logistic regression reveals how changes 
in exogenous variables affect the probability that a given case of cosponsorship 
represents innovation rather than emulation. My dependent variable unfortunately does 
not capture the non-cosponsorship of policy. Ideally, I would have data capturing the 
non-cosponsorship of policy and would (similar to the procedure that was used to analyze 
innovation and emulation in policy adoption in chapters 3 and 4) use non-cosponsorship 
as a baseline and then investigate whether changes in the explanatory variables of 
interest120 differentially affect the probability of innovating or emulating compared to 
remaining at the non-cosponsorship baseline. My empirical analysis, as it currently 
stands, explores how changes in the explanatory variables of interest affect innovation 
over a baseline of emulation, and while this analysis is useful insofar as it shows when 
(conditional on changes in the explanatory variables of interest) innovation is more likely 
than emulation, it does not address how the explanatory variables of interest affect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 In fact, a hierarchical logistic model (the “mixed effects logit” or “xtmelogit” in Stata) 
that includes both legislator (level 1) and state (level 2) error components will not 
converge despite numerous attempts.   
120 These are legislative professionalism, electoral vulnerability, and term limit 
provisions. 
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cosponsorship in the first place nor does it let us compare innovation and emulation over 
a common (non-cosponsorship) denominator.121 
 Gathering data on (and appropriately modeling) policy non-cosponsorship will be 
a challenging but necessary component of the project moving forward. At a minimum— 
assuming that I only use the same legislation that is already being analyzed in this 
study—I would need to gather the names of all legislators within a state who 
contemporaneously served alongside cosponsoring legislators but chose not to cosponsor 
the same legislation as the cosponsoring legislators, and I would need to add the choices 
of the non-cosponsoring legislators to my dataset.122 
 A second challenge involves the fact that my dataset only includes observations 
from adopted legislation. This feature of my dataset is an artifact of the data collection 
process used in the dissertation, as DSIRE—the source from which I obtained 
information about state RPS policies—only gathered data on adopted policies. A valid 
concern related to omitting data from non-adopted policy proposals is that the effects of 
my explanatory variables of interest may be different across samples of adopted versus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 My point here is that we must take care when interpreting the results of this chapter. 
Here, term limits relates positively with innovation (and negatively with emulation) and 
one may conclude that the presence of term limits increases the likelihood of innovation 
and reduces the likelihood of emulation. However, if we were to add cases of non-
cosponsorship to the dataset and compare innovation and emulation to the non-
cosponsorship baseline, it may be the case that term limit provisions increase the 
likelihood of both innovation and emulation (compared to not cosponsoring) but that the 
effect of term limits is stronger with respect to innovation than it is with respect to 
emulation. The interpretation given the addition of the non-cosponsorship baseline would 
still be that term limit provisions increase innovation more than emulation but we could 
no longer say (and would in fact be incorrect to say) that term limit provisions decrease 
the probability of emulation.        
122 This fix would at least account for non-cosponsorship within my dataset of adopted 
legislation. A second challenge—accounting for non-cosponsorship (and for that matter, 
innovation and emulation) in legislation that was not adopted is one that I next discuss.   
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non-adopted policy proposals. It may be the case (to again use a hypothetical example 
from my term limits variable) that legislators from states with term limit provisions 
appear to be more risk acceptant and supportive of cosponsoring innovations because 
these legislators have already received word that the innovations are likely to be adopted. 
An alternative proposition, of course, is that legislators from states with term limit 
provisions are just as risk averse as their peers from states lacking term limit provisions, 
and that the pro-innovation effect of term limits documented in this chapter is entirely an 
artifact of only analyzing adopted policies.       
 I unfortunately cannot address the above possibility without gathering data on the 
cosponsorship of non-adopted policies.123 One way to gather this data moving forward 
would be to use keywords from the names of adopted RPS policies to search through 
state legislative records and identify bills (these bills would ideally contain RPS policies) 
that were ultimately not adopted by state legislatures.124 Employing a data collection 
process identical to the one utilized in this chapter, I could then gather data on the 
cosponsorship activity associated with non-adopted legislation and then evaluate the 
effects of my explanatory variables of interest on innovation and emulation using the 
non-adopted sample. If empirical results in the non-adopted sample are substantively 
similar to empirical results in the adopted sample, then I can defend against the charge 
that empirical support for my theory is largely an artifact of selecting a sample wholly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 And given the earlier discussion about incorporating the choice of non-cosponsorship 
into my dataset, I would ideally gather data on the non-cosponsorship, innovation, and 
emulation of policies that were not successfully adopted.  
124 It is important to select non-adopted bills dealing with RPS policies for one reason: we 
still want to focus on a policy area where the federal government left policymaking in the 
hands of the states and moving away from RPS policy may introduce unwanted variation 
in federal involvement (and maybe other types of unwanted variation) into our dataset.    
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composed of adopted policies. Makse (2013) uses the aforementioned strategy to address 
selection issues in his study of sponsorship in criminal justice legislation (he also initially 
only looked at the sponsorship of policies that were eventually adopted), and moving 
forward, I plan to use the same strategy to address selection issues in this chapter.   
 Having provided an overview and discussed the limitations of my dependent 
variable, I now describe the study’s three explanatory variables of interest. The first 
variable, Legislative Professionalism, is Squire’s preeminent (2007) measure of 
professionalism and captures the amount of resources (measured as the sum of three 
components: session length, legislator salary, and staff size) available to members of a 
legislature in state i in year t. Consistent with the pro-emulation finding from chapter 2 
and with the Legislative Professionalism Cosponsorship Emulation Hypothesis, I expect 
that legislative professionalism will relate negatively and significantly with 
Cosponsorship Type, suggesting that rising legislative professionalism increases the 
probability that a legislator emulates rather than innovating when cosponsoring policy. 
My second explanatory variable of interest, Legislator Vote Share, measures the vote 
share earned by a legislator in his or her last election and captures a legislator’s level of 
electoral vulnerability.125 A positive and significant relationship between Legislator Vote 
Share and Cosponsorship Type would lend credence to the Electoral Vulnerability 
Cosponsorship Emulation Hypothesis, as it links a lower vote share to increased 
emulation in cosponsorship. A negative and significant relationship between Legislator 
Vote Share and Cosponsorship Type, on the other hand, lends support to the Electoral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 The assumption here is that decreases in Legislator Vote Share correspond to 
increases in electoral vulnerability. 
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Vulnerability Cosponsorship Innovation Hypothesis by linking a lower vote share to 
increased innovation in cosponsorship.              
 The final explanatory variable of interest, Term Limits, is binary and takes a 
value of 1 if members of a state legislature face a limit on the number of terms that they 
can serve and 0 if members of a state legislature face no such limit. A positive and 
significant relationship between Term Limits and Cosponsorship Type lends support to 
the Term Limits Cosponsorship Innovation Hypothesis, as this relationship suggests that 
legislators from states with term limit provisions are more likely to cosponsor innovative 
policy compared to legislators from states lacking term limit provisions.126 
 I include several legislator-specific control variables that may capture other 
explanations of innovation and emulation in cosponsorship. Non-Freshman Legislator is 
a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a sponsor is serving in at least his or her second 
term and 0 if the sponsor is serving in his or her first term. It could be the case that on-
the-job knowledge drives innovation in policy cosponsorship, and I include the Non-
Freshman Legislator variable to account for this possibility. Legislator Party is a binary 
variable that takes a value of 0 if a cosponsor belongs to the Democratic Party and 1 if a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 A reader may wonder whether Legislative Professionalism and Term Limits 
interactively affect a legislator’s choice to emulate or innovate during cosponsorship. I 
fail to find statistical evidence supporting this proposition, as a variable reflecting the 
multiplicative interaction of Legislative Professionalism and Term Limits does not 
achieve statistical significance in the empirical models utilized in this paper. 
Additionally, the Term Limits variable captures the existence of term limit provisions at 
the state level. I do not have data on whether an individual legislator is currently in his or 
her final term, nor do I have data on the number of years that an individual legislator has 
left before he or she must leave office due to term limit rules. I do have data on the 
number of years that a state allows legislators to serve before they must leave office, and 
I evaluate whether variation in the length of service allowed by a state affects innovation 
and emulation. I find evidence that corroborates the term limits result in this chapter, as 
legislators with shorter lengths of service are more likely to innovate when cosponsoring 
policy than are legislators with longer lengths of service.     
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cosponsor belongs to the Republican Party. RPS policymaking has traditionally been part 
of the Democratic Party’s agenda, and it may be the case that Democratic legislators have 
driven innovation in cosponsorship. Dominant Party is a binary variable that takes a 
value of 1 if a cosponsor belongs to a party that possesses unified control of state 
government and 0 if a cosponsor belongs to a party that does not possess unified control 
of state government. It may be the case that legislators belonging to a dominant party 
(and emboldened by their affiliation with the dominant party regime) are more likely to 
innovate when cosponsoring policy. Finally, Legislator Chamber is binary and takes a 
value of 1 if a cosponsor is a Senator and a value of 0 if a cosponsor is a Representative 
or a Delegate. Makse (2013) showed that belonging to an upper chamber makes a 
legislator more likely to sponsor policy, and it is possible that a legislator’s chamber of 
affiliation also affects whether that legislator innovates or emulates when cosponsoring 
policy.127 Here, lower chamber legislators, who generally have shorter terms than their 
upper chamber colleagues, may want to quickly send signals of policy stewardship to 
constituents and may choose to emulate since they can use the track record of the 
(already tested) policy proposal to quickly draw attention to their own abilities as good 
policy stewards.  
 I also include a host of controls gathered at the state-specific level. Legislative 
Election Year is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if state i holds a legislative 
election in year t and 0 otherwise. Legislative Election Year captures the possibility that 
policy cosponsorship activity could be driven by fears among cosponsors that an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Makse argues that the smaller size of a Senate makes it easier for a senator to sponsor 
bills compared to a Representative. 
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upcoming election will usher in a new legislative environment that is less hospitable for 
the policy proposals being put forth.  
 Two more controls, Increase in Unemployment Rate, and State Per Capita 
Income, measure economic conditions in state i and capture the possibility that 
legislators from states with more robust economies may be more likely to cosponsor 
innovative policies. Three variables, Percentage of Coal Consumption, Percentage of 
Petroleum Consumption, and Percentage of Renewable Consumption capture the 
percentages of total energy consumption in state i in year t that come from coal, 
petroleum, or “renewable” sources.128 The coal, petroleum, and renewable industries have 
tried to sustain markets at the point of sale (hence, the use of consumption) by lobbying 
for protections in the states where they have a sizeable retail presence. Therefore, it is 
possible that energy sector industries could mobilize legislative allies to cosponsor 
innovative policies. 
 I also include Solar Average, the average daily amount of solar radiation received 
in state i in year t (in kilowatt-hours per square meter per day); River Miles, the total 
mileage for perennial rivers in state i (in thousands of miles); and Shoreline, the total 
mileage (in thousands of statute miles) of coastline for any state that borders an ocean, 
the Gulf of Mexico, or any of the Great Lakes. Higher values in these variables may 
correspond with increases in the likelihood that legislators will cosponsor innovative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 As in chapters 3 and 4, the definition of “renewable” for the Percentage of Renewable 
Consumption variable comes from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
Hydroelectric, wood and waste, ethanol, ethanol co-products, geothermal, solar, 
photovoltaic, and wind-based energy outputs are included under the EIA’s definition of 
renewable energy. 
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policies, as sectoral interests may convince legislators that exploiting these resources can 
lead to economic growth. 
 Lastly, I include two state-specific variables, Prior Innovation, and Neighbor 
Innovation, which account for temporal and spatio-temporal influences on innovation in 
policy cosponsorship. Prior Innovation is the total number of previous instances of 
innovation that occurred in state i divided by the total number of previous instances of 
innovation that occurred across all states. Prior Innovation captures the possibility that 
innovation in policy cosponsorship is a function of the inherent innovativeness of state i. 
Neighbor Innovation measures the fraction of total previous instances of innovation that 
occurred in states adjacent to i and captures the possibility that innovation in policy 
cosponsorship could follow a neighborhood trend. 
 In table 23, I display descriptions and summary statistics for variables included in 
this chapter. 
TABLE 23: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in this Chapter 
 
Variable Type Structure Mean 
Cosponsorship 
Type 
Dependent 
 
Binary 16.7% of Observations = 
Innovation 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
Explanatory Continuous 0.19 
Legislator Vote 
Share 
Explanatory Continuous 64.2 
Term Limits Explanatory 
 
Binary 24% of Observations = Term 
Limits 
Non-Freshman 
Legislator 
Control Binary 77.4% of Observations = Non-
Freshman Legislators 
Legislator  
Party 
Control Binary 61.1% of Observations = 
Democrats 
Dominant 
Party 
Control Binary 37.9% of Observations = 
Dominant Party Affiliation 
Legislator Chamber Control Binary 61.2% of Observations = House 
Members 
Legislative Election 
Year 
Control Binary 60.9% of Observations = Non-
election Years 
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Variable Type Structure Mean 
Increase in 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Control Continuous 0.0005 
% State Per Capita 
Income 
Control Continuous 103.5 
% Coal 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 18.5 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 40.1 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
Control Continuous 8.8 
Solar Average Control Continuous 3.6 
River Miles Control Continuous 19.7 
Shoreline Control Continuous 1.1 
Prior Innovation Control Continuous 0.004 
Neighbor Innovation Control Continuous 0.098 
 
I estimate four model specifications in this study. First, I utilize a logit model and 
cluster standard errors by state to account for the realistic proposition that observations 
from the same state are not independent from one another. As a robustness check on 
results obtained using the logit model with state clustered errors, I secondly estimate a 
logit model using state random effects. The third and fourth models are analogous to 
models 1 and 2, except that I use a definition of innovation that lasts two years instead of 
one year.129   
I cannot estimate a model using state fixed effects for two reasons: first, the Term 
Limits variable is time-invariant, meaning that state fixed effects would capture the 
variation contained in the Term Limits variable. Second, my data is largely cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal in nature: I rarely have more than two years worth of 
observations for any one state. Including fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Remember that using the two-year innovation variable serves as a robustness check 
and reduces the probability of temporal mismatch, where a legislator actually innovates 
in cosponsorship even though his or her legislature emulates in adoption. I discuss this 
phenomenon in greater detail in footnote 104. 
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(Prior Innovation and Neighbor Innovation contain lagged forms of the dependent 
variable) in a dataset containing a small number of time periods leads to Hurwicz bias, 
where fixed effects “downwardly bias the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable” 
(Beck 2005). I also should mention that I do not include either lagged dependent variable 
while using state random effects. I make this modeling choice to avoid the situation 
pointed out by Baum (2010), where including a lagged dependent variable in a random 
effects model introduces a correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
estimated unit error parameter.130 
 
5.5 Results 
 In table 24, I display estimation results for the specifications using state clustered 
standard errors and state random effects. 
TABLE 24: Estimation Results for One-Year Innovation  
Variable Logit with State 
Clustered Errors 
Logit with State 
Random Effects 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
-8.027** 
(3.150) 
-69.602*** 
(4.673) 
Legislator 
Vote Share 
-0.0001 
(0.003) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
Term  
Limits 
1.779** 
(0.769) 
8.705*** 
(1.361) 
Non-Freshman 
Legislator 
-0.056 
(0.100) 
-0.023 
(0.101) 
Legislator 
Party 
-0.138 
(0.192) 
0.096 
(0.098) 
Dominant 
Party  
-0.340 
(0.467) 
-0.481*** 
(0.143) 
Legislator 
Chamber 
-0.878*** 
(0.298) 
-0.234** 
(0.106) 
   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Remember that one of the core assumptions of random effects regression is that X 
variables are not correlated with either unit error or idiosyncratic error. I would like to 
thank Christopher Baum for helping to explain this issue via electronic correspondence. 
	  168	  
   
Variable Logit with State 
Clustered Errors 
Logit with State 
Random Effects 
Legislative 
Election Year 
0.914 
(0.869) 
-0.066 
(0.194) 
Increase in 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.264 
(0.369) 
-0.554*** 
(0.151) 
% State Per Capita Income 0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.380*** 
(0.029) 
% Coal 
Consumption 
0.050* 
(0.027) 
-0.430*** 
(0.025) 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
0.108*** 
(0.020) 
0.636*** 
(0.051) 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
-0.027 
(0.036) 
-0.900*** 
(0.051) 
Solar 
Average 
-1.070** 
(0.413) 
-4.411*** 
(0.550) 
River 
Miles 
0.109*** 
(0.026) 
0.511*** 
(0.035) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.351 
(0.217) 
-3.735*** 
(0.458) 
Prior 
Innovation 
2.082 
(8.642) 
- 
Neighbor 
Innovation 
2.318 
(2.319) 
- 
Observations 7,079 7,079 
Wald/Probability > χ2 387.60*** 2296.14*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01 
 
 In table 25, I re-estimate the models from table 24 but substitute a two-year 
definition of innovation for the one-year definition used previously. 
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TABLE 25: Estimation Results for Two-Year Innovation 
Variable Logit with State 
Clustered Errors 
Logit with State 
Random Effects 
Legislative 
Professionalism 
-5.056*** 
(1.725) 
-28.397*** 
(2.002) 
Legislator 
Vote Share 
-0.0003 
(0.004) 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
Term  
Limits 
1.246* 
(0.752) 
5.255** 
(2.477) 
Non-Freshman 
Legislator 
-0.076 
(0.103) 
-0.029 
(0.092) 
Legislator 
Party 
-0.126 
(0.191) 
0.076 
(0.093) 
Dominant 
Party  
-0.548 
(0.387) 
-0.627*** 
(0.132) 
Legislator 
Chamber 
-0.689** 
(0.274) 
-0.224** 
(0.098) 
Legislative 
Election Year 
0.570 
(0.697) 
-0.518*** 
(0.199) 
Increase in 
Unemployment Rate 
-0.472 
(0.372) 
-0.707*** 
(0.156) 
% State Per Capita Income 0.009 
(0.025) 
-0.092** 
(0.044) 
% Coal 
Consumption 
0.040 
(0.036) 
-0.088 
(0.059) 
% Petroleum 
Consumption 
0.090*** 
(0.022) 
0.362*** 
(0.053) 
% Renewable 
Consumption 
-0.028 
(0.038) 
-0.492*** 
(0.089) 
Solar 
Average 
-0.683* 
(0.377) 
-2.499** 
(1.013) 
River 
Miles 
0.081*** 
(0.017) 
0.242*** 
(0.056) 
Shoreline 
 
-0.126 
(0.186) 
-0.637** 
(0.284) 
Prior 
Innovation 
-0.222 
(7.822) 
- 
Neighbor 
Innovation 
2.466 
(2.652) 
- 
Observations 7,079 7,079 
Wald/Probability > χ2 245.84*** 855.76*** 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01. 
 Tables 24 and 25 provide support for the Legislative Professionalism 
Cosponsorship Emulation Hypothesis and the Term Limits Cosponsorship Innovation 
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Hypothesis. Note that in all four empirical models, Legislative Professionalism relates 
negatively and significantly with Cosponsorship Type. This suggests that individual 
cosponsors, similar to the macro-level legislatures making adoption choices in chapter 3, 
also chiefly embrace emulation in response to increases in legislative professionalism. It 
also suggests, again in a response reminiscent from chapter 3, that factors besides 
legislative professionalism (such as legislator ideology, for example) may make the 
amount of uncertainty associated with innovating less important for legislators and 
increase the probability that legislators embrace the higher risk of innovation over 
emulation. Understanding how factors like ideology change the tradeoff between 
innovating and emulating is an important future direction of investigation.       
 Term Limits also maintains a consistent and statistically significant relationship 
with Cosponsorship Type in all four models, although the statistical significance 
associated with Term Limits is admittedly weakened in the model (from table 25) using a 
logit with errors clustered by state. The positive and significant relationship between 
Term Limits and Cosponsorship Type suggests that legislators from states with term limit 
provisions are more willing by virtue of their shorter time horizons to take risks and 
cosponsor innovative policy compared to legislators from states that lack term limit 
provisions. An implication of this finding is that reducing electoral accountability through 
imposing term limits changes the nature of the choice between innovating and emulating, 
as legislators with truncated time horizons may believe that the risk differential between 
innovation and emulation is actually quite small.    
 Interestingly, Legislator Vote Share, the variable that I use to measure electoral 
vulnerability and the direct individual-level analog to the statistically significant group-
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level electoral vulnerability variable (Median Vote Share of Incumbent Legislator) used 
in chapter 3, does not achieve statistical significance here and even relates negatively 
with Cosponsorship Type, suggesting (with very little certainty given a comparison of 
coefficient and standard error sizes) that increases in electoral vulnerability make 
legislators more likely to innovate rather than emulate during cosponsorship. One 
possible explanation for the slightly negative and nonsignificant relationship between 
Legislator Vote Share and Cosponsorship Type may be that cosponsors respond 
heterogeneously from one another in response to rising electoral vulnerability. If one 
group of cosponsors responds to declining vote share by innovating and another group of 
cosponsors responds to declining vote share by emulating, then the overall relationship 
between Legislator Vote Share and Cosponsorship Type would appear inconclusive. This 
explanation, of course, does not preclude the possibility that a different conceptualization 
of electoral vulnerability may affect the legislator’s choice between the well-specified fit 
and high risk of innovation versus the more general fit and low risk of emulation. 
 We can also try to explain why electoral vulnerability would affect the decision-
making of a legislature (remember that policy adoption is a macro-level or legislative 
decision) but not the decision-making of an individual cosponsors. Many cosponsors 
arguably have a personal connection with the policies they support (this is a reason why 
legislators actually cosponsor policy) and may be committed to key parts of their policy 
agendas regardless of vote share concerns. In contrast, many voting members of a 
legislature may not have a personal connection with a given policy and may (in the 
absence of having a personal connection) be more likely to adjust their policy adoption 
choices in response to electoral considerations. 
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 I also would like to draw attention to the finding linking membership in the lower 
chamber of a legislature to an increased likelihood of cosponsoring innovative policy. 
Although I include Legislator Chamber as a control rather than an explanatory variable 
of interest, the negative association between Legislator Chamber and Cosponsorship 
Type is puzzling and may be due to analyzing a policy area (RPS) where the bulk of early 
RPS policies were heavily cosponsored by lower chamber legislators. 
 Since the results from tables 24 and 25 show coefficients rather than effects, I 
display predicted probabilities in graphical and tabular form in order to capture the 
effects of Legislative Professionalism and Term Limits on Cosponsorship Type. In figure 
5, I plot the likelihood of innovating rather than emulating during cosponsorship as a 
function of legislative professionalism. As with the comparable figures in chapter 3, I 
plot legislative professionalism from a lower bound of 0.05 to an upper bound of 0.40.131 
I use the logit model with state clustered standard errors and a one-year definition of 
innovation to generate predicted probabilities and set all binary variables to their most 
frequent values and continuous variables to their mean values. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The lowest possible value for Legislative Professionalism is 0.027 (corresponding to 
New Hampshire’s level of professionalism). The highest possible value for this variable 
is 0.659 (corresponding to California’s professionalism). The median level of 
professionalism is 0.19, meaning that my plotted range (0.05 to 0.4) arguably captures 
low to high legislative professionalism. 
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FIGURE 5: The Effect of Legislative Professionalism on Innovation during 
Cosponsorship 
 
 
 
 In figure 5, the solid line describes how the probability of cosponsoring an 
innovation (rather than an emulation) changes for given values of legislative 
professionalism. The dashed lines show both upper and lower bound (95%) confidence 
curves for the predicted probability of cosponsoring innovation. Note that the predicted 
probability of innovating rather than emulating during cosponsorship decreases as 
legislative professionalism increases and indeed drops to approximately 7.5% once 
legislative professionalism rises slightly above its median value (0.19). This figure gives 
the reader a visual representation of the Legislative Professionalism Cosponsorship 
Emulation Hypothesis and suggests that increased legislative professionalism creates a 
pro-emulation bias among individual cosponsors. 
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 In table 26, I show how the predicted probability of innovating rather than 
emulating during cosponsorship changes as we shift from a state without term limit 
provisions to a state with term limit provisions. As was the case with figure 5, I use the 
logit model with state clustered standard errors and a one-year definition of innovation to 
generate predicted probabilities and set binary variables to their most frequent values and 
continuous variables to their mean values.  
TABLE 26: The Effect of Term Limits on Cosponsorship Type 
Variable Values Predicted Probability of Cosponsor 
Innovating versus Emulating 
Term Limits = 0 0.086*** 
(0.033) 
Term Limits =1 
 
0.359* 
(0.206) 
*Significant at 0.10; **significant at 0.05; ***significant at 0.01 
 
 A useful way to interpret table 26 is to view (Predicted Probability when Term 
Limits = 1) – (Predicted Probability when Term Limits = 0) as the estimated effect that 
term limit provisions have on the likelihood that a legislator innovates rather than 
emulating when cosponsoring policy. Subtracting 0.359 by 0.086 yields a value of 0.273, 
and the positive magnitude of this value suggests that term limits increase the likelihood 
that legislators innovate rather than emulating during cosponsorship.     
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I look at innovation and emulation from the vantage point of 
legislators who are cosponsoring policy. My focus here represents a departure from the 
rest of the dissertation, as I analyze the actions of legislators rather than legislatures; and I 
study policy cosponsorship rather than policy adoption. This departure is useful because 
it first allows us to compare the behavior of individual legislators with that of macro-level 
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legislatures; and because it allows us to investigate whether the factors that affect policy 
adoption also affect cosponsorship. Cosponsorship has been an understudied and even 
underappreciated activity, and some scholars (Mayhew 1974) argue that cosponsorship is 
a relatively costless (for the legislator) way of signaling policy stewardship to 
constituents. My findings here—by linking rising legislative professionalism to increased 
emulation rather than innovation, and showing that the reduced electoral accountability 
from term limits makes legislators more willing to embrace the risk of cosponsoring 
innovative policy—suggest that legislators take their own risk tolerances into 
consideration when cosponsoring policy and also suggest that cosponsorship may not be 
as costless as some observers make it out to be. 
 The study admittedly suffers from two large defects that will need to be addressed 
moving forward. One defect centers around the omission of data dealing with non-
cosponsorship. Adding non-cosponsorship data will improve the analysis by creating a 
more realistic baseline (non-cosponsorship) against which we can then compare 
probabilities of innovation and emulation. Legislative professionalism and term limits 
may both actually increase the probability of cosponsorship generally but have 
differential effects on the likelihood of innovation compared to emulation, and using a 
non-cosponsorship baseline would allow me to explore this possibility. The second defect 
centers around my exclusive use of cosponsorship data from adopted policies. It is 
possible that the empirical results presented here could be an artifact of only using 
adopted policies, and re-estimating my empirical models using cosponsorship data from 
non-adopted policies will help to guard against the possibility that selection bias has 
generated the results of this chapter. Incorporating data from non-cosponsorship and non-
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adoption will allow me to provide a more robust confirmation of the story (and empirical 
results) displayed here. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Implications and Concluding Thoughts about State Policy Innovation under 
Devolution 
 
6.1 Recapping the Central Themes of the Dissertation 
 Conventional wisdom assumes that state policymakers operating under devolution 
will naturally choose to turn their states into “laboratories” of innovation (New State Ice 
Company v. Liebmann 1932) even though we know very little about why these 
policymakers would choose to innovate, or create novel and untested policy, rather than 
emulate and copy known policy that has already been tested in a comparable setting (or 
even comparable settings). 
 Conventional wisdom designating the states as innovation laboratories also 
ignores perceptive observations linking electoral vulnerability among state officials to 
increased risk aversion and consequently emulation (Rose-Ackerman 1980; Volden, 
Ting, and Carpenter 2008; and Cai and Treisman 2009) as well as observations linking 
resource limitations among state officials to increased incentives to free-ride off of the 
experiences of other states and emulate (Kollman, Miller, and Page 2000). 
 In this project, I analyze how electoral vulnerability and a key manifestation of 
state resource capacity—legislative professionalism—affect whether state officials 
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choose to innovate or emulate when crafting policy in an area characterized by a lack of 
direct federal intervention on state policymaking (that is, a policy area characterized by 
devolution). Understanding when state officials innovate or emulate given negligible 
federal involvement allows us to identify the limits of the narrative describing the states 
as laboratories of innovation and also opens the stage for future research in which we can 
examine how the centralization of policy may change how electoral vulnerability, 
legislative professionalism, and in the case of cosponsorship (as I will describe shortly), 
term limit provisions, affect state-level decisions to innovate or emulate. 
Main Points from the Discussion of the Coding Process Utilized in this Project 
(Chapter 2) 
 In this chapter, I describe the RPS policy domain and discuss why analyzing this 
policy domain is useful for studying the determinants of state innovation and emulation. I 
also discuss the advantages of evaluating innovation and emulation at the level of the 
policy feature rather than using the policy regime, which has been the conventional 
analytical unit of choice employed by political scientists to study policy adoption. I then 
discuss one of the main tasks that I undertake in this project—separating innovation from 
emulation using the official documentation from state policymaking—and I walk the 
reader through a step-by-step account of my coding process. 
 I close with a discussion of how I use my coding process to evaluate the 
determinants of state-level innovation and emulation in legislative policy adoption, 
regulatory policy adoption, and legislator policy cosponsorship, and I identify three ways 
in which my coding method advances the field of policy adoption and diffusion. First, I 
build on theoretical suggestions from Walker (1969), Boushey (2010), and Boehmke and 
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Skinner (2012), and I devise a way for innovation and emulation to be separated into 
distinct outcomes that can then be analyzed using the tools of quantitative social science. 
Second, I unite work on the non-spatial unit-specific determinants of policy 
innovativeness with work on the spatial determinants of policy diffusion across states 
(Berry and Berry 1990; Mintrom 1997; Volden 2006; Franzese and Hays 2010; and 
Pacheco 2012) by creating a way to use event history analysis to simultaneously research 
about the unit-specific determinants of policy innovativeness and the spatial determinants 
of policy diffusion across states. And third, I show how using the policy feature as the 
unit of analysis allows researchers to incorporate a greater amount of diversity in state 
policymaking into their studies of adoption and diffusion.    
Results and Main Points from the Analysis of Legislative Innovation and 
Emulation in Policy Adoption (Chapter 3) 
 I investigate the determinants of state innovation and emulation given devolution 
in three parts. In chapter 3, I study when legislatures—the main bodies charged with 
advancing policies across the states—choose to innovate or emulate when adopting 
policy. I apply a framework from Bednar (2007) to show that the legislature’s choice to 
innovate rather than emulate represents a decision to uniquely specified but highly 
uncertain policy over more generally tailored but less uncertain policy, and I then 
investigate how legislative professionalism and electoral vulnerability affect the 
legislature’s propensity to innovate or emulate. I specifically evaluate how a macro-level 
measure of electoral vulnerability, the Median Vote Share of an Incumbent Legislator in 
his or her last election, and legislative professionalism measured using the Squire Index 
(Squire 2007) affect legislative innovation and emulation in policy adoption. Devising a 
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way to empirically distinguish innovation from emulation and using data on state 
renewables portfolio standard (RPS) policy adoption for statistical analysis (RPS is a 
policy area where the states have dominated policymaking with negligible input from the 
federal government, I find that increased electoral vulnerability makes it more likely that 
a legislature will emulate when adopting policy. I also find that rising legislative 
professionalism increases the likelihood of legislative emulation more than that of 
legislative innovation. 
 Taken together, the electoral vulnerability and legislative professionalism findings 
complicate the narrative describing state governments operating under devolution as 
laboratories of innovation, because these findings suggest (giving some empirical heft to 
the formal theoretic claims of Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008 as well as Cai and 
Treisman 2009) that reelection concerns induce copycatting rather than the creation of 
novel policy. The legislative professionalism result problematizes our view of the 
conditions under which state legislatures serve as incubators of innovation because it 
suggests that better resourced legislatures possess a stronger relative preference for 
emulating rather than innovating than do less resourced legislatures, meaning that 
resources are not enough to overcome the high uncertainty of innovation. The pro-
emulation legislative professionalism finding may also be bad from a normative 
perspective if it suggests that state legislatures do not rely on their own capacity to 
conduct research and instead mainly use advice from other potentially biased sources 
(such as interest groups) to innovative policy proposals. 
Results and Main Points from the Analysis of Regulatory Agency Innovation and 
Emulation in Policy Adoption (Chapter 4) 
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 Here, I switch my focus to the RPS policy adoption activity of regulatory agencies 
and specifically analyze decision-making by state public utilities commissions. The pro-
emulation electoral vulnerability result from chapter 3 suggests that appointed 
policymakers may serve as the wellsprings of state policy innovation, as appointees are 
not subject to the pressures of reelection. Variation across the states in terms of whether 
public utilities commissioners are elected or appointed allows us to investigate whether 
appointed public utilities commissioners innovate more than their elected colleagues, and 
I undertake this analysis in chapter 4. 
 Employing a similar empirical strategy to the one utilized in chapter 3 but 
analyzing the RPS adoption choices of state public utilities commissioners instead of 
state legislatures, I find that elected public utilities commissioners are actually more 
likely to innovate compared to their appointed peers. Referring to and extending the work 
of Besley and Coate (2003), I argue that elected public utilities commissioners have more 
freedom to innovate than appointed commissioners because the elected commissioners 
serve principals (median voters) who care less about energy regulatory policy issues 
(save for the issue of consumer energy prices) than do the principals (state legislators and 
governors) of appointed commissioners. This means that elected commissioners are 
largely free to take on the risk of innovating so long as they can convince median voters 
that the innovations will not raise consumer energy prices. Appointed commissioners, on 
the other hand, may face serious questioning from legislative and gubernatorial bosses 
about how a potential innovation could harm the interests of legislative and gubernatorial 
allies, and the appointees may simply choose not to innovate in order to reduce the 
probability of facing pushback from legislative and gubernatorial principals. 
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 The result linking the election of public utilities commissioners to innovation in 
policy adoption matters because it suggests that giving policy responsibility to appointees 
may not increase policy innovation and may in fact hinder the creation of novel policy. 
Although elected state officials are bound by electoral considerations and although the 
elected lawmakers from chapter 3 prefer to emulate as electoral vulnerability increases, it 
is elected officials (and at least with respect to policy adoption, not appointed officials) 
who serve as key producers of state policy innovation: this is true in the area of RPS 
policy adoption when we compare legislative innovation to regulatory agency innovation 
(in aggregate and percentage terms, legislatures innovate more than public utilities 
commissions and much more than citizens acting through the ballot initiative)132; and this 
is true within the universe of state public utilities commissioners, as elected 
commissioners are more likely to innovate than their appointed colleagues. The fact that 
elected state officials exercise restraint (by emulating in response to electoral pressures) 
but still innovate is arguably good on normative grounds because it suggests that while 
elections keep state officials accountable in terms of how these officials approach 
policymaking choices, elections do not make state officials so timid that they no longer 
try to find novel policy solutions to important societal challenges. 
 Results and Main Points from the Analysis of Legislator Innovation and 
Emulation in Policy Cosponsorship (Chapter 5) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Recall that there is never a case of ballot initiative innovation in the dataset. In the 
appendix of the dissertation, I display the full list of RPS policy adoptions broken down 
by actor (legislature, regulatory agency, or ballot initiative). I also display the percentage 
of cases of innovation and emulation that occurred through legislative, regulatory agency, 
or ballot initiative action. 
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 In this chapter, I evaluate the policy cosponsorship activity of legislators and 
identify characteristics that affect whether legislators innovate or emulate during 
cosponsorship. Cosponsorship is an important but underemphasized part of the 
policymaking process and understanding the dynamics affecting legislators’ risk 
tolerances during cosponsorship will help to shed light on another way in which the states 
may or may not serve as laboratories of policy innovation. As was the case in chapter 3, I 
extend the work of Bednar (2007) and argue that the choice to innovate rather than 
emulate represents a decision to select uniquely specified but highly uncertain policy 
(innovation) over more generally specified but less uncertain policy (emulation). 
 A major goal of chapter 5 is to provide a micro-level comparison to the macro-
level analysis conducted in chapter 3, and I evaluate whether electoral vulnerability and 
legislative professionalism exert the same effect on individual legislators’ cosponsorship 
behavior that they exert on legislative adoption behavior. Unlike in chapter 3, here, I fail 
to find a meaningful relationship between electoral vulnerability and legislator innovation 
versus emulation in cosponsorship. One reason for the lack of a meaningful relationship 
between electoral vulnerability and legislator innovation versus emulation in 
cosponsorship could be that legislators within the cosponsorship sample behave 
differently from one another in response to rising electoral vulnerability: if rising 
electoral vulnerability causes some legislators to innovate and causes other legislators to 
emulate, we could get an inconclusive signal linking electoral vulnerability and 
innovation versus emulation in cosponsorship. We can also try to explain why electoral 
vulnerability would affect the decision-making of a legislature (remember that policy 
adoption is a macro-level or legislative decision) in chapter 3 but not the decision-making 
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of an individual cosponsors in chapter 5. Many cosponsors arguably have a personal 
connection with the policies they support (this is a reason why legislators actually 
cosponsor policy) and may be committed to key parts of their policy agendas regardless 
of vote share concerns. In contrast, many voting members of a legislature may not have a 
personal connection with a given policy that is up for adoption and may (in the absence 
of having a personal connection) be more likely to adjust their policy adoption choices in 
response to electoral considerations. 
 In chapter 5, I find that the effect of legislative professionalism on innovation 
versus emulation in cosponsorship mirrors the effect of legislative professionalism on 
policy adoption from chapter 3: namely, increased legislative professionalism induces a 
pro-emulation bias, as legislators obtain a better return on research investment for 
investigating and vetting the fit of an already tested policy rather than investigating and 
vetting the fit of a novel policy. The pro-emulation legislative professionalism potentially 
creates the same normative problem that I discussed when recapping implications from 
chapter 3: if better resources do not drive innovation, then what does? And is the answer 
to the “what does” question problematic from a normative good governance perspective? 
  My last finding relates term limit provisions to increased innovation in 
cosponsorship.133 This finding matters from an electoral accountability perspective, as it 
suggests that shortening the time horizons of legislators makes them more willing to 
embrace untested policy since their career prospects may not be threatened by 
unanticipated and undesired effects of the untested policy. Short time horizons are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 I would like to emphasize that I hope to check the robustness of the findings from 
chapter 5 by testing my empirical models using data on non-cosponsorship as well as the 
cosponsorship of non-adopted policies.  
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necessarily bad from an electoral accountability perspective if the legislators advance 
innovations that they genuinely believe are beneficial for constituents in the districts that 
they represent. However, short time horizons are bad if legislators advance pet 
innovations without giving much regard to the risk and potential downstream effects of 
the innovations.134 
 
6.2 Overall Implications and Next Steps 
Overall Implications 
 
 In this project, I add nuance and identify the limits to when we can expect state 
government officials operating under devolution to create novel policy and make their 
states laboratories of innovation. To be sure—if the policy area of RPS analyzed in this 
study serves as a useful guide—state governments do innovate. In fact, legislatures 
innovated 91 times with respect to RPS policy adoption, and innovations represented 
roughly 18% of all RPS policy adoptions. We additionally saw more evidence of 
innovation from the RPS policy adoption patterns of elected public utilities 
commissioners and the RPS cosponsorship behavior of legislators from states with term 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 In chapter 3, Term Limits relates positively with innovation and negatively with 
emulation but does not achieve statistical significance. In chapter 5, term limits still 
relates positively with innovation and negatively with emulation but also achieves 
statistical significance. Term limits, I argue, have a stronger effect on the behavior of 
individual cosponsors rather than collective legislatures (the units responsible for 
adopting policy) because legislative decision-making requires a multitude of legislators to 
support an innovative policy proposal and believe that their own short time horizons will 
protect them from electoral damage caused by unanticipated and undesired effects from 
the innovative policy proposal. And while it is easy for an individual legislator from a 
state with term limits to support an innovative policy proposal and believe that his or her 
short time horizons reduce the probability of electoral damage from the unanticipated and 
undesired effects of innovation, it is harder to see a majority of voting legislators from a 
state with term limits making that same conclusion. 
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limit provisions.135 All of these examples reveal evidence of the states acting as 
incubators of innovation. 
 However, on balance, my analysis indicates that state policymakers operating 
under devolution are more appropriately described as emulators rather than innovators. 
This is true in a definitional or functional sense—we perhaps should describe state 
policymakers as emulators because there are only so many novel policy solutions that a 
state government could create compared to the much larger pool of existing policy 
solutions that they could emulate—but it is more importantly true in terms of how state 
governmental characteristics increase the likelihood of emulation. The pro-emulation 
electoral vulnerability finding from chapter 3 suggests that the threat of electoral loss 
makes emulation more likely in institutions (state legislatures) that have been considered 
to be the engines of state policy innovation. And the pro-emulation legislative 
professionalism finding from chapters 3 and 5 suggests that even those in state 
government who are perhaps best equipped to innovate (by virtue of possessing ample 
resources) favor emulation and actually favor it by an intensifying margin. Both of these 
findings suggest that I explore whether other factors, such as government ideology, make 
those in the legislative branch more willing to embrace the higher risk of innovation.  
 There are two ways to interpret the assertion that states operating under 
devolution are better described as emulators rather than innovators. A positive 
interpretation focuses on the idea that more emulation is desirable because this means 
that a higher number of adopted policies are likely to be successful. According to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 As I mention in chapter 2, I do not fully investigate how interactions between 
legislators and regulators could influence state policy innovation and emulation choices. 
Unpacking the nature of these interactions comprises part of my future research agenda.  
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view, to use language from evolutionary biology, emulation is better than innovation 
because emulated policies have survived and possess the requisite fitness needed to thrive 
in different environments. According to this view, we should therefore welcome 
increased emulation since citizens are largely shielded from the risks of untested and 
potentially unfit policies. 
 The second interpretation is negative and focuses on the paucity of state-level 
innovation under devolution as well as the quality of state-level innovation under 
devolution. The point about paucity refers to the idea that we depend on innovation in 
order to make the determinations of policy fitness described in the paragraph above and 
potentially reveal when a novel policy solution does a better job of addressing a problem 
than does an existing (and even widespread) policy solution. The point about quality 
indirectly comes from Kollman, Miller, and Page (2000) and refers to the idea that 
heterogeneous policy motivations across the states may yield a range of policy solutions 
that fail to effectively address a problem that is cross-state or multijurisdictional in 
scope.136 
 Incentivizing state policymakers to look beyond their own particularistic 
constituencies may improve the quality of state-level policy from a multijurisdictional 
perspective, and the federal government is arguably the actor most qualified to try to use 
incentives to change the behavior of state policymakers. The federal government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 This has arguably occurred with respect to innovation in the devolved issue area of 
RPS policymaking. While the large-scale and multijurisdictional problem addressed by 
RPS is the need to increase the use of “clean” (and especially carbon neutral) energy, a 
number of states where coal is a dominant source of energy have innovated by adding 
coal derivatives to their RPS standards. The coal-related innovations represent novel 
policymaking but represent less effective (or lower quality) policies from the vantage 
point of wanting to increase the use of clean or carbon neutral energy.      
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typically utilizes financial assistance or rulemaking (or a combination of both) to 
incentivize state policymakers to align state policy choices with federal prerogatives 
(Peterson 1995). Historically, the federal government has utilized rulemaking to force 
states to abandon ineffective and even morally reprehensible innovations, as was the case 
when the federal government put an end to state-level experimentation with Jim Crow 
laws. In this example, the federal government used the same rulemaking to force 
emulation by requiring state governments to honor both the Civil Rights Act and Voting 
Rights Act. The federal government has also used financial assistance to encourage state-
level innovation, as was the case when the federal government gave grants to states that 
had devised novel ways to boost participation in the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program (Volden 2006). My objective moving forward is to investigate how the federal 
government directly influences state-level innovation and emulation activity. 
Next Steps 
 As it turns out, the RPS issue area will soon provide an excellent test case for 
investigating how federal influence on state policymaking affects the innovation and 
emulation behavior of state-level officials. In June 2014, the federal Environmental 
Protection Agency, with the backing of the Obama administration, issued the Clean 
Power Plant Proposed Rule. This rule aims to encourage the use of clean and carbon 
neutral energy by mandating that states require power plants to generate electricity from 
cleaner sources: the rule, in other words, is functionally similar to an RPS policy and 
represents the federalization of RPS policy. The federal government currently aims to use 
a mix of guidelines and rulemaking to align state RPS policymaking with the EPA’s 
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preferences.137 Guidelines will provide advice to the states on how to lower the carbon 
emissions of power plants while rulemaking will set mandatory state-specific carbon 
reduction targets that the states must meet within a designated timeframe (usually that the 
states reach their mandated carbon reduction targets by the year 2030). 
I plan to use the implementation of the EPA’s Clean Power Plant Rule to compare 
state-level innovation and emulation in the absence versus the presence of federal 
influence on state RPS policymaking. It is possible that federal influence could change 
the effect of electoral vulnerability on state legislative innovation, as citizens supportive 
of federal environmental policy may reward state lawmakers for devising innovative 
ways to reduce power plant carbon emissions. It is also possible that federal influence 
could change the effect of legislative professionalism on state legislative innovation, as 
professionalized state legislatures may point to the EPA’s guidelines as evidence of the 
potential success of innovative carbon emission cutting policymaking. Finally, federal 
influence could change the effect of term limit provisions on state legislator 
cosponsorship, as legislators from states with term limit provisions who want to signal 
their support for federal environmental policy (signaling this kind of support, for 
example, may help these legislators advance future career plans) may emulate and 
cosponsor policy that has already been endorsed by the federal government and adopted 
in other states. 
 Comparing state-level innovation and emulation in the absence and presence of 
direct federal influence will help us answer the longstanding question of whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 It is possible that the federal government could also use financial assistance to 
incentivize state policymakers to align their policymaking with the goals of the EPA. 
However, current EPA plans do not mention routine financial help or any type of transfer 
system.  
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centralization increases state policy innovation or emulation. In this project, I have 
analyzed state innovation and emulation under the baseline condition of devolution and 
identified the limits to the claim that state officials operating free from federal 
intervention serve as wellsprings of innovation. However, I do not detail how changes in 
federal intervention affect state innovation and emulation. The next phase of this project 
will reveal exactly how the introduction of a federal actor changes the policymaking 
decisions of state government officials. 
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General Appendix 
 
I. Coding Scheme: here, I discuss the coding scheme with respect to policy adoption. I 
do not discuss cosponsorship since cosponsorship data is extracted from policy adoption 
data. Chapter 4 includes a thorough discussion of the data processing procedure for 
cosponsorship data. 	  
II. Definition of Innovation and Emulation: 
Distinguishing innovation from emulation requires identifying the chronological order 
in which a given state adopted a specific renewable portfolio standard policy. State i 
innovates if it adopts policy k before any other state has adopted policy k OR if it adopts 
policy k within one calendar year of another state being the first state to adopt policy k. 
State i emulates if it adopts policy k at least one calendar year after another state became 
the first state to adopt policy k. 
 
III. Identifying the Set of Policies that Comprise the Dataset: 
Renewable energy policy specialists at the Database of State Incentives for Renewables 
and Efficiency (DSIRE) formulated a list of key state renewable energy portfolio standard 
policies and have identified whether state i has adopted a particular policy k.138 The 
policies identified by DSIRE specialists fall into five groups: 
1. Eligible Renewable/Other Technologies: What sources and/or technologies 
does state i include in its renewable energy portfolio standard? 
2. Standard Type: What kind of standard does state i impose on electricity 
providers? 
3. Technology Minimum: Does state i specify that some amount of the standard 
be met from any one specific renewable source or technology? 
4. Credit Trading: Does state i allow electricity providers to trade credits or 
certificates in order to satisfy renewable energy portfolio standards? 
5. Voluntary or Mandatory: Is the renewable energy portfolio standard levied on 
an electricity provider by state i voluntary or mandatory?139 
 
Specific policies map onto each of the five groups listed above and comprise the set of all 
policies used in the dataset. The following tables display each policy identified by DSIRE 
sorted by each of the five groups (listed above) also identified by DSIRE. I display the 
name of the policy, the number of states that have adopted the policy, the year of first 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 This information is available on the DSIRE website. 
139 DSIRE has data for two additional categories: (1) what kind of provider (e.g. investor-
owned utilities versus rural cooperatives) falls under state i’s renewable energy portfolio 
standard; and (2) the actual rate (say, 15% of the electricity sold by provider q in state i) 
associated with state i’s renewable energy portfolio standard. I do not include policies 
from these two categories based on a 2013 phone conversation with Justin Barnes, then 
chief policy analyst at DSIRE, who stated that data from these two categories had not 
been checked for veracity. Barnes also stated that each of the policies listed by DSIRE 
was unique and identified in consultation with renewable energy industry experts.     
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adoption by a state, and the percentage and number of adoptions for that policy that 
occurred through legislative, regulatory/agency, and ballot initiative channels. 
 
TABLE 27: Eligible Renewable/Other Technologies 	  
Policy Name # of 
States 
that 
Adopt 
Year of 
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative 
% (#) 
Advanced Nuclear 1 2008 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Anaerobic 
Digestion 
22 2002 63% (14) 36% (8) 0% (0) 
Biodiesel 4 2004 50% (2) 25% (1) 25% (1) 
Biogas 1 2010 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Biomass 35 1994 82% (29) 11% (4) 5.7% (2) 
Biomass Thermal 2 2005 0% (0) 50% (1) 50% (1) 
CHP/Cogeneration 9 1997 77% (7) 22% (2) 0% (0) 
Clean Coal 2 2008 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Co-Firing 1 2007 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Coal Bed Methane 2 2009 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Coal Gasification 1 2004 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Coal Mine 
Methane 
3 2004 100% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Coal Technology 1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Coal-Fired with 
Carbon Capture 
and Sequestration 
1 2008 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Compressed Air 
Energy Storage 
1 2010 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Daylighting 1 2006 0% (0) 100% (1) 0% (0) 
Densified Fuel 
Pellets 
1 2010 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Electricity from 
Waste Heat 
2 2007 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Energy Demand 
Reduction 
1 2011 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Energy Recovery 
Processes 
1 2003 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Energy Storage 2 2002 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Energy from 
Waste 
1 2007 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Ethanol 2 2004 50% (1) 50% (1) 0% (0) 
Fuel Cells 8 1997 87% (7) 12% (1) 0% (0) 
Fuel Cells using 
Renewable Fuels 
21 1997 76% (16) 19% (4) 4.7% (1) 	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Policy Name # of 
States 
that 
Adopt 
Year of 
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative 
% (#) 
Fuel Produced by  
a Coal 
Gasification or 
Liquification 
Facility 
1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Gasification 1 2008 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Geothermal 
Direct-Use 
3 2006 66% (2) 33% (1) 0% (0) 
Geothermal 
Electric 
28 1997 78% (22) 14% (4) 7.1% (2) 
Geothermal Heat 
Pumps 
7 1999 57% (4) 42% (3) 0% (0) 
Hydroelectric 35 1983 82% (29) 11% (4) 5.7% (2) 
Hydrogen 9 2001 100% (9) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Integrated 
Gasification 
Combined Cycle 
Technologies 
1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Landfill Gas 35 1997 80% (28) 17% (6) 2.8% (1) 
Low Emission 
Renewables 
1 1998 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Methanol 1 2004 0% (1) 100% (0) 0% (0) 
Microturbines 1 2008 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Municipal Solid 
Waste 
18 1997 100% (18) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Natural Gas 1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Nuclear 1 2011 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Ocean Thermal 12 1997 83% (10) 8% (1) 8.3% (1) 
Other Distributed 
Generation 
3 2004 100% (3) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Photovoltaics 24 1996 83% (20) 16% (4) 0% (0) 
Pumped Storage 
Hydroelectric 
Projects 
1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Recycled Energy 2 2007 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Renewable Fuels 2 1997 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Seawater AC 1 2004 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Small 
Hydroelectric 
10 1997 90% (9) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Solar AC 1 2004 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Solar HVAC 1 2006 0% (0) 100% (1) 0% (0) 
Solar Light Pipes 1 2010 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Solar Pool 
Heating 
2 1997 50% (1) 50% (1) 0% (0) 
Solar Space Heat 6 2001 66% (4) 33% (2) 0% (0) 
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Policy Name # of  
States 
that 
Adopt 
Year of 
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative 
% (#) 
Solar Thermal 
Electric 
35 1983 82% (29) 11% (4) 5.7% (2) 
Solar Thermal 
Process Heat 
7 1996 85% (6) 14% (1) 0% (0) 
Solar Water Heat 11 1999 63% (7) 36% (4) 0% (0) 
Synthetic Gas 2 2009 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Tidal Energy 16 1997 87% (14) 6% (1) 6.2% (1) 
Tire-derived Fuel 1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Waste Coal 2 2004 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Waste Heat 1 2008 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Waste Tires 1 2003 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Wave Energy 17 1997 88% (15) 5% (1) 5.8% (1) 
Wind 37 1983 83% (31) 10% (4) 5.4% (2) 
Zero-emission 
Technology 
1 2002 0% (0) 100% (1) 0% (0) 	   	  
TABLE 28: Standard Type 
 
Policy Name # of  
States 
that 
Adopt 
Year of 
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative % 
(#) 
Percentage of 
Consumption140 
1 2005 0% (0) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Percentage of 
Installed Capacity 
1 2010 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Percentage of 
Peak Demand 
Capacity 
1 2009 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Percentage of 
Retail 
33 1996 81% (27) 12% (4) 6% (2) 
Set Amount of 
Renewable 
Generating 
Capacity 
5 1992 100% (5) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 “Percentage of Consumption” was issued by the Governor of Iowa and therefore fits 
in none of the actor (legislative, regulatory, or ballot initiative) categories. 
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TABLE 29: Credit Trading 
 
Policy 
Name 
# of  
States 
that  
Adopt 
Year of  
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative 
% (#) 
Credit 
Trading 
33 1997 75% (25) 15% (5) 9% (3) 
 
TABLE 30: Technology Minimum 
 
Policy  
Name 
# of  
States 
that  
Adopt 
Year of 
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative 
% (#) 
Biomass 2 1994 100% (2) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Customer-
Sited 
1 2004 0% (0) 100% (1) 0% (0) 
Distributed 
Generation 
4 2006 50% (2) 50% (2) 0% (0) 
Hydroelectric 1 2007 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Offshore Wind 1 2010 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Photovoltaics 4 2004 100% (4) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Poultry Waste 1 2007 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Solar 5 1997 60% (3) 20% (1) 20% (1) 
Solar-Electric 3 2007 66% (2) 33% (1) 0% (0) 
Swine Waste 1 2007 100% (1) 0% (0) 0% (0) 
Wind 3 1994 66% (2) 33% (1) 0% (0) 
 
TABLE 31: Voluntary/Mandatory 
 
Policy  
Name 
# of  
States 
that  
Adopt 
Year of 
First 
Adoption 
Legislature 
% (#) 
Agency 
% (#) 
Initiative 
% (#) 
Mandatory 32 1983 84% (26) 9% (3) 9.3% (3) 
Voluntary 11 2001 90% (10) 9% (1) 0% (0) 
 
In the above tables (i-v), DSIRE provides information about columns 1 (“Policy Name”) 
and 2 (“# of States Adopting”), as it lists the RPS policies adopted by each state on each 
state’s respective RPS overview webpage. DSIRE does not provide information about 
when each state adopted its respective policy or what state governmental actor (a 
legislature, a public regulatory commission, or citizens) adopted each respective policy. 
This information, similar to that depicted in columns 3 and 4, is necessary in order to (1) 
code innovation and emulation and (2) identify legislative and regulatory instances of 
innovation and emulation that can be used in this analysis. DSIRE and the Union of 
Concerned Scientists, a secondary repository of RPS data, provide lists of laws and 
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regulations pertaining to each state’s RPS program. I construct a library from the 
identified laws and regulations of all states and assign a date to each policy adoption 
based on when the law or regulation containing each respective policy adoption is 
adopted (this means that a respective policy appears in the law or regulation in which that 
policy is adopted).141 I then use the definitions of innovation and emulation outlined on 
page 1 to code each policy adoption and then utilize the legislative (or regulatory) subset 
of adoptions to populate the event history dataset used in this paper. The full list of 
documents utilized for coding purposes is listed below. Bolded entries correspond to 
documents that contain the policy adoptions listed in Tables i-v above. 
 
TABLE 32: Original Documents Used in Project 
 
State Document Year 
Arizona ACC Decision 59943 1996 
Arizona ACC Decision 62506 2000 
Arizona ACC Decision 63334 2001 
Arizona ACC Decision 63486 2001 
Arizona ACC Decision 69127 2006 
Arizona ACC Decision 72500 2011 
California SB 1078 2002 
California SB 1038 2002 
California AB 57 2002 
California SB 67 2003 
California Docket 03-RES-1078 2003 
California Decision 03-06-071 2003 
California Rulemaking 04-04-026 2004 
California Decision 04-06-014 2004 
California Decision 04-06-015 2004 
California Decision 04-06-013 2004 
California Decision 04-07-029 2004 
California Ruling for Phase 2 of RPS 
Program 
2004 
California Ruling Releasing 
Renewable Avoided Cost 
Calculation 
2005 
California Decision 05-05-011 2005 
California Decision 05-07-039 2005 
California Decision 05-10-014 2005 
California Decision 05-11-025 2005 
California Decision 05-12-042 2005 
California SB 107 2006 
California AB 32 2006 
California Resolution E-3980 2006 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 For laws, this date corresponds to when a bill clears both chambers of a legislature and 
takes its enrolled form. For regulations, this date corresponds to when a public regulatory 
commission makes an official decision concerning regulatory policy. For ballot 
initiatives, this date corresponds to the date of the election in which the initiative passed. 
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State Document Year 
California Decision 05-06-039 2006 
California Decision 06-10-019 2006 
California Decision 06-10-050 2006 
California SB 1036 2007 
California AB 809 2007 
California Decision 07-05-028 2007 
California Decision 07-07-027 2007 
California Decision 07-09-024 2007 
California Executive Order S-21-09 2009 
California AB 2514 2010 
California Decision 10-03-021 2010 
California SBX 1-2 2011 
California Decision 129354 2011 
Colorado Ballot Initiative 37 2004 
Colorado SB 05-143 2005 
Colorado Docket 05R-112E 2005 
Colorado HB 1281 2007 
Colorado HB 1001 2010 
Connecticut H 5005 1998 
Connecticut Docket 98-06-15 1998 
Connecticut H 6621 1999 
Connecticut SSB 733 2003 
Connecticut H 6428 2003 
Connecticut Docket 03-10-19 2004 
Connecticut Docket 04-02-07 2004 
Connecticut H 7501 2005 
Connecticut Docket 05-04-16 2005 
Connecticut Docket 04-01-13 2005 
Connecticut S 212 2006 
Connecticut Docket 05-07-19 2006 
Connecticut Docket 04-01-12RE01 2006 
Connecticut H 8006 2007 
Connecticut H 7432 2007 
Connecticut Docket 07-06-07 2007 
Connecticut Docket 03-12-10RE01 2007 
Connecticut Docket 05-04-16RE01 2007 
Connecticut Docket 07-08-11 2008 
Connecticut SB 1243 2011 
Delaware SB 74 2005 
Delaware Docket 56, Order 6793 2005 
Delaware Docket 56, Order 6885 2006 
Delaware Docket 56, Order 6931 2006 
Delaware Title 7 DNREC 106 2006 
Delaware SB 19/House Amendment 
1 
2007 
Delaware Docket 56, Order 7276 2007 
Delaware SB 328 2008 
Delaware Order 7377 2008 
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State Document Year 
Delaware Order 7494 2008 
Delaware SB 173 2009 
Delaware Order 7699 2009 
Delaware SS 1 for SB 119 2010 
Delaware SB 124 2011 
Delaware CDR 26-3000-3008 2005-2011 
Hawaii SLH 2001, Act 272/HB 173 2001 
Hawaii SB 2474 2004 
Hawaii SB 3185 2006 
Hawaii Order 23191 2007 
Hawaii Decision and Order 23912 2007 
Hawaii Memorandum of 
Understanding 
2008 
Hawaii HB 1464 2009 
Illinois Illinois Resource 
Development and Energy 
Security Act/ Public Act 
92-0012 
2001 
Illinois Public Act 095-0481 2007 
Illinois SB 1987/Public Act 095-
1027 
2009 
Illinois Public Utilities Act 2009 
Illinois Public Act 96-0033 2009 
Illinois Public Act 096-0159 2009 
Illinois ICC Order 09-0342 2009 
Illinois ICC Docket 08-0519 Final 
Order 
2009 
Illinois ICC Docket 09-0373 2009 
Illinois 83 Illinois Administrative 
Code, Part 455 
2010 
Illinois HB 1458 2011 
Illinois HB 1865 2011 
Illinois SB 1652 2011 
Indiana SB 251 2011 
Iowa Iowa Code 476.41 1983 
Iowa Chapter 1252, Sections 31-
33 
1990 
Iowa Chapter 1017 1992 
Iowa Chapter 1163, Section 97 1992 
Iowa Chapter 1166, Section 1 1992 
Iowa Chapter 1196, Section 11 1996 
Iowa Chapter 4, Sections 11 and 
36 
2001 
Iowa Chapter 1109, Section 4 2002 
Iowa Chapter 29, Sections 2-6 2003 
Iowa Executive Order 41 2005 
Iowa Utilities Board Order, 
Docket AEP-07-1 
2007 
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State Document Year 
Iowa Chapter 1032, Section 106 2008 
Iowa Chapter 1126, Section 31 2008 
Iowa Chapter 1128, Sections 14-
15 
2008 
Iowa Chapter 1133, Sections 6 
and 9 
2008 
Iowa Chapter 1191, Section 129 2008 
Iowa Chapter 148, Sections 1-2 2009 
Iowa Chapter 1061, Section 180 2010 
Iowa IAC 199-15.11 2010 
Iowa Chapter 25, Section 125 2011 
Iowa Chapter 77, Section 1 2011 
Kansas Renewable Energy 
Standards Act 
2009 
Kansas KAR 82-16 2010 
Maine LD 1804/ Public Law 316 1997 
Maine Docket 97-584 1998 
Maine Docket 2002-494, Chapter 
311 
2003 
Maine Docket 2004-505 2004 
Maine LD 2041 2006 
Maine Public Law 403 2007 
Maine Docket 2007-391 2007 
Maine LD 2283 2008 
Maine LD 1810 2010 
Maine Public Act 413 2011 
Maryland HB 1308/SB 869 2004 
Maryland PSC Comar 20-61 2005 
Maryland HB 1016/SB 595 2007 
Maryland HB 375/SB 209 2008 
Maryland HB 368/SB 268 2008 
Maryland HB 1166/SB 348 2008 
Maryland HB 471/SB 277 2010 
Maryland HB 1121/SB 690 2011 
Maryland HB 933/SB 717 2011 
Massachusetts Chapter 164 Acts of 1997 1997 
Massachusetts 225 CMR 14.00 2002 
Massachusetts Policy Statement on the 
RPS Eligibility of Retooled 
Biomass Plants 
2005 
Massachusetts Green Communities 
Act/SB 2768 
2008 
Massachusetts 225 CMR 15.00 2009 
Massachusetts 220 CMR 17.00 Emergency 2010 
Massachusetts 225 CMR 14.00 2010 
Michigan Public Act 295 2008 
Michigan PSC Order U-15800 2008 
Michigan PSC Order U-15900 2010 
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State Document Year 
Minnesota Radioactive Waste 
Management Facility 
Authorization Law (SF 
1706) 
1994 
Minnesota Docket RP-98-32 1999 
Minnesota SF 0772 2001 
Minnesota HF 9 2003 
Minnesota Docket CI-03-869 2004 
Minnesota SF 4 2007 
Minnesota Docket CI-04-1616 (1) 2007 
Minnesota Docket CI-04-1616 (2) 2007 
Minnesota SF 2996 2008 
Minnesota Docket CI-04-1616 2008 
Minnesota SF 1197 2011 
Missouri SB 54 2007 
Missouri SB 1181 2008 
Missouri Proposition C 2008 
Missouri 4 CSR 240-20.100 2010 
Missouri SB 795 2011 
Montana SB 415 2005 
Montana HB 681 2007 
Nevada 1997 Restructuring 
Legislation 
1997 
Nevada SB 372 2001 
Nevada NAC 704.8831-704.8893 2002 
Nevada AB 296 2003 
Nevada AB 429 2003 
Nevada NAC 704.8901-704.8939 2004 
Nevada AB 3 2005 
Nevada Docket 05-7050 2006 
Nevada AB 1 2007 
Nevada SB 358 2009 
Nevada AB 150 2011 
Nevada NAC 7704.8831-704.8939 Ongoing 
New Hampshire HB 873 2007 
New Hampshire HB 1268 2008 
New Hampshire PUC Chapter 2500 2008 
New Jersey Electric Discount and 
Energy Competition Act 
1999 
New Jersey BPU Solar Transition 
Order 
2007 
New Jersey SB 2936 2008 
New Jersey AB 3520 2010 
New Jersey SB 2036 2010 
New Jersey NJAC 14:8 Ongoing 
New Mexico PRC Case Number 3619 2002 
New Mexico SB 43 2004 
New Mexico 17.9.572 NMAC 2004 
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State Document Year 
New Mexico SB 418 2007 
New Mexico 17.9.572 NMAC 2007 
New Mexico SB 549 2011 
New York Case 03-E-0188 9/24/2004 2004 
New York Case 03-E-0188 
12/16/2004 
2004 
New York Case 03-E-0188 4/14/2005 2005 
New York Case 03-E-0188 
10/31/2005 
2005 
New York Case 03-E-0188 11/2/2005 2005 
New York Case 03-E-0188 1/26/2006 2006 
New York Case 03-E-0188 6/28/2006 
(1) 
2006 
New York Case 03-E-0188 6/28/2006 
(2) 
2006 
New York Case 03-E-0188 6/28/2006 
(3) 
2006 
New York Case 03-E-0188 2009 
New York Case 03-E-0188 1/8/2010 2010 
New York Case 03-E-0188 2/16/2010 2010 
New York Case 03-E-0188 4/2/2010 
(1) 
2010 
New York Case 03-E-0188 4/2/2010 
(2) 
2010 
New York Case 03-E-0188 12/3/2010 2010 
North Carolina SB 3 2007 
North Carolina 04 NCAC 11 R08-64 2008 
North Carolina SB 90 2009 
North Carolina SB 886 2010 
North Carolina NCUC Order, Docket E-100 
Subsection 113 
2010 
North Carolina SB 75 2011 
North Dakota Administrative Code 69-
09-08 
2006 
North Dakota HB 1506 2007 
North Dakota PSC Order, Case PU-07-
318 
2008 
Ohio SB 221 2008 
Ohio ORC 4928.64 2008 
Ohio OAC 4901: 1-40 2009 
Ohio SB 232 2010 
Oklahoma HB 3028 2010 
Oregon SB 838 2007 
Oregon OAR 330-160-0015 to 330-
160-0050 
2008 
Oregon HB 3039 2009 
Oregon HB 3674 2010 
Oregon PUC Order 10-200 2010 
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State Document Year 
Pennsylvania SB 1030 2004 
Pennsylvania AEPS Implementation 
Order 1 
2005 
Pennsylvania AEPS Implementation 
Order 2 
2005 
Pennsylvania Docket M-00051865 2005 
Pennsylvania Docket M-00051865 (1) 2006 
Pennsylvania Docket M-00051865 (2) 2006 
Pennsylvania Docket L-00050174 2006 
Pennsylvania Docket L-00050175 2006 
Pennsylvania HB 1203 2007 
Pennsylvania HB 2200 2008 
Pennsylvania Docket L-00060180 2008 
Pennsylvania Docket M-00051865 2009 
Pennsylvania Docket M-2009-2093383 2009 
Rhode Island HB 7375 2004 
Rhode Island Docket 3659 2005 
Rhode Island CRIR 90-060-015 2007 
South Dakota HB 1123 2008 
South Dakota Docket RM11-011 Final 
Rules 
2011 
Texas SB 7 1999 
Texas PUCT Substantive Rule 
25.173 
1999 
Texas PUCT Project 26848 2003 
Texas PUCT Project 28407 2004 
Texas SB 20 2005 
Texas HB 1090 2007 
Texas PUCT Project 33492 2007 
Utah SB 202 2008 
Utah SB 99 2009 
Utah HB 192 2010 
Utah  HB 228 2010 
Utah SB 104 2010 
Vermont 30 VSA 8001 2005 
Vermont CVR 30 000 054.4.300 2006 
Vermont SB 209 2008 
Vermont Act 159 2010 
Vermont Act 47 2011 
Virginia Code 56-585.2 2007 
Virginia HB 1994 2009 
Washington Initiative 937 2006 
Washington Energy Independence Act 2006 
Washington WAC 480-109 2007 
Washington WAC 194-37 2008 
West Virginia Code 24-2F-1/HB 103 2009 
West Virginia SB 350 2010 
West Virginia Case 11-0249-E-P 2011 
	  203	  
State Document Year 
Wisconsin Act 204 1998 
Wisconsin Act 9 1999 
Wisconsin Act 141 2006 
Wisconsin SB 273 2010 
Wisconsin SB 81 2011 
Wisconsin CR 10-147 2011 
 
In table 33, I finally display total cases of innovation and emulation broken down by 
actor. 
 
TABLE 33: Policy Adoption Innovations and Emulations by Actor 
 
 Legislature Regulatory 
Agency 
Ballot Initiative 
Innovation 91 19 0 
Emulation 405 68 26 
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